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October 4, 1988

Mary T. Noonan
Clerk of Court
Utah Court of Appeals
400 Midtown Plaza
230 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Re: Kathleen Hamby and
the State of Utah v.
Gail Jacobson, No.880026-A
Dear M s , Noonan:
Pursuant to Rule 24(j) Citation of Supplemental Authorites, I
am submitting the following authorites:
1. A copy of Rule 405-1-5, Name of Child, Utah Bureau of Vital
Statistics, and a copy of a letter dated February 19, 1988 from
John E. Brockert, Director, Bureau of Vital Records making reference
to the same.
The rules are discussed in the Appellant's Reply Brief, page 9a,
and would be included in the Addendum of the same. The rules are
also discussed in Ms. Hamby's Brief. The enclosed would have been
included on page 4 of the same. The rules are discussed at page 41
of Ms. Hamby f s Brief. The revised rules would have been included in
the Addendum to the Appellant's principal brief.
2. Nellis v. Pressman, 282 A. 2d 539 (D.C. App. 1971)
Nellis v. Pressman is cited in the article, "The Right of Women
To Name Their Children," which is included in the Addendum of Appellant's
initial brief, but not in the text. At oral argument it was referred
to with respect to the recognition of the custodial parent's right to
select the name(s) of children when the custodial parent is the exhusband. On page 547 of the decision, it is written:
"The impasses continued and on June 17, 1968 he brought an action
in the Court of General Sessions asking that permanent custody Of
the children be awarded to him...In this posture of the case it
was scarcely necessary to put the mother on notice again that he
was protesting her discontinuance of the use of his name by the
children, for if he had succeeded in obtaining custody of them
he obviously would have remedied the matter himself." (emphasis
added).
Also mentioned in oral argument was the passage in Nellis v. Pressman
on page 545 wherein the Court said:
"We can only doubt that what the father apparently hoped to

achieve by way of an injunction—assurance of a good and
lasting relationship with his children—is in the power of
any court to give."
3. On page A-ll of Ms. Hamby's Reply brief, the Respondent's
attorney articulated his position with respect to the male right
to name marital children:
Mr. Taylor: The child before the Court, because the support for
the child before the Court and the legitimacy of the child, I
think the child has been legitimized by the parents and by
acknowledgment of both parties, that the child is, at the child's
age, in that event it's just as if the child was born and conceived after wedlock. So if she chooses to call the child
Hamby, I don't think that that would preclude the Court from
ordering at this time that this is common law right to have the
child to bear his name if he's going to be ordered to support and
be determined to be the father of the child..." (emphasis added).
Further, at page A-28 of the Addendum of Ms.v.Hamby's Reply brief,
the transcriptof the lower court reads:
"Mr. Taylor:. .. it' s generally recognized that the father who is
ordinarily the objecting party has a protectable interest in
having his child bear the paternal surname in accordance with
the usual custom, even though the mother may have been awarded
the custody of the child...11
And, further, on page A-30 of the Addendum to the Reply brief,
the Court articulated its acceptance of a paternal right:
"The Court:...that is this man is going to be ordered to support
the child, acknowledge paternity, accept the responsibility for
the child, be given the right to visitation and all of the normal
things that the father has, that merely because the child was
born prior to wedlock should not preclude the Court from ordering
that that child bear this man's surname, because he's going to
have all of the burden of responsibility." (emphasis added)
At page A-32, the Court again articulated its understanding of
the "common law" as reason to name the child with the paternal name:
"The Court...And the child to be born would have the, under the
common law, would normally be known as Jacobson."
The transcript came up in oral argument in connection with the
reasons for the lower court's actions.
4. In re Kidder,

A. 2d

(Me. 1988).

This case discusses the issue of naming in a joint custody
situation. Counsel for Respondent brought up the issue in oral
argument. In the Addendum of Ms. Hamby's initial brief, at page
147 (footnote 222) and at page 113 (footnote 59) the issue is
addressed.

5. Fla. Stat, sec. 382.013 (1987) and letter dated March 16, 1988
to me from Richard T. Dowries, Vital Records Administrator for the
State of Florida.
This new statute was mentioned in oral argument with reference
to the presumption that the custodial parent name children pursuant
to their best interests.

I am sending you an original and five copies of this letter and
enclosures. By this letter I am certifying that I am also sending
copies of the same to all counsel involved, Mssrs. Taylor, Wardle
and Gamon, and the Corporon and Williams law firm.
Thank you.

cc: Kathleen Hamby
Corporon and Williams
Ray Gamon
Richard Taylor
Lynn Wardle

^ « i
Norman H. Bangerter
Governor

Suzanne Dandoy, M.D., M.RH.
Executive Director

February 19, 1988

Priscilla Ruth MacDougall
Attorney at Law
346 Kent Lane
Madison, Wisconsin 53713
Dear Ms. MacDougall:
This is in response to your letter of February 10, 1988. The proposed
guideline regarding naming of children has been incorporated in the revised
vital statistics rules, which became effective March 17, 1987. The rule reads
as follows: "A newborn child's name should be recorded on the birth
certificate as determined by it's parents.
If the parents disagree on a
child's name and they have never married each other or are separated or
divorced, the custodial parent shall determine the child's name.
If the
parents are married to each other and cannot agree on a child's name, it may
be left blank on the birth certificate and added later by an Affidavit to
Amend a Record or by court order."
When adding the name by affidavit, we try to obtain the affidavit of both
parents.
However, if one of the parents is deceased or has deserted the
custodial parent, we do allow the affidavit to be signed by some other
knowledgeable person.
If I can be of further assistance, please let me know.
Sincerely,

John E. Brockert, Director
Bureau of Vital Records
(801) 538-6186

Office of Administration and Planning
288 North 1460 West • PO Box 16700 • Salt Lake City Utah 841)6-0700 • (801) 538-6125

State Registrar shall delegate such duties and responsibilities for
local registrars as is deemed necessary to insure the efficient
1,0
tfon Qf tfoe system of vital statistics. Ihese may include, but are not
ffwlted tot the following:
la)
The receipt and processing of birth, death, and spontaneous fetal
death records. This includes the receipt of these records from the person
responsible
for
filing
the
record,
checking
it
for
accuracy
and
completeness, making a local copy, and forwarding the original to the State
Registrar at least once a week.
(b)
Issuance of certified copies of birth, death, and fetal death
certificates
after
receiving
written
authorization
from
the
State
Registrar. The records from which the certified copies aro issued shall be
the local copy of the original certificate.
A H forms and procedures used
to issue the copies shall be provided or approved by the State Registrar.
(c)
Issuance
of burial-transit
and disinterment
permits and
other
designated forms as prescribed by regulation or direction of the State
Registrar.
(d) Acting as the agent of the State Registrar in their designated area
and providing assistance to physicians, hospitals, funeral directors, and
others in matters related to the system of vital statistics.
The State Registrar, with the approval of the Department, shall determine
the responsibilities and duties of each office independently.
R405-1-5 Name of Child
A new born child's name should be recorded on the birth certificate as
determined by its 1 parents.
If the parents disagree on the child's name and
they have never married each other or ara
separated or divorced, the
custodial parent shall determine the child's name.
If the parents are
married to each other and cannot agree on the child's name, it may be left
blank on the birth certificate and added later by an Affidavit to Amend a
Record or by court order.
KEY:
Vital
Children
1987

Statistics,

Standards,

Appointment

to

Office,

Custody

of

26-2-3
26-2-4

R405-2 INFANTS OF UNKNOWN PARENTAGE; FOUNDLING REGISTRATION
R405-2-1
Ihe
report
for
an
infant
of
unknown
parentage
shall
be
registered on a foundling certificate of live birth and shall, unless more
definitive information is available:
(a) Show the date and place of finding
(b)
Show the signature and title of the custodian in lieu of the
attendant during delivery.
If the child
is identified and a certificate of birth is found or
obtained, the foundling certificate shall be placed in a sealed file and
shall not be open to inspection, except on the order of a court.
KEY:
1987

Vital Statistics, Custody of Children
26-2-6

STATE OF FLORIDA

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES

March 1 6 , 1988

Ms. Priscilla Ruth MacDougall
Attorney at Law
346 Kent Lane
Madison, Wisconsin 53713
Dear Ms. MacDougall:
Mr. Boorde has asked me to reply to your letter of March 9.
Enclosed are copies of 382.013 Florida Statutes and an excerpt
from our handbook about disagreements on the naming of children
on birth records.
We will not accept a birth record without a surname except for
foundlings, and we handle disagreements as specified in the
enclosure.
We enclose a printout of 1986 (our first) most popular given
names, but we haven't done anything about surnames.
Please let us know if we can be of further service.
Sincerely,

/e^t+ay*?^ ^ £ & * 2 £ —
Richard T. Downes
Vital Records Administrator
Office of Vital Statistics
(904) 359-6920
RTD
Enclosures: 3

P.O. BOX 21Q • JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA 32231
BOB MARTINEZ, GOVERNOR

GREGORY L. COLER, SECRETARY

382

VITAL STATISTICS

382.013 Certificate of birth; registration.—
(1) A certificate of birth for each live birth which occurs in this state shall be registered within 5 days after
such birth with the local registrar of the district in which
the birth occurred and shall be filed by the state office
if it has been completed and registered in accordance
with this section.
(2) If a birth occurs in an institution or en route thereto, the physician, midwife, or person in attendance during or immediately after the delivery shall provide the
person in charge of the institution or his designated representative the medical information required by the certificate, within 48 hours after the birth. The person in
charge of the institution or his designated representative shall obtain the other information required by the
certificate and shall prepare the certificate, certify to the
facts of birth, and register the certificate with the local
registrar.
(3) If a birth occurs outside an institution and the
child is not taken to an institution immediately after delivery, the certificate shall be prepared and registered
within 5 days by one of the following persons in the indicated order of priority:
(a) The physician or midwife in attendance during or
immediately after the birth or, in the absence of such a
person;
(b) Any other person in attendance during or immediately after the birth or, in the absence of such a person;
(c) The father or the mother or, in the absence of the
father and the inability of the mother, the person in
charge of the premises where the birth occurred.
(4) If a birth occurs on a moving conveyance and the
child is first removed from the conveyance in this state,
the birth shall be registered in this state, and the place
to which the child is first removed shall be considered
the place of birth. The birth certificate shall be registered
in accordance with subsection (2) or subsection (3),
whichever is applicable.

F.S. 1987

(5)(a) If the mother is married at the time of birth, the
mother and the father as entered on the birth certificate
shall select the given names and surname of trie .Child
If both parents will have custody of the child,'otherwise
the parent who will have custody shall select the given
names and surname of the child.
(b) If the mother is not married at the time of birth",
the person who will have custody of the child shall select
the given names and surname of the child.
. \ \
(6)(a) If the mother is married at the time of birth* the
name of her husband shall be entered on the certificate
as the father of the child unless paternity has been determined otherwise by a court of competent jurisdiction.
(b) If the mother is not married at the time of birth,
the name of the father shall not be entered on the certificate of birth without the consenting affidavit of the mother and the person to be named as the father, unless paternity is determined by a court of competent jurisdiction.
(c) In any case in which paternity of a child is determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, the name of
the father and surname of the child shall be entered on
the certificate of birth in accordance with the finding and
order of the court. If the court fails to specify a surname
for the child, then the surname shall be entered in accordance with paragraph (5)(a) or paragraph (5)(b),
whichever is applicable.
(d) If the father is not named on the certificate of
birth, no other information about the father shall be entered on the certificate.
(7) At least one of the parents of the child shall attest to the accuracy of the personal data entered on the
certificate in time to permiUhe registration of the certificate within the 5 days prescribed herein.
History.—s. 13. eft. 689Z 1915: AGS 2083; CGI 3283; s. 1. ch. 77-319: j . 150.
ch. 79-400: s. 11. ch. 87-387.
Not*.—Former *. 382.16.

In cases where the mother and father have joint custody of the
hild and disagree on the selection of a surname, the surname
elected by the father and surname selected by the mother shall
oth be entered on the certificate, separated by a hyphen, with the
elected names entered in alphabetic order. The surname so
elected may be amended before the child's seventh birthday by
ayment of the required fee and by a joint written agreement of
oth parents submitted to the department listing the agreed upon
urname, or upon request of a parent subsequently awarded sole
arental responsibility of the child by a court of competent
urisdiction.

Changes of the surname after the seventh birthday

ill require the same documentation as other surname changes.
In cases where the mother and father have joint custody of the
hild and disagree on the selection of given names, the given names
n the certificate shall not be entered until a joint written
greement between both parents is submitted to the department
isting the agreed upon given names or selection of given names is
ade by a parent who is awarded sole parental responsibility of the
hild by a court of competent jurisdiction.

Parties to the Proceeding in the Trial Court
1. Kathleen Hamby.
Known for a brief time by the name Jacobson, Appellant Kathleen
Hamby!s divorce action in the trial court was entitled: Kathleen
Jacobson, and the State of Utah, by and through Utah State Department
of Social Services, Case No. 67,957 (Fourth Judicial District Court,
Utah County).
2. State of Utah Department of Social Services.
The Utah Department of Social Services moved to become a party
plaintiff in the trial court proceedings because the Respondent
Gail Jacobson owed the State money for child support. The Department
is named in the caption but has not as yet participated in the
instant appeal.
3. Gail Jacobson.
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Issues Presented for Review
1. Whether the trial court had jurisdication pursuant to its
authority over the care, custody and control of children conferred by Title 30, Chapter 3 of the Utah Code (particularly
U.C.A., 30-3-5 and 30-3-10) to determine the surnames of l)the
child born prior to Ms. Hamby's marriage to Mr. Jacobson, and
2) the child born subsequent to Ms. Hamby's divorce from Mr.
Jacobson.
The trial court's ruling on this issue is confusing. The
court entertained jurisdiction in March, 1985 to determine the
surname of the child not yet born at the time of divorce but
declined at that time to change the surname of the child born
prior to the marriage. The judge told the parties that he would
entertain name change "applications" from both of them if filed
within 30 days of the birth of the child to be born following
the divorce. The applications thus filed, however, did not comply
with the statutory requirements of Utah's name change statute,
U.S.C. 42-1-1--42-1-3. In the case of the newborn child who had
not been a resident of the county for a year as required by such
statute, the name change statute could not be applicable.
The Appellant Kathleen Hamby believes that the trial court had
jurisdiction to determine the names of both her infant children
in March, 1985 as well as after the birth of her child in April,
1985 pursuant to its continuing jurisdiction over the care, custody
and control of children pursuant to a divorce action.

-6-

1. Whether the trial court erred in ordering that both of the
children in Ms. Hambyrs custody should bear the paternal surname
rather than the name Ms. Hamby, as custodial parent, determined
to be in the children's best interests--her own--in view of the
evidence of record, the legal rights, privileges and responsibilities
of the custodial parent, and the mandates of equal protection and
due process guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the State of
Utah and the United States?
Ms. Hamby appealed the decision of the trial court because she
believes the trial court erred egregiously.

-7-

Determinative Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, Rules and Regulations
Constitutional Provisions-Utah
Article I, section 1[Inherent and inalienable rights]
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and
defend their lives and liberties: to acquire, possess and
protest property; to worship according to the dictates of their
consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and
petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that
right.
Article I, section 2 [All political power inherent in the people]
All political power is inherent in the people; and all free
governments are founded on their authority for their equal
protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter or
reform their government as the public welfare may require.
Article I, section 7 [Due process of law]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.
Article I, section 27 [Fundamental Rights]
Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to
the security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free
government.
Constitutional Provision-United States
Amendment XIV, section 1 [Citizenship defined; privileges of citizens]
...No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
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Statutes
U.C.A. 30-3-5. Disposition of property-Maintenance and health care
of parties and children-Court to have continuing jurisdictionCustody and visitation-Termination of alimony.
1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include
in it such orders in relation to the children, property and
parties, and the maintenance and health care of the parties,
as may be equitable. The court shall include in every decree of
divorce an order assigning responsibility for the payment
of reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of
the dependent children. If coverage is available at a reasonable
cost, the court may also include an order requiring the purchase
and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental
care insurance for those children. The court shall have continuing jurisdiction to make such subsequent changes or new
orders with respect to the support and maintenance of the parties,
the custody of the children and their support, maintenance,
and health and dental care, or the distribution of the property
as shall be reasonable and necessary. Visitation rights of
parents, grandparents, and other relatives shall take into
consideration the welfare of the child.
U.C.A. 30-3-10. Custody of children.
In any case of separation of husband and wife having minor
children, or whenever a marriage is declared void or dissolved
the court shall make such order for the future care and custody
of the minor children as it may deem just and proper. In determining custody, the court shall consider the best interests
of the child and the past conduct and demonstrated moral
standards of each of the parties. The court may inquire of the
children and take into consideration the children's desires
regarding the future custody; however, such expressed desires
shall not be controlling and the court may, nevertheless, determine the children's custody otherwise...
U.C.A. 42-1-1 to 3. Chapter 1. Change of Name.
U.C.A. 42-1-. By petition to district court-Contents.
Any natural person, desiring to change his name, may file a
petition therefor in the district court of the county where
he resides, setting forth:
1) The cause for whichthe change of name is sought.
2) The name proposed.
3) That he has been a bona fide resident of the county for the
year immediately prior to the filing of the petition.
42-1-2. Notice of hearing-Order of change.
The court shall order whay, if any, notice shall be given of
the hearing, and after the giving of such notice, if any, may
order the change of name as requested, upon proof in open court
of the allegations of the petition and that there exists proper
cause for granting the same.
-9-

42-1-3. Effect of proceedings.
Such proceedings shall in no manner affect any legal action
or proceeding then pending, or any right, title or interest
whatsoever.
Rules and Regulations
Guidelines for Reporting Name of Father and Surname of Child on
the Birth Certificate (revised October 5, 1981) by the Bureau of
Health Statistics, Utah Department of Health.
Surname of Child.
The surname to be given the child should be determined by the
parents.
A. When the mother is married it is usual for the child to
receive the surname of the husband(father). However, some
recent immigrants into the United States and some subcultures
within the nation have customs of assigning surnames which vary
from the standard American tradition. The surname given the
child should be determined by both parents. It clearly is not
mandatory that the child have the father's surname. When the
parents disagree as to the child's surname, the sole consideration
should be the best interests of the child. This may be best
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction.
Therefore, if the parents (husband and wife) are in disagreement regarding the surname of the child, it should be left blank
on the birth certificate. It can be added later when the parents
reach agreement by an affidavit to amend a record or if necessary,
by court order.
B. When the child's mother is not married, she has considerable
latitude in the name she gives the child. Even if the father
is not named on the birth certificate, the mother may give the
child a surname different than her own surname. Additionally,
the mother may name the father on the birth certificate (by
Acknowledgment of Paternity) and give the child a surname
different than the father's.
C. The parents should be advised that by giving the child a
different surname than that of the father, the birth certificate
may appear to some persons as a birth which occurred out of
wedlock.
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Statement of the Case
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings and Disposition in
the Trial Court
This case involves the right of a divorced woman, awarded and
entrusted with the sole custody of her two infant children of her
dissolved marriage, to determine the names of her children consistent with their best interests, and the right of the children
to bear names which are in their best interests.
It also involves the threshold jurisdictional question of
whether a divorce court has jurisdiction to determine the names
of children pursuant to its continuing jurisdiction over the care
and custody of children.
The case concerns the naming of two children, one born in 1983
prior to Appellant Kathleen Hamby's brief marriage to Gail Jacobson,
who was given her name, and one born in 1985, two days following
her divorce from Mr. Jacobson on the grounds of mental cruelty.
The stipulation between the parties respecting the various matters
of child custody, property distribution, etc,,included a provision:
The minor child of the parties, Kelly, does not currently
bear defendant's last name, Jacobson. Plaintiff desires
that status to continue for Kelly and also to apply to the
expected minor child. Defendant desires that both children
bear his name, Jacobson. This is the only issue remaining
over which the parties are in dispute and over which a
hearing in Open Court is desired." R. 31 (No. 10).
A hearing was held on March 14, 1985 respecting this issue at
which time former counsel for Ms. Hamby objected to the Court
taking jurisdiction to change the name of the child born in 1983.
The Fourth Judicial District Court, Judge J. Robert Bullock presiding, assumed jurisdiction to determine the name of the child
to be born and ordered that such child bear the name of the father
because a marital child

IT

under the common law, would normally
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be known" by the father's surname.
The Court further ordered that the child born prior to the
marriage continue to bear the mother's surname

unless and until

the parties brought the issue of naming to him following the
birth of the second child. The Court reserved jurisdiction to
hear the names issue but otherwise issued a final divorce decree
on April 11, 1985. In doing so he said he wojuld entertain "applications1
for name changes from both parties following] the birth of the
1985 child.
Within 30 days of the birth of the child Ms. Hamby petitioned
for a change of his name pursuant to this or^ler, and her exhusband countered with a (late) application for a name change of
the two year old. The Fourth Judicial District Court, Judge
Ray M. Harding now presiding, ruled that both children should bear
the father's surname.
The case is before the Utah Supreme Court, on appeal by Ms. Hamby
of that decision.

1
The terms "marital" and "nonmarital" are used herein instead
of "legitimate" or "illegitimate" which denote good or base
societal status as determined by males. See footnote No. l,p.91
of MacDougall, "The Right of Women To Name Their Children," 3
J. L. and Ineq. 91(1985) reproduced in the Addendum.
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Statement of the Facts
Approximately eleven years ago the Appellant Kathleen Hamby
gave birth to her first child. She gave the child, a boy, the surname which she shared with her husband, the Child's father, Hamby.
She was later divorced from the father of her first child. The
dates of her marriage to and divorce from her first husband do not
appear in the Record of this case. Ms. Hamby has sole custody of
her firstborn.
On June 14, 1983 Ms. Hamby gave birth to a child fathered by
the Respondent Gail Jacobson. She gave the c}iild the same surname
as herself and her first child, Hamby. R. 12^.
On November 29 of that year, 1983, Ms. Hainby married Mr. Jacobson.
The following October she separated from him and filed for divorce
by a complaint and amended complaint dated October 29, 1984
against him on the grounds of mental crueltyI R. 7,10.
By a Motion for Joinder of Party Plaintiff dated January 14, 1985
(R. 13) the State of Utah, Department of Social Services, asked
to become a party to the divorce action because Ms. Hamby had been
receiving public assistance. The motion was granted on February
7, 1985. R. 25. By date of February 13, 1985]the State of Utah
filed a complaint in the case against Mr. Jacobson alleging that
the defendant has failed to support his children as required by
U.C.A. 78-45-3 2and asking that the defendan-p be required to
pay back and on-going child support.

R. 27.

The Record in this case also includes a Writ of Garnishment from
the State of Utah to the Sunshine Mining Company dated July 29,
198 5 and a Garnishee Writ of Execution from the State of Utah to
2

See Roberts v. Roberts, 592 P. 2d 597 (Utah 1979) and Mecham
v. MecTTIm, 570 P. 2d 125 (Utah 1977) respecting the right of the
Department to seek reimbursement of funds paid for child support
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the Sheriff or Constable of Utah County respecting the Sunshine
Mining Company dated August 8, 1985. R. 54, 58^
During the ten-eleven months that Ms. Hamby lived with Mr.
Jacobson in marriage she used the surname Jacobson. Upon separating
from her ex-husband she reverted to her pre-marriage name which
she intends to use the rest of her natural lif^.3
A divorce was granted to Ms. Hamby on the grounds of mental
cruelty on April 11, 1985. R. 114. The decree provided for her to
formally

resume her pre-marriage name. R. 1161

2
In her Affidavit in Support of Motion for Change of Title of
Action to the Supreme Court of Utah, Ms. Hamby stated that she used
the surname Jacobson for less than a year. Since October 20, 1984
when she separated from Mr. Jacobson, she has jised the surname
Hamby which she intends to do for the remainder of her natural life.
These facts are otherwise not part of the Record in the case. The
parties stipulated to the change of title on the basis of Ms. Hamby's
affidavit.
In ordering that the child born following Ms. Hamby's divorce
should bear the paternal name ,the trial court stated as a reason
for his ruling that "Hamby is not the mother's maiden name." R. 102.
This distinction is misguided as discussed, infra. Ms. Hamby
considers Hamby her name jiast as Mr. Jacobson presumably considers
Jacobson his name irrespective of where he acquired it, by birth or
change of name while a minor or as an adult. Ms. Hamby assumed
the surname Hamby during a prior marriage, has used it for years,
and, as she stated in her affidavit to the Supreme Court, "I consider
it my name and I never intend to use any other surname than Hamby
for the remainder of my natural life."
As written in the Center for a Woman's Own Name, 1975 Supplement
to Booklet For Women Who Wish To Determine The|;r Own Names After
Marriage 6 (1975) :
"It is the position of the Center For A Woman's Own Name that
the name(s) a woman chooses to use is her own name. It may
be the name given her at birth, a name assumed during childhood,
assumed at marriage, assumed at a previous ikarriage, a hyphenated
name or a name made up by herself at any tiipe."
The term "maiden" name or "married" name is not used herein except
in reference to the trial court's usage of the term. It refers to the
name a woman uses just prior to her first marriage when she presumably
is a "maiden'.' Identifying a woman by her sexual and marital status is
inappropriate. The terms"own" name, or simply "name" are used instead,
or tne antiquated terms are used within quotes^
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Twtr days after her divorce was granted Ms.riambygave birth
to her third son, a child fathered by Mr. Jacobson.
The divorce decree issued by Judge R. Rohjert Bullock ordered,
with respect to the children's names:
11. The surname of the minor child, Kelly, shall remain Hamby
at this time. If Defendant desires that njame to be changed to
Jacobson then he may file a Petition for change of name in
this matter within 30 days after the birth of the minor child
expected in April, 1985. Plaintiff may respond and/or object
to any such Petition thus filed.
12. The minor child expected in April 19815 shall bear the
surname Jacobson. If plaintiff desires th^t name to be changed
to Hamby then she may file a Petition for change of name in
within 30 days after the birth of said chtld. Defendant may
respond and/or object to any such petition thus filed.
An evidentiary hearing on the children's Barnes was held before
the judge on March 14, 1985. Mr. Jacobson did not contest the
divorce or the award of sole custody of the two children to Ms.
Hamby. He did not appear at the hearing.
Prior to the hearing the parties had stipulated that the only
issue reamining between the parties was that of the children's
names and had asked the Court to hear the is^ue.
Mr. Jacobson did not attend the evidentiaitv hearing of March
14, 1985? according to his lawyer because a jdb came through. At
the hearing it came out that since Ms. Hamby had separated from
Mr. Jacobson in October, 1984, he had had no association with the
child born in 1983. R. 140.
Ms. Hamby testified that Mr. Jacobson was Verbally and physica
abusive !,to all of the children in our home," that he is a drunk
("He's drunk more often than he's sober") and that he "wouldn't
work." R. 127, She

testified that Mr. Jacobson had hit the baby

born before the marriage, causing the child t0 lose the upward
motion in his left eye. R. 128. She mentionedithat he had a reputation in the community in which she lives ior
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being a drinker

and fighter in town. T. 133-134.
Ms. Hamby testified that, as custodial parent of her children,
she felt she should make the decisions respe|<cting their names
while the children are young. At the time o£ the hearing, her
first child was 10 years old and bore the name Hamby; her second
child, who was almost two years old, bore the name Hamby; she
wished her third child, who was not yet born, to also bear the
family name. She testified that she wanted the children to bear
her name for their benefit:
M

Yes. I have a lot of reasons. The main ope is for, are for
the benefit of the children. If the children donTs have the
same last name in the family I feel that it makes more insecurity, less family closeness. Mr. Jacopson has put me in
a position now to raise three children by myself, because
it's his choice not to be a husband that |I can stay with.
And when I have to raise three children I need the best
circumstances to raise those kids under that's_ rpossible;
, .and
I feel that having my whole family have tjie same last name
brings the family closer together, there yill be a lot less
questions brought up at an earlier date fbr those little
babies. They won't be wondering why their name is different
until they are old enough to discuss it. R. 131-132.
Ms. Hamby futher testified that as the children get older fTif
they make the decision that they want their father's name, if he
has been coming around and seeing them and b^ing a father to them.
I would never object to my children having tjieir own way when they
are old enough to make a decision like that.f R. 141-142.
Ms. Hamby's conclusion that the family unit which she heads
should bear the same surname came as a result of a great deal of
thought and her own life experience. She spoke with several people
about it and reflected on her personal experience of having grown
up in a household with different names following divorce.
ff

I was, also, raised in a broken home witlk a different last
name and saw the affects[sic] of it. Even when you are happy
in a broken home, when you come home with a child as a friend
and you introduce your mother with a different name, your friend
asks you: why does your mother have a different name, is she
really your mother, or things like that. And, so that kids
begin to wonder who their mother and father is.
-16-

And I feel that it's just the security onl the children.
It's not an issue here I'm not here to argue about to hurt
Gail Jacobson or anything also. His name fioes carry around
stigma." R. 133.
As Ms. Hamby summarized her position with) respect to her right,
as a matter of her childrearing responsibilities,to determine
her children's names while they are young:
Q: But you want to make that decision for them now?
A. Yes, I do. I have custody of them, and I'm their mother. R. 141.
Following Ms. Hamby's testimony, a school psychologist, Gaylor
Lester Downing, testified that in his opinion family identity
is somewhat disrupted if the family unit living together following
a divorce has two different surnames:
"For example, I've worked with one boy wh<bse parents are
divorced, and he will go through periods when he's more
happy with his dad so he'll take on his dad's name, and there
will be some problems there,and so he'll go more in with
his mom and he'll take his mom's name. And it will create
uncertainty in his own mind as to who he j.s and where
he is and what he ought to be doing. Because attached to
that name is also the values that go alont with the parent
who also has that name." R. 146.
Mr. Downing, in answer to a question posed by Mr. Jacobson's
counse J., responded:
Q: You are certainly not advocating in all circumstances that
the name of the father be changed to that of the mother in
case of a divorce, are you?
A. I think it should always be considered on an individual
basis. R. 146.
At the hearing Mr. Jacobson's counsel contended that a man
has a right under the common law to have children he sires bear
his name unless there be demonstrated an overriding benefit
to thecontrary, and that if the man has legal responsibility to
a nonmarital child that he should have the right to name the child.
R. 149.
Mr. Jacobson was ordered to pay $80 a montth for each child
pursuant to the stipulation of the parties. Tfhe State of Utah
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appeared at the hearing by its counsel Ray Eh Gammon and
stated that as of that date Mr.Jacobson had paid back money he
owed the State for child support. R. 149.
On May 13, 1985 Ms. Hamby petitioned the Fourth Judicial District
Court pursuant to its ruling,for a change of surname of the
thild born on April 13, 1985 (Kevin). On May 21, 1985 the Respondent
petitioned for a change of name for the child born on June 14,
1983 (Kelly). Ms. Hamby objected to the untimely filing of her exhusband's petition, but the Court heard both petitions and decided the issue as to both children's names in favor of Ms.Hamby's
ex-husband.
The matter was decided by Judge Ray M. Harding on the evidence
presented to Judge Bullock on March 14, 1985, an unwritten
4
stipulation, and briefs of the parties.
Ms. Hamby made this appeal to the Supreme Court of Utah.

A

The Reply Memorandum of Gail Jacobson (R. 96) refers to a
pre-trial stipulation "that if called the father (Jacobson) would
say the interest of the children are best served if they bear
his name and that the mother (Hamby) would testify otherwise."
No written stipulation appears in the file or record to the
knowledge of the Appellant. Judge Harding referred to matters
raised at the evidentiary hearing on March 14, 1985 as well as
to facts not adduced anywhere in the Record of this case.
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Summary of Argument
The trial court's imposition on the custodial parent of its
own judgment that the two infant children in her custody should
bear the surname of the noncustodial parent constitutes gross
and reversible error.
As more and more women do not change their surnames because
of marriage and/or revert to their pre-marriage names when they
divorce at the same time as courts and legislatures have all but
abolished the tender years presumption as an absolute legal
standard by which to award custody of children, courts across the
nation are being faced with the situation of custodial mothers
seeking to name their children in their custody with their own
names, hyphenated names, or other surnames which differ from the
patronymic.
This case is typical of those coming before trial courts today.
It is, consequently, a case which the Supreme Court of Utah should
examine closely in order to render the requisite guidelines to
lower courts faced with disputes between custodial and noncustodial
parents of newborns and infant children.

I

Where childrsn are infants or very young-i-and in their mother's
custody--in contrast

to where children are older, were originally

given their fathers' names which their mothers also used, and
lived in a family unit with both parents for a substantial period
of time--a growing number are ruling in favor of the custodial
mother's choice of name.
Most courts recognize the jurisdiction of divorce courts to
determine disputes between custodial and noncustodial parents
over the naming of marital children. The Appellant in this case
believes that the trial courts of Utah have the jurisdiction
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pursuant to U.C.A. 30-3-5 and 30-3-10. Appelllant would like
clarification on this point from the Supreme Court of Utah.
The trial court erred in not recognizing the presumption
that a custodial parent acts in his/her children's best interests
in all matters of childrearing, including the naming of children,
absent proof to the contrary, and in failing to put this burden
on the noncustodial father to prove that Ms. Hamby was abusing
her custodial parental responsibilities.
In ruling as it did the trial court failejd to discard as a
relic of days past the now legally impermissible superior right
of men over women to name marital children v^hich was established
in the cases of older children originally given their fathers1
surname and which has, even under the caselaw thus developed,
no applicability to cases involving newborn or infant children.
The trial court's stated reasons for finding for the father
are contrary to the evidence and are based on legally impermissible
or incorrect criteria.
The trial court should be reversed with instructions to the
trial court to recognize the right of the custodial parent of
newborn or infant or very young children to ^iame the children in
his/her custody consistent with California Supreme Court Justice
Mosk's concurring opinion in the case of In re Schiffman, 28 Cal.
3d 640, 620 P. 2d 579, 169 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1980).
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I. Introduction and Historial Perspective on the Common Law of
Names and the Right of Women To Name Themselves and Their Children
The instant case is typical of cases occurring in trial courts
across the nation. As a logical outgrowth of the efforts of women
in this

century and last to secure for themselves and their

daughters and granddaughters the common law tight to determine
one's own name, women who are custodial pareiits of marital children
no longer accept that heretofore virtually unfettered right of
men to impose their surnames on marital children irrespective of
the children's best interests.
It used to be so "simple.ff In yesterday Ms. Hamby would have
retained the surname Jacobson^which she used for a period of less
than a year,following her divorce and the children in her custody
would have done likewise.
The Court is referred to the article by Ms. Hambyfs counsel,
f!

The Right of Women To Name Their Children," 3 Journal of Law and

Inequality 91(1985) which is included in the Addendum to this brief,
and respectfully requested to read it. Ms. Hamby's case arises in
the context of the movement towards equality in the area of naming
children which the article discusses.
In yesteryear women abandonned their "maiden"

names upon marry-

ing and assumed their spouses' surnames as their own. They often
ealled themselves "Mrs." plus their husbands

full names, although,

with some exceptions, for most legal purposes a married woman's
name was her own first (given) name and her chosen surname as was
and is the case with men.
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In yesteryear, when women had children,thb children were
given the family name, the surname of both of their parents*
When divorce became permissible, and then common, women reverted
to their "maiden" names if they had no children from the marriage
and retained their "married" names if they did. Women who had
children out of marriage--called "bastards" at old common law-traditionally called them by their "maiden" names although,
technically, a "bastard" did not have any name by birth alone.
S/he had to earn one by reputation.
Most men retained the family names they were born with throughout life, but a sizeable number changed their surnames for any
of a number of reasons, including to Americanize them. Slaves took
on names upon emancipation. Wives and childrlen changed their names
when the head of the family did.
Although the foregoing was the custom, it was not the common
law. In fact, at old English common law, which has been adopted by
all states except Louisiana, it was not unusually uncommon for
women of property not to change their family names upon marriage or
to retain them for some but not all purposes. Men adopted their
wives' names on occasion. Marital children sometimes took their
mothers' names, Thomas Littleton, the son of Elizabeth Littleton
and Thomas Westcott being prime examples of the same. Under the
common law names are established by usage, not statute or court
decree, and can be changed at will without judicial proceedings.
Pursuant to the common law,married women change their names by
usage, by assuming their husbands1 names after marriage. The most
common example of a common law name change is that of a woman
voluntarily assuming her spouse's name upon marriage,
-22-

"When a woman on her marriage assumes, as she usually does
in England, the surname of her husband
in substitution for
her father's name, it may be said that she acquires a new name
by repute. The change of name is in fact, rather than in law,
a consequence of the marriage.ft Husband a^id Wife. Assumption
by Wife of Husband's Name, 22 Halsbury's Laws of England,
Sec. 1018 at 633 (4th ed. 1979JT
Upon remarriage a woman could, and sometimes, did,retain the
surname she acquired during her prior marriage even over the ob*
jection of the ex-husband. See, e.g., Cowleyj v. Cowley, 1901 A.C.
450, the case most frequently cited for this point. See also,
Wood v. Detroit Edison, 409 Mich. 279, 294 N.W. 2d 571 (1980);
Welcker v. Welcker, 342 So. 2d 251 (La. AppJ 1977).
For discussions of the common law of names, see, in addition to
the article included in the Addendum, Lamber, "A Married
Woman's Surname: Is Custom Law? 1973 Wash. U.L. Q. 779 (1973);
Daum, "The Right of Married Women To Assert |Their Own Surnames,"
8 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. 63 (1974) and Comment,| "Married Women and
The Name Game," 11 Rich.L. Rev. 121 (1976). Numerous articles on
the law have appeared in recent years. In adjdition to the foregoing and those cited in the Addendum article, see the list of
law review commentary in MacDougall, "Women's, Men's and Children's
Names: An Outline and Bibliography," 7 Fam. L. Rep. 4013 (March
17, 1981).
It was in the mid nineteenth century when! the issue of the right
of a married woman to use her own name came to the fore as a
feminist issue in the United States with the example of Lucy Stone,
prominent orator and leader in the feminist and abolitionist
movements, who did not change her surname when she married Henry
B. Blackwell in 1885. In the early twentieth century, women facing
strong prejudice on the part of society against women using their
-23-

own names, organized as the Lucy Stone League. Together with
the National Woman's Party they brought numerous actions, including
a successful challenge to the Passport Office, to secure married
women the right to their own identities consistent with their
common law right to choose their own names.
The Lucy Stoners, however, did not take dn the issue of naming
children and the issue of a woman's right to name herself did not
arise frequently until the early 1970s. With the rebirth of the
feminist movement, vast numbers of women were met with societal
resistance as agencies were inundated across the land with married
women seeking to vote, run for office, drive , register their cars,
purchase property, attend educational institutions, obtain professional licenses or employment, etc., etc., etc. Courts were
flooded with cases of married or divorcing women seeking to
statutorily change their surnames. Legislatures started to repeal
divorce name change provisions which depriveld divorce courts of
jurisdiction to change women's names pursuant to divorces if they
had children. See, eij*. In re Harris, 236 S.E. 2d 426 (W. Va. 1977)
wherein the West Virginia Supreme Court reco gnized the right of a
divorced woman with children to change her njame pursuant to the
state's general name change statute despite the divorce name change
statute prohibiting her from doing so pursuant to her divorce.
A whole body of law and legal commentary, some of which has been
cited, supra, developed over the issue and today every state in
the country recognizes that married women--afrd divorced womenhave the right to not change their names at marriage or divorce
and/or to change them while married or at or after divorce irrespective of whether they have children in their custody.
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The names issue turned to the naming of children. In 1970
only North Carolina and Hawaii had statutes requiring newborn
marital children to bear the paternal name on their birth
certificates.Both of these statutes were invalidated as unconstitutional restraints on parents1 liberty to rear their
children. Jech v. Burch, 466 F. Supp. 714 (D. Hawaii 1979);
O'Brien v. Tilson, 523 F. Supp. 494 (E.D.N.C. 1981). See discussion, infra, respecting the fact that the section of a child's
surname is a constitutionally protected childrearing right.
Three other states passed similar laws in the 1970s. In Sydney
v. Pingree, 564 F. Supp. 412 (S.D. Fla. 1982), Florida's statute
was invalidated. Louisiana and New Hampshire repealed and revised
their statutes, New Hampshire adopting as a standard for-resolving
disputes over newborn's names, the right of the custodial parent
to select the name.

N.H.Rev. Stat. Ann., sec. 126.6-A(I) (a)(1984).

State courts affirmed that under the common law the State makes
no requirement as to how minors should be named. In the country's
most inclusive case on the common law of names--it involved
married women's names, children's names, divorced women's names,
etc.--the Massachusetts Supreme Court wrote that the common law
principle of freedom of choice in the matter of names "extends
to the name chosen by a married couple for their child."
Secretary of the Commonwealth v. City Clerk of Lowell, 373 Mass.
178, 190, 366 N.E. 2d 717, 722(1977). See also Doe v. Dunning,
87 Wash. 2d 30, 549 P. 2d 1 (1976).
Attorneys general and state registrars o£ vital statistics
reaffirmed that parents could name their children as they pleased
absent an express statute to the contrary.
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With the right of parents in agreement to name their children
as they pleased, litigation developed in the area of parental
disputes over children's names following divjorce. Disputes between
remarried women seeking to give their older children the surnames
of their new husbands are well known to the courts. The language
quoted in cases to the effect that the male |has a "time-honored
right" or "natural right" or that there is d "preference" for the
rarelV
male name, and that a child's name will^be changed over the objection of the natural father all comes from this kind of traditional
case:
1. Woman assumes husband's surname at marriage.
2. Husband and Wife have children who are given the family name.
3. Husband and Wife live together in a family unit with the
children, all using the same last name.
4. Husband and Wife divorce, Wife gets custody of the children
and retains the family name along witl^ the children.
5. Wife remarries and assumes her new husband's surname.
6. Wife seeks to change the children's names to her new
marital name.
7. Ex-Husband objects and courts protect his right to insist
that the children continue to use his name which they were
given at birth and have borne all their lives instead of
permitting the children to adopt the stepfather's name,
provided that Ex-Husband is not guilty of gross misconduct or
ftas&bandonned the children to the extent that they could be
adopted from him.
Disputes of this kind still occur regularly, but a new kind of
case has arisen as a result of the new freedom women have in
realizing their common law right to name themselves and their
children. Women who have not remarried--or who have remarried
and not changed their names--have sought to name the children in
their custody with their names, usually to have the family unit
share the same name

or part of a hyphenated name.
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Ms. Hamby is representative of this new k|ind of case. The courts
are beginning to respond to the obvious need for a new way of
reviewing parental disputes in light of the [Law which has developed
over the past decade and a half. The women s|ich as Ms. Hamby are
not seeking to change the names of children to stepfathers' names.
Further, a growing number are seeking assistance from the courts
when their children are newborns, infants or very young. Often,
such as in Ms. Hambyfs case, the children have not lived with their
biological fathers at all or only for a short time.
In Jacobs v. Jacobs, 309 N.W. 2d 303 (Minh. 1981) the Minnesota
Supreme Court articulated a distinction between disputes involving
older and younger children, drawing on a distinction made in the
1975 case of Laks v. Laks, 25 Ariz. App. 58, 540 P. 2d 1277 (1975),
a case which had involved a custodial mother seeking to hyphenate
her older children's names. In Jacobs, and its companion case,
In re Saxton, 309 N.W. 2d 298 (Minn. 1981) the court articulated:
fl

We have recognized that neither parent has a superior right
to determine the initial surname of their child. No preference
is accorded to either the paternal or maternal surname...When
one parent seeks to change the surname of a child, the
other has standing to object and the resolution of the
dispute hinges on the best interests of the child...Due
deference is given, however, to the fact the child has
borne a given surname for an extended period of time.ft p. 302.
The Court then found against the mother an4 her two children,
7 and 9 who wished to bear a hyphenated name of both parents, while
stating that the children's interests would be well served by use
of either the mother's choice of name--the hyphenated name--or the
father's insistence on his name.
A review of the cases decided during the past few years demonstrates the willingness of courts to decide in favor of custodial
mothers when the children are newborn or very! young. Indeed, given
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the virtual impossibility of deciding which frame, as opposed to
which parent should decide the name, should be given a child who
is a newborn, an infant, or very young (pre-jcindergarten can be
used as a cut-off date, or three to five years), the custodial
parent presumption is becoming the obvious solution to the issue.
In his scholarly and most practical concurring opinion in the
case of In re Schiffman,28 Cal. 3d 640, 620 P. 2d 579, 169 Cal.
Rptr. 918 (1980), California Supreme Court Justice Mosk articulated
the "custodial parent presumption" whereby courts should expressly
defer to the judgment of the custodial parent with respect to
naming children as an incident of childrearijig:
"The principle that the custodial parentfehouldbe given the
choice of a newborn child's surname has been codified by the
Pennsylvania Legislature. (Pa. Code, tit. 28, sec. 1.7(b)
(1975). And as one commentator noted, 'since the court
awards custody on the basis of the child's best interest,
it can be argued that the custodial parent is acting in the
child's best interest when he or she changes its. name.1
(Comment, Surname Alternatives in Pennsylvania (1977)
82 Dick. L. Rev. 101,115-116). Thus is would seem that a
parent deemed fit to have custody ordinarily should be
deemed fit to select a name that accords ydth the child's
best interest." p. 585.
Other portions of Justice Mosk's opinion are set forth throughout this brief.
Thus, Kathleen Hamby appeals to the Supreme Court of Utah for
the benefit of this presumption with respect to her decision that
it is in her two infant children's best interests that they bear
the same surname that she and the fourth member of her household,
her eleven year old child, bear.
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II. The trial court had jurisdiction pursuant to its continuing
authority over the care, custody and control of children conferred
by Title 30, Chapter 3 of the Utah Code, to resolve the dispute
between Kathleen Hamby and Gail Jacobson oveif the naming of the
two children as part of the divorce action.
As set forth in the Statement of the Case^ supra, the jurisdictional issue arose in the trial court during the March, 1985
hearing. Although the parties had stipulated that the name was
the only unresolved issue in the divorce, Ms^ Hambyfs former
attorney questioned the trial court's authority to change the
name of the child born prior to Ms. Hamby!s Carriage to Mr. Jacobson. The District Court handled the matter by asking the parties
to file applications for changes of name within

thirty days of

the birth of the child expected in April, 19$5. He ordered the
divorce subject to the names issue being resolved at a later date.
R.152.
Utah's name change statute, U.C.A. 42-1-1 to 42-1-3, requires
that a person seeking a name change be a resident of the county
for a year prior to filing for the name change. This provision
would likewise apply to an adult seeking to change the name of
a minor. Compare In re Fletcher, 486 A. 2d 627 (Ct. 1984) and In
re Staros, 280 N.W. 2d 409 (Iowa 1979).
Pursuant to this statute neither parent cc^uld have sought a
name change for Kevin, born two days following the divorce, for
a year.
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As evidenced by the bountiful caselaw on naming children, the
overwhelming majority of courts do accept as part of their jurisdiction over the care, custody and control of children, jurisdiction
to resolve disputes between parents over their children's names.
See the compilation of cases in Annot., Rights and Remedies of
Parents Inter Se With Respect To The Names of Their Children, 92
A.L.R. 3d 1091 (1979); MacDougall, "The Righ-t of Women To Name
Their Children," Footnote No. 161, p. 135. Centra, Hurta v. Hurta.
25 Wash. App. 85 95, 605 P. 2d 1278(1978).
In Jacobs v. Jacobs, 309 N.W. 2d 303 (Minn. 1981), the companion
case to In re Saxton, 309 N.W. 2d 298 (Minn. 1981) the Minnesota
Supreme Court, in a case similar the the instant one in the sense
that it involved an infant born to the parties after their divorce,
disposed of the jurisdictional issue in an initial footnote:
"We do not decide at what point a trial court
loses jurisdiction to change a child's surname through
modification of a divorce decree. Since the child was not
provided for in the original decree, the trial court had the
authority to change the child's name in the context of a
petition to amend the divorce decree." p. 304.
Jj> In re Schiffman,

28 Cal.

3d 640,

620 P. 2d 579,

169

Cal.

Rptr, 918 (1980) Justice Rose Bird in her concurring opinion expressed her concerns:
"I am concerned about the lack of a cleaii jurisdictional
basis for the trial court's modification of a child's name
in the course of a dissolution of marriage...I recognize
that many courts have apparently assumed the existence of
such jurisdiction in a proceeding to dissolve a marriage,"
p> 586.
This issue is raised on appeal because of the peculiar posture
of this case and the statewide ramifications of the Supreme Court's
determination on it. The parties all submitted to the jurisdiction
of the court and the trial judge entertained the issue. Utah's
statutes give trial courts continuing jurisdiction over the "custody
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of their children and their support,maintenance, and health and
dental care..." Custody is awarded by a tridl court's considering
"the best interests of the child and the pa^t conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties." U.C.A. 33-3-5;
33-3-10. Consistent with the recognition by courts across the
nation that naming is an incident of childrearing, and of the
decades-long practice of the nation's court^ outside of Ohio until
very recently, it should be clear that the trial court did have
jurisdiction to determine the children's names both before and
after Kevin was born on April 13, 1985.
An Illinois court summarized the basis of a divorce court's
jurisdiction over naming children in the regularly cited case of
Solomon v. Solomon, 5 111. App. 2d 297, 125 N.E. 2d 675 (1955):
"If the matter of a change of name of a minor child of divorced
parents is a matter incidental to the custody of the child,
and we hold that it is, then the court had the jurisdiction
to entertain the motion and to enter the order involved in
this appeal." p. 678.
Solomon contains a good discussion of the issue. In efforts to
avoid jurisdiction over controversial naming matters, courts could
easily avoid a genuine, ongoing matter of a ^hild's best interests
by simply avoiding jurisdiction.
Because the Supreme Court's decision in this case will impact on
procedures in trial courts in Utah, the Court is urged to address
the jurisdictional issue by reaffirming the trial court's jurisdiction
to determine disputes between custodial and noncustodial parents
respecting their children's names.
The distinction between what is a determination of a child's
name and a change of the same becomes blurred when newborn, infant
of very young children are involved. Divorce courts are courts of
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equity.

"Child custody proceedings are an4 should be equitable

in the highest degree,ft Rice v. Rice, 564 P.[ 2d 305,306(Utah 1977).
The trial courts of Utah clearly have jurisdiction to determine
children's names in disputes between parent^ over the initial
naming of children or changing their names When they are older.
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III. The selection of newborn, infant or veijy young children's
surnames is a constitutionally protected ch^ldrearing decision
which properly rests with the parent(s) entrusted with the care,
custody and control of the child(ren) pursuafnt to an award of
custody on the basis of the children's best interests.
At the same time that women were seeing ijecognition of their
right to name themselves and participate in the naming of their
marital children, men were seeing their right to be awarded
custody recognized by states across the natijon. The "tender years
presumption" has been abolished as a means for determining
custody. See Freed and Foster, "Divorce in the Fifty States: An
Overview," 18 Fam. L. Q. 369 (1985):
"In custody law, the 'tender years' doctijine has lost ground
and is rejected or relegated to a role of 'tiebreaker' in
most states. Moreover, an increase is observable in a number
of awards of joint custody (for the most part where parents
have so provided by agreement), and also |in the number of
custody awards to a father." pp. 434-435.
In Utah, the tender years doctrine was specifically repealed
by an amendment to U.C.A. 30-3-13 in 1977. ithe Supreme Court of
Utah has several times articulated that children should be entrusted
to a parent's custody pursuant to the children's best interests
and not the parent's sex. Nilson v. Nilson, 652 P. 2d 1323 (Utah 1982);
Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 599 P. 2d 510 (Utah 1979). As The Supreme
Court wrote in 1978, in Bingham and Bingham, 575 P. 2d 703 (Utah 1978):
"under the modern trend of social thinking away from former
fixed rigidities, toward equality of the sexes and greater
flexibility in considering the qualificat ions of the parents
on an individual basis, that presumption is subordinate to
the higher rule that the paramount concern in such cases is
the best interest and welfare of the chil d." at 704.
In Nilson, supra, the Supreme Court, citing Lembach v. Cox, 639
P. 2d 197 (Utah 1981) with approval, stated that:
"According to the rule as explained in Lembach, however,
a judicial preference for the mother coulld become operative
only if the evidence was that all other things were
equal between the parents." at 1324.
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Once the decision has been made as to wh^ich parent shall have
custody of children of a marriage, the custodial parent assumes
full responsibility for the care, custody and control of the
children in all aspects of their lives, including what they eat,
where they go to school, what religion they will be reared in if
any, etc. subject to the control of the court if a modification
of custody is sought due to changed circumstances, or abuse or
neglect. While joint custody does not seem to be prohibited in
Utah, the statutes do not expressly provide for it.
Ms. Hamby was awarded sole custody of th^ children she bore
prior to and subsequent to her marriage to tail Jacobson and is
entrusted with determining their upbringing!pursuant to their best
interests.
A. The selection of a child's name is a Constitutionally
protected childrearing decision.
In awarding custody to the parent who wi^l act in the best
interests of the child(ren) courts entrust i:\ie custodial parent
with the rights of childrearing which have been protected by
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution by the Supreme Court of the United States.
Santosky v. Kramer, 466 U.S. 745, 102 S. Ct} 1388 (1982); Wisconsin
v, Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S. Ct. 1526 (197^); Smith v. Organization
of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 97 S. Ct. 2094 (1977); Piere§ v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S. Ct.571 (1925); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S. Ct. 625 (1923); Prince v. Massachusetts
321 U.S. 159, 64 S. Ct. 438 (1944); Dike v. School Board of Orange
County, 650 F. 2d 783 (5th Cir. 1981).
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In Wisconsin v. YnrW the U.S. Supreme C<|mrt upheld the
right of parents to raise their children in accordance with their
(Amish) religious beliefs, stating that parents' primary
authority over their children's upbringing is "established beyond
debate as an enduring American tradition." in Pierce v. Society
of Sisters the Court relied on the Fourteenth Amendment as
guaranteeing the liberty of parents to educate their children in
private schools and striking down a statute requiring public
school attendance.

In Meyer v. Nebraska the Court upheld the

liberty right of parents to have their children taught foreign
languages in face of a statute prohibiting tjhe teaching of anything but English to school children. The Court said that the
parental role in directing their children's {upbringing was
"essential."
The Supreme Court of Utah has just as strjongly affirmed the
primary right of parents to rear their children absent abuse or
neglect which would call the State into the situation pursuant

I

to U.C.A. 78-3a-48. In re Castillo, 632 P. 2Id 855 (Utah 1981);
State in re Walter B., 577 P. 2d 119 (Utah l|978). In In re J.P.,
648 P. 2d 1364 (Utah 198 ) , citing the above cases and others of
i

the U.S. Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of Utah referred to
Article I, sections 2, 25 and 27, as a basis for the liberty right
of parents to rear their children under Utahfs Constitution, and
with language as strong as that of the U.S. Supreme Court, stated
inter alia:
"The integrity of the family and the parents' inherent
right and authority to rear their own children have been
recognized as fundamental axioms of Ango-jjumerican culture,
presupposed by all our social, political, and legal institutions. . .this Court has stated that the parent's right,
as well as duty, to care for a child 'maylbe termed
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natural, as well as legal and more.' ^ill v. Brown, 31 Utah
473, 483, 88 P. 2609, 613(1907)." at| 1373.
Naming one's children has long been recognized as a primary
childrearing function which has in recent y^ars been recognized
as a liberty right protected by the due proqess clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitutiqn by several federal
district courts.
The Attorney General of Connecticut articlulated this childrearing right in 1975:
"The natural parents, or parent, as the c ase may be,
have legal responsibility for the childreh which may be
terminated only after certain procedures and findings are
followed and made...Until such time, the parents have
their prerogatives as well as the respons abilities and duties
which devolve upon them. One of the prero gatives is naming
the child.ff Op. Atty. Gen. Conn. 5 (Jan. f>3, 1975).
See also L.A.M. v. State, 547 P. 2d 827, 832 (Alaska 1976); Parks
v. Francis Administrator, 50 Vt. 626 (1878); D'Ambrosio v. Rizzo,
81 Mass. App. 1539, 425 N.E. 2d 369 (1981); jiosmer v. Hosmer,
611 S.W. 2d 32 (Ma. App. 1981); Gardner v. D^nison, 217 Mass. 492,
105 N.E. 359 (1914); Eaton v. Libby, 165 Mas|>. 218, 42 N.E. 1127
(1896) for illustration of judicial recognition of naming as a
childrearing function.
As the Massachusetts Supreme Court stated in Secretary of the
Commonwealth v. City Clerk of Lowell, 373 Ma^s. 178, 366 N.E. 2d
717 (1977):
ff

[T]he common principle of freedom of choice in the matter
of names extends to the name chosen by a parried couple for
their child." at 725.

And, citing the U.S. Supreme Court precedent cited above,
the Massachusetts Court stated that:
"Parents' claim to authority in their own [household to
direct the rearing of their children is basic to the structure
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of society; the custody, care and nurturle of the child
reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom
include preparation for obligations the State can neither
supply nor hinder...There has unquestionably been a widespread custom in this country to give a child the surname of
its father...Consistently with what we have said above, we
think this has been a matter of parental choice rather
than a matter of law. We once assumed that 'the right to name
a child belongs to its parents, and ultimately to its
father." at 723,725.
Several recent cases have specifically railed on the issue of
parents1 right to name their children. In J^ch v. Burch, 466 F.
Supp. 714 (D. Hawaii 1979) the federal district court Stated that
parents have a ffcommon law right to give thteir child any name
they wish, and that the Fourteenth Amendment protects this right
from arbitrary state action." In a case involving a couple wanting
to fuse their surnames, Jech and Befurt, to give their child the
surname "Jebef," the court characterized th^ naming of one's child
as one of the "blessings of liberty" under ^he U.S. Constitution.
466 F. Supp. 714, 719 (1979).
The Hawaiian court invalidated the state statute requiring a
marital child to bear its father's name. Following the decision
the Legislature amended the statute.
In a similar case in North Carolina, in 6'Brien v. Tilson,
523 F. Supp. 494 (E.D.N.C. 1981), a federal district court invalidated
the state statute requiring marital children to be given their
fathers' surnames on their birth certificatess. The case involved
three married couples. One couple wished to name their son in the
Swedish tradition, by combining the father's) first name, Arne,
with the suffix "son" to create "Arneson." Tlhe two <£her couples
wanted to give their child a hyphenated combination of both parents'
names, one in accordance with Spanish traditlion and the other as
an expression of the equality between the
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sexes,

The North Carolina court found that the stlatute f,impinge [d]
upon decisions affecting family life, procreation, and childrearing;
areas of human experience which the Supreme nnUrt has long held
must be accorded special protection." 523 F. Supp. at 496.
And in Sydney v, Pingree, 564 F. Supp. 41^ (S.D.Fla. 1982)
a Florida federal district court followed Jecjh and O'Brien in
striking down a similar statute as an unconstitutional intrusion
on the parents1 "constitutionally protected ifight to choose the
name of their child."
See also Doe v. Hancock County Board of Health, 436 N.E. 2d 791
(Ind. 1982) (Hunter, J. dissenting).
That selection of children's names is a parental, childrearing
right is self apparent. When parents separate, when they disagree
over their children's names after separation or divorce, the
courts get involved. By awarding the care, custody and control of
a child to the custodial parent--the same caire, custody and
control which is constitutionally protected--^courts entrust the
parent with the educational, psychological and religious upbringing
of the child. This includes deciding what nai^ies are in the child(ren)'s
best interests.

B. In a dispute between a custodial and noncustodial parent
over the naming of newborn or very young children, the
custodial parent's decision should be rebuttably presumed
valid as being in the best interests of the children
consistent with the concurring opinion of Justice Mosk
in In re Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d 640, 62(^ P. 2d 579, 169
Cal. Rptr. 918 (1980).
If the father of a marital child in the mother's custody does
not object to the child's bearing a name oth^r than his, the
case mav **at reach

a court. The law protects both parents as

against the State from intrusion into their Tight to name their
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children as they please. In practice, a great many parental
disputes get settled as part of a divorce settlement. In practice,
also, many women are asked to forfeit child s|upport in exchange
for the fathers

not hassling them about the |name theyselect

for the children.
The courts lack a guiding principle by which to decide the
cases beyond the general "best interests of the child" recitation.
Justice Mosk, in his concurring opinion in the 1980 California
Supreme Court case of In re Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d ,640, 620 P.
2d 579, 169 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1980), a case involving a child born
to the custodial mother during the pendency c)f divorce proceedings,
articulated a presumption in favor of the custodial parent consistent with that parent's responsibility of the care, custody
and control of the child:
"Since the law has long recognized the ability and right
of the parent with custody to choose among the innumerable
alternative courses involving the child'sjwelfare, I can
see no rational reason to deny that parent a similar
right to select the name with which the cljiild will be
more comfortable.
Thus I would recognize a presumption that I the parent with
custody--whether custody was assumed without conflict, by
agreement or by court order--has acted in the child's best
interest in sel ecting the name. The selection may be the
original name, or a name change for a child of tender
years. The presumption, however, would be rebuttable. Just
as the noncustodial parent can seek a corrective cour order
if the child's health, education or control are deleterously
affected by the abuse of custodial care, so the selection
of name can be contested on the ground that it is not in
the child's best interest. The burden, however, would be on
the noncustodial parent to establish the intrusion on the
child's best interest." at 584.
Justice Mosk's opinion has been accepted favorably by law
review commentary. See Foggan, "Parents' Selection of Children's
Surname," 51 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 583 (1983); Comment, "No
Judicial Dyslexia: The Custodial Parent Presumption Distinguishes
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The Paternal From The Parental Right To Name A Child/1 58
N.D.L. Rev. 793 (1982). The early law review article written in
the state of Utah, Note, "The Controversy Ov)er Children's Surnames:
Familiarl Autonomy, Equal Protection and thd Child's Best
Interests," 1979 Utah L. Rev.303, suggested the presumption as
a possible means of resolving disputes, but did not thoroughly
consider it. It was suggested in Comment, "Surname Alternatives
in Pennsylvania," 82 Dick. L. Rev. 101 (197^).
As more and more men receive custody and the courts continue
to acknowledgment women's rights in the are?* of naming their
children, the custodial parent presumption Will most likely become
recognized as the logical means for resolving disputes generally.
The Utah Supreme Court, however, does not n^ed to, in this case,
adopt a custodial parent presumption as a m^ans of resolving all
disputes between parents over naming their children. There is a
vast difference between changing the name o$ an older who has used
its noncustodial parent's name since birth ^nd determining the
name for a child during the first few years of its

life.

The legislaturesof two states have expressly adopted the
custodial parent presumption statutorily as a means of recording
births when parents are in disagreement. Similar proposals have
been introducted in Kentucky and Florida. NJH. Rev. Stat. Ann.
sec. 126-6-A(I)(a)(1984) reads that "The choice of surname rests
with the parent who has actual custody following birth"). See
to same effect, sec. 69. 14(1)(f)(1)B), Wis^ Stat.
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A published regulation in Pennsylvania , is Pa. Admin. Code,
sec. 1.7(b) reads that "If the parents are divorced or separated
at the time of the child's birth, the choice of surname rests with
the parent who has custody of the newborn children" and has been in
effect since 1975. It was interpreted in the recent case of In re
Schidlmeier by Koslof, 496 A. 2d 1249 (Pa. Sliper. 1985). The noncustodial father attempted to change the namfe of the child who
was born following the parents' separation when the mother had
custody. The child was then 18 months.
The administrative regulation was upheld as a valid record
keeping measure. Although the Superior Court would not articulate
the presumption as a standard for resolving all postbirth disputes over children's surnames, it held that the father had the
burden of "coming forward with evidence that the name change he
requested would be in Jessica's best interest." at 1254.
The Pennsylvania court essentially turned around the burden
of proof usually imposed on women who seek tb change older children's
names. Given that a sex neutral method of fi|rst naming the child
was operative, the court did not need to reinforce the presumption
by stating it. The change in the burden of ptroof accomplished the
same thing.
In Utah the State Bureau of Health Statistics of the Department
of Health has not yet adopted a provision fotr registering births
in cases where the parents are in disagreement. Its Guidelines
for Reporting Name of Father and Surname of Child on the Birth
Certificate( revised October 5, 1981) do expressly recognize that
marital children do not need to bear their fathers' surnames, but
the Guidelines leave to the courts the determination of the
"Best interests of the child."
-41-

In determining the ,fbest interests of the child" the Court
should employ the custodial parent presumption. Different people
could debate for hours, days, weeks and months about what name
a child should have. Reasonable people could/will differ. The
choice, to be reviewed by the courts by putting the burden of
proof on the noncustodial parent to rebut itb belongs to the parent
entrusted with the care, custody, control and upbringing of the
child(ren).
Not only is the custodial parent presumption consistent with
sound public policy to eliminate discrimination on the basis of
gender, it is sound because it will discourage attempts of noncustodial parents to disrupt the award of custody by seeking modifications of divorce decrees to change child support obligations
and children's names.
Most importantly, the custodial parent presumption is founded
on the premise that the child's best interests will be served by
entrusting the naming function to the parent whom

the court has

determined is best suited to act in the chilld's best interests.
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IV. The trial court should be reversed because its findings of
fact and conclusions of law (Ruling and Ordet) are contrary to
the evidence, assume facts not in evidence, and reflect a presumption for the paternal name and a superiot right of men over
women to name marital children irrespective of who is entrusted
with the care, custody and control of the children, in violation
of the Constitutions of the United States andl Utah and Utah's
statutory scheme to guarantee equal rights to women in all aspects of private and public life.
A. The trial court's reasons are erroneous in fact and law.
The trial court, in its effort to find anV and all rationale
by which to justify letting the father impos^ the paternal name
on the children, made several errors of fact and law.
First, the court erroneously presumed that upon marriage a
woman's name authormatically becomes that of her husband as a
matter of law in reasoning that MWere plaintiff to remarry Kevin
and Kelly would again have a surname other than that of at least
one of their custodial parentsV There is no evidence in the trial
record that Ms. Hamby would change her name again. Indeed, she
has told the Supreme Court,in her affidavit to change to the title
of the action, that she never intends to change her name again.
The law is clear that a woman is not required to assume her husband's surname as a matter of law. See Halsbury's Laws of England,
supra, and State v. Taylor, 415 So. 2d 1043 (Ala. 1982) and cases,
laws and attorney general opinions cited in MacDougall, "The Right
of Women To Name Their Children/1 included in the Addendum, Footnote
9.
Second, the trial court erroneously presumed that a child's
bearing a surname which differs from that of its father if another
child bears the father's name implies illegitimacy as a matter of
fact or law.
Several courts have ruled that a name does not imply birth
status. See Doe v. Dunning, 87 Wash. 2d 50, 549 P. 2d 1 (1976).
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MacDougall, supra, pp. 152-154. The statement of the judge makes
no more sense than were he to apply the same standard to Ms. Hamby,
that one or more of her children,by the same father or not, were
born out of marriage. Besides using an impermissible criteria—birth
status — for determining a child's name (see (^'Brien v. Tilson,
523 F. Supp. 494 (E.D.N.C. 1981); Doe v. Hancock County Board of
Health, 436 N.E. 2d 791 (Ind. 1982), the law permits couples to
name their children as they fit, even with different last names.
As but one example of this admittedly not coijimon practice is the
couple in New Hampshire who named one child,tyorn in California,with
one hyphenated name and the other one, born in New Hampshire, with
an entirely different hyphenated name. See MacDougall, supra, Footnote
109.
Third, the trial court erroneously concluded that the children
should bear Ms. Hamby!s ex-husband's surname because the name Ms.
Hamby has determined is best for her childrep, Hamby, "is not the
mother's maiden name."
Hamby is Kathleen Hambyfs surname. It is her name irrespective of
where she originally acquired it. She has bopi it for years except
for the period of less than a year when she ysed the surname Jacobson.
The issue in this case is what is best for t}ie children. Children
are not cattle, to be branded by an owner's |iame.
Fourth, the trial court erroneously concluded that because
"the children are too young to be accustomed to the surname Hamby"
it is a reason to defer to Ms. Hamby's ex-hu^band's desire that
the children bear his surname.
As discussed, supra, the deference to the] name longer used as
a criteria for deciding what name a child shbuld use arose in the
Saxton and Jacobs cases. The rationale was that if a child has born a
-44-

paternal name for a long while, that the narte should be deferred
to.

if the children are newborn, as in Jacobs, then the same

criteria would not operate to entrench the paternal naming custom
in the law. The trial court misused the standard. The same reasoning
would apply to the fact that the children aite too young to be
accustomed to Mr. Jacobson's name, or any other name.
Fifth, the trial court erroneously found, despite any evidence
remotely to such effect, that if the childrdn bear their father's
name at this time that they "will always be identified with at
least one natural parent by being known by the surname Jacobson."
Mr. Jacobson might himself change his name sometime. Another court
may determine that the children are better off with a name other
than Jacobson. There is absolutely no evidenjce of record that the
children are not identified to their mother by the name Hamby which
she and the household uses.
Sixth, there is absolutely no evidence in| the record of this
case to support the trial court's conclusion that "The father-child
relationship will be strengthened by the children bearing the name
Jacobson while not harming the mother-child Relationship." This kind
of language derives from the cases involving older children whose
mothers seek to change their names to stepfathers' names. As a
judicial presumption it is ridiculous. As a factual determination,
it has no basis in the record.
Seventh, the trial court erroneously found, contrary to the
clear and uncontradicted evidence in the record, and without any
explanation, that "there is no embarrassment of inconvenience
associated with an explanation of why their pother's surname is
different since divorce is a common occurrencieV Ms. Hamby testified
about her own experience in this regard.
-45-

Eighth, the trial court erroneously found, contrary to the
clear and uncontradicted evidence in the recolrd, and without any
explanation, that "there is no embarrassment because of defendant's
alleged bad reputation." To the contrary, the|re is no evidence
that there is not embarrassment.
Further, the court ignored Ms. Hamby's testimony that the father
had not even visited the newborn child at the time of the hearing.
The trial court in this case went all out Ito justify in some
way a finding for the father. He put the burdlen of proving why the
father's name should not be imposed on the children on the mother.
His predecessor had (incorrectly) ordered tha|t the child born after
the divorce bear the paternal name as a matter of common law. Ms.
Hamby was required to rebut this erroneous

statement of the

common law and the law of Utah and every cour|t which has dealt with
the issue: at birth neither parent has a superior right to name a
child because of his/her gender and the operating rule of the Utah
Department of Health that a newborn does not Jiave to bear the paternal
name. See Jacobs v. Jacobs, Laks v. Laks, Cohjee v. Cohee,2!0 Neb. 855,
317 N.W. 2d 381 (1962).
By imposing the paternal name on the marit|al children in this
case contrary to the judgment of the children's custodial parent,
the trial court impermissibly discriminated against Ms. Hamby on
the basis of sex in violation of Article I, sections 1,2,7, and
27, and Utah's statutory scheme to guarantee (equal rights to women.
U.C.A. 30-5-2 guarantees that men can procur (divorces on the same
basis as men. U.C.A. 30-3-10 provides for either parent to receive
custody. Discrimination in employment is prohibited. U.C.A. 34-35-6.
The Legislature has established a Governor's (Commission on the
Status of Women to address the concerns of wo^nen.U.C.A. 63-47-1
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to 63-47-5.
The United States Supreme Court, in a long line of cases
beginning with Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 70, 92 S. Ct. 251 (1971)
has made it clear that classifications based pn sex cannot
withstand constitutional scrutiny if they reflect "the traditional
baggage of sexual stereotypes." Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 99 S. Ct.
1102 (1979). A requirement that marital children bear the paternal
name or the name of the fahter's choice, creates an impermissible
classification on the basis of sex contrary to the standard set
forth by United States Supreme Court precedent: in order for a
gender-based discrimination to be valid it must serve important
governmental objectives and the means employed must be substantially
related to the achievement of such objectives!. See Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S.
7, 95 S. Ct. 1373 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,
93 S. Ct. 1764(1973); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 101 S.
Ct. 1195 (1981); Mississippi University For Women v. Hogan,458
U.S. 718 (1982).
If a trial court decision such as the instant one is allowed to
stand, it will be a clear message to women in Utah that they do not
any enforceable legal right to name their children on an equal basis
to men.
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Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein the Appellant Kathleen Hamby
asks that the Order and Ruling of the Fourth Judicial District
Court be reversed and her two children fathered by her ex-husband
be given her surname, Hamby. The Appellant also requests that in
its Order to such effect,the Supreme Court ofl Utah give clear
direction to trial courts of the state for a [method for resolving
disputes between custodial and noncustodial parents of newborn,
infant or very young children consistent with the custodial parent's
authority to direct the upbringing of children in accordance with
their best interests.
Dated this /Pday of June, 1986.
Respectfully submitted,
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ADDENDUM

Kathleen Jacobson and the State of Utah, by an^i through Utah
State Department of Social Services vs. Gail jjacobson, Case No,
67,957 (Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah qounty, March 10
1986) (Order)
Kathleen Jacobson and the State of Utah, by anli through Utah
State Department of Social Services vs. Gail Jacobson, Case No,
67,957 (Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah Cpunty, February
21, 1986) (Ruling),
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

7
8
0

KATHLEEN JACOBSON,
AND THE STATE OF UTAH
by and through Utah State
Dept. of Social Services,

10!

11
12

Plaintiffs,
ORDER
vs.
GAIL JACOBSON,

13

Civil No. 67,957

Defendant.

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

This matter came on for hearing October 24, 1985 before
the Honorable Ray M. Harding upon plaintiff's petition to change
the surname of Kevin Jacobson to Kevin Haniby and upon defendant's
petition to change the surname of Kelly Hamby to Kelly Jacobson.
The Court heard profers of testimony from plaintiff and
defendant and counsel for the parties stipulated that the Court
may consider the petitions before it upon such profers and upon
memoranda to be filed. The parties filed the memoranda and the
Court having considered the same it is therefore
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

Kevin

D.

Jacobson
-1-

27

A-l

born

April

13,

1984

shall

1

2

continue to bear the surname of defendant Gail Jacobson.
2.

Kelly

Hamby born June

14,

1983 shall

bear

the

3 surname of Jacobson and shall be knovm as Kelly Jacobson.
4

DATED t h i s y f f ^ d a y of /%gft^£-^ I 1986.

S

BY THEjCe«RT:

6
7
8

9
10
11

CERTIFICATE &F MAILING
I hereby certify I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing to Mr. Donald E. Elkins, Attorney at Law, 60 East
100 South No. 200, Provo, UT 84601, postage prepaid on the 28th

12

day of February, 1986.
13
14
15

Secretary
Si

16
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UfAH
*******

02Ca£e Number

KATHLEEN JACOBSON,

H;.R -& ".' !!• 28

67957

Plaintiffs,
RULING

vs.
GAIL JACOBSON,
Defendant.
********

Having considered the memoranda a^id argument of the
parties, and having taken the matter under pdvisement, the court
hereby grants defendant's petition and denies plaintiff's
petition.

The court finds that it is in thfe best interest of the

parties minor children, Kelly Lynn & Kevin p., to be known by the
surname Jacobson.
The court bases this ruling on thb following reasons:
1) the father-child relationship will be strengthened by the
children bearing the name Jacobson while not harming the motherchild relationship, 2) there is no embarrassment or inconvenience
associated with an explanation of why their mother's surname is
different since divorce is a common occurrence, 3) the children
are too young to be accustomed to the surname Hamby, 4) Hamby is
not the mother's maiden name, 5) there is np embarrassment
because of defendant's alleged bad reputation, and 6) the
children will always be identified with at least one natural
parent by being known as Jacobson.

A-3

The court finds unpersuasive plalintiff's arguments that
it would be beneficial for Kevin and Kellyl to be known by Hamby
as their mother and stepsister are.

Were Custody to change,

Kevin and Kelly would be faced with the saime situation plaintiff
now seeks to avoid.

Furthermore, were plalintiff to remarry Kevin

and Kelly would again have a surname other than that of at least
one of their custodial parents.
court is the fact that Kevin

Of paramdunt concern to the

and Kelly should both bear the same

name to avoid any implications of illegitimacy which might arise
if asked why brothers of the same natural father have different
last names.
Finally, the court notes that tHe law provides that the
children may petition for a name change if they so desire when
they are old enough to make an intelligent decision.
Defendant's counsel to prepare an appropriate order.
DATED this j ^ / ^ d a y of F$

JUDGE
cc:

T x

Richard M. Taylor
Donald E. Elkins
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^ t ^

KATHLEEN JACOBSON, Plaintiff
Appearing Pro Se
Box 188
Goshen, Utah 84663
Telephone (801) 667-9966
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRCIT COURT o!F UTAH COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
KATHLEEN JACOBSON, and the State
of Utah, by and through Utah State
Dept. of Social Services,
Plaintiffs,

)
)
)

QF

AppEAL

)

-vs-

)

GAIL JACOBSON,

)
)
)

Defendants.

N0T1CE

Civijl No. 67,957

Plaintiff KATHLEEN JACOBSON, appearing prb se, hereby gives
notice to all concerned parties that she will kppeal that ORDER
entered herein on March 10, 1986 in the office of the Clerk of
the above-entitled Court which said ORDER determined the surnames
by which the minor children of the plaintiff KATHLEEN JACOBSON and
the defendant GAIL JACOBSON shall be legally k^iown.

Such appeal

is to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah.
DATED this 7th day of April, 1986.

KATHLEEN JACOBSON,
Appearing Pro Se

plaintiff

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true copy of the foregoing,
postage prepaid, U.S. Mail, to counsel for the defendant, RICHARD
M. TAYLOR, at P. 0. Box 288, Spanish Fork, Ut.|84660-0288 on the
7th day of April, 1986.
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The Right of Women to Name Tfyjir Children
Priscilla Ruth MacDougal]
I. Introduction
Over the past decade important strides have been made toward recognizing the right of women to name their children.
However, relentless resistance to giving up tne virtually irrebuttable male prerogative to name marital children1 promises to
make achievement of the right of women to najne children a major
feminist struggle for the next decade.
Women's growing demand to share the l|)asic right to name
children follows logically from women's successful assertion of
their right to name themselves. In Doe v. Dunning, the country's
first major case involving women's rights to name their children,
the Washington Supreme Court acknowledged this in 1976 stating
that "[a]s more women exercise their right to retain their own surname after marriage, the likelihood that children will be given a
surname other than the paternal surname increases."2
The right of married and divorced women to choose whether
or not they will use the surnames of their spouses or ex-spouses
arose to the fore as a feminist issue with the erroneously litigated
case of Forbush v. Wallace in 1972.3 In Forbitsn, the United States
Supreme Court summarily affirmed an Alabama federal district
court's determination that a conceded common law requirement,
1. In referring to children, the terms marital childrenl nonmarital children, or
children born to married or unmarried parents are generally used. The old common law appellation for a nonmarital child, "bastard," has all but passed out of parlance; the term "out of wedlock" likewise is giving way; the terms "legitimate" and
"legitimacy," and "illegitimate" and "illegitimacy" denote good or base societal status as determined by fathers. The rights of parents in naming their children in relation to the state and each other still relate directly to their status as married or
unmarried, and to the birth status of their children as modified or not by state standards for legitimation or determination of paternity. Therefore, this article uses
terms denoting the birth status of children. A nonmarital child is one born to parents who were not married to each other from the time of conception to birth. A
marital child is one born to parents who were married at the time of birth or
conception.
2. Doe v. Dunning, 87 Wash. 2d 50, 53, 549 P.2d 1, 3 (1976). "An erosion of the
traditional system of adopting the husband's surname as the single and sole surname for each member of the family unit is apparent and in practice and has been
recognized by the case law of many jurisdictions." Rice y. Department of Health
and Rehabil. Services, on remand No. 80-1674 Order and Findings of Fact of Div. of
Administrative Hearings, Dec. 31, 1980 at 7-8. Final order entered Jan. 13, 1981, on
remand from 386 So. 2d 844 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
3. 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala. 1971), affd per curiaml 405 U.S. 970 (1972).
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that by operation of law a woman adopts tier husband's surname
as her "legal name," was constitutional. 1rhe so-called common
law requirement accepted by the litigants w^s not, however, an accurate statement of the common law. The case brought the issue
to the attention of the country.
In the wake of the widely publicized forbush decision, women encountered difficulties using their owrj surnames throughout
the country. Lawsuits arose everywhere4 knd women organized
around the issue of a woman's right to control her own name. 5
4. Stuart v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 266 k d . 440, 295 A.2d 223 (1973)
arose immediately and served to guide the long line of well-litigated and successful
cases reaffirming the common law right of a woman not to change her name because of marriage. See Priscilla Ruth MacDougall,Married Women's Common Law
Right To their own Surnames, 1 Women's Rts. L. Reri., Fall/Winter 1972-73, at 2.
Women brought petitions for name changes in trial courts across the nation.
Within a year, the appeal in Kruzel v. Podell, 67 Wis. 2^ 138, 226 N.W.2d 458 (1975),
which became the pivotal case on the issue, was filed iri Wisconsin.
5. The Center for a Woman's Own Name developed in 1973 as a result of the
appeal in Kruzel. Organized and directed by the writer and Terri P. Tepper, between 1973 and 1976, it took a national lead with the American Civil Liberties
Union during such time in advocating the recognition [of women's rights to name
themselves and their children. The Center published and distributed the basic
guide to the names issue, Booklet For Women Who Wish To Determine Their Own
Names After Marriage (1974).
In 1974, while Kruzel was on appeal, the Olympia ^rown League was organized
by Suzan Hester, Fran Kaplan, Anne Brouwer and others to aid Milwaukee women
directly affected by the lower court's ruling. The League, which developed a membership numbering over 200, joined the case as amiqus curiae. The group was
named after the country's first female ordained minister, from Racine, Wisconsin,
who retained her own name in 1873 when she married John Henry Willis. See, e.g.,
Kathy Harney Wins, Newsletter of the Olympia Brown League, April, 1975.
In 1972, Massachusetts women founded Name-Change in the wake of Forbush
and litigation in Massachusetts over women's right to use their names for voting.
The group distributed a "Fact Sheet For Women Who Wish To Retain Their Own
Name After Marriage" and promoted the right of women to determine their own
names in that state. Letter from Diana Altman, organizer of the group, to writer
(January 23, 1973).
In 1973, Michigan women organized the Committee To Encourage Richard H.
Austin To Give Michigan Women Their Middle Names For The Holidays (CERHA)
with Attorney Jean L. King, and led a humorous and successful campaign supporting the right of women to obtain drivers' licenses using their birth names as middle
names. The campaign demanded such right on every holiday from Valentine's Day
to Christmas. See Booklet for Women Who Wish to Determine Their Own Names
After Marriage 23 (1974).
In California, the Name Choice Center distributed a fact sheet and promoted
the issue with the Attorney General and the Legislature! The Center had a mailing
list of over 15,000 by 1974. Letters from the group's organizer, Pat Montandon, to
writer (March 25, 1974 and May 13, 1974) and to Wall iptreet Journal reporter Joanne Lublin (September 9, 1984).
The Women's Legal Defense Fund in Washington, D.C. established a committee on names which published and distributed a booklet bn women's names for D.C.
area residents. The NOW Legal Defense and Educatiori Fund participated as amicus in Kruzel. Governors' commissions on the status of Women supported the right
of married women to have their first names listed in telephone directories. Special
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The cause was not new. During the early part of the century women had organized around it as the Lucy Stone League, named for
Lucy Stone, the nineteenth century abolitionist knd feminist
leader who did not change her name when she married Henry B.
Blackwell in 1855.6 The League, however, expressly decided not to
take on the issue of women's rights in naming children.7
In 1982 the Alabama Supreme Court repudiated the Forbush
case as not accurately representing the common law br the law of
Alabama.8 The decision thus capped a body of law developed durNOW task forces dealt with the name issue, and law student, legal services, and
other organizations participated in litigation. The subject became| a popular topic
for law review articles. See infra note 9. The National Conference on Women and
the Law began offering workshops on women's naming rights in l|)76.
Where the term "own" name is used in this article it refers to the chosen name
of the woman, regardless of the origin of the name. As written in Center For A
Woman's Own Name 1975 Supplement To Booklet For Women Who Wish To Determine Their Own Names After Marriage 6 (1975):
It is the position of the Center For A Woman's Own Name that the
name(s) a woman chooses to use is her own name. It may be the name
given her at birth, a name assumed during childhood, assumed at marriage, assumed at a previous marriage, a hyphenated name <>r a name
made up by herself at any time.
During this period of feminist activity over the issue in the mid 1970s, Ellen
Goodman commented
I guarantee you that the first generation of women who grow up without scribbling "Mrs. Paul Newman" all over their notebooks "just to
see what it looks like" is going to think we were mad. It is & very odd
and radical idea indeed that a woman would nominally disappear just
because she got married.
The Name of the Game, Boston Globe, Sept. 24, 1974.
6. Under the primary leadership of Ruth Hale and Jane Grant, the Lucy Stone
League and the National Woman's Party litigated the right of married women to
use their own surnames with the few state and federal agencies people had to contend with in those days. This included the passport office, which since that time
has recognized the right of married women to be issued passports in their own surnames. See Ruth Hale, The First Five Years of the Lucy Stone League (1926);
Note, Names—Married Women—Right to Retain Maiden Names, 73 U. Pa. L. Rev.
110 (1924). The right was codified in the first Code of Federal Regulations in 1938.
22 C.F.R. § 51.20 (1938). The Lucy Stone League still exists in Nejv York City.
7. Hale, supra note 6. Lucy Stone and Henry Blackwell na^ned their distinguished daughter Alice Stone Blackwell. See Elinor Rice Hays, Liicy Stone: One of
America's First and Greatest Feminists (1961); Alice Stone Blackwell, Lucy Stone:
Pioneer of Woman's Rights (1930). The Lucy Stoners likewise frequently gave
their children the surname of the mother as a middle name. For example, Ruth
Hale and her husband Heywood Broun named their sports commentator son Heywood Hale Broun.
8. State v. Taylor, 415 So. 2d 1043 (Ala. 1982). The Department of Public
Safety, however, only conceded in 1984, in the face of litigation, th^ right of an individual married woman to a driver's license in "the name of her choice." Letter
from Ray Acton, department attorney, Alabama Department of public Litigation,
to Daniel L. McCleave, co-counsel in State v. Taylor (Nov. 1, 1984). Litigation to
make the Department change its general policy and to apply this concession to all
married women in Alabama has been commenced in a federal class action. Wendy
A. Rockwell v. Prescott, Case No. 85-0875-XS (filed July 12, 1985, U.S. D.C. S.D.
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ing the 1970s recognizing the right of women to choose their own
names. 9 Until a married or divorced woman's legal right to name
Ala.). It is incredible that the Department refuses to acknowledge the ruling of Alabama Supreme Court and it is hoped that the Attorney General will effectuate a
swift resolution of the Department's recalcitrance.
9. The Alabama Supreme Court in its unanimous decision in Taylor followed
Kruzel v. Podell, 67 Wis. 2d 138, 226 N.W.2d 458 (1975). For leading cases recognizing a woman's right to not change her name because of marriage, see also Dunn v.
Palermo, 522 S.W.2d 679 (Term. 1975); Secretary of the Commonwealth v. City
Clerk of Lowell, 373 Mass. 178, 366 N.E.2d 717 (1977); Simmons v. O'Brien, 201 Neb.
778, 272 N.W.2d 273 (1978).
By statute, judicial opinion, state attorney general opinion, formal and informal
agency directives or memoranda, or legislation, all states now recognize that women have the right to not change their names when they mar^y. Alabama: State v.
Taylor, 415 So. 2d 1043 (Ala. 1982); Alaska: Op. Att'y. Gen. Alaska (May 5, 1976);
Arizona: Malone v. Sullivan, 124 Ariz. 469, 605 P.2d 447 (19^0); Laks v. Laks, 25
Ariz. App. 58, 540 P.2d 1277 (1975); Arkansas: Walker v. Jackson, 391 F. Supp. 1395
(E.D. Ark. 1975); Op. Att'y Gen. Ark. No. 74-123 (Oct. 8, 1974J; Op. Att'y Gen. Ark.
No. 74-75 (April 19, 1974); California: Weathers v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. App. 3d
286, 126 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1976); Op. Atty Gen. Cal. (March 12, 1974); Connecticut:
Custer v. Bonadies, 30 Conn. Supp. 385, 318 A.2d 639 (SupeiL Ct. 1974); Op. Att'y
Gen. Conn. (Jan. 23, 1975); Delaware: Op. Att'y Gen. Del. (Aiig. 7,1974); District of
Columbia: Brown v. Brown, 382 A.2d 1038 (D.C. 1978), vacating 384 A.2d 632 (D.C.
1977); Op. Corp. Counsel D.C. (1975); Florida: In re Hooper 436 So. 2d 401 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Pilch v. Pilch, 447 So. 2d 989 (Fla. Dist. C t App. 1984); Davis v.
Roos, 326 So. 2d 226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Marshall v. S t a k 301 So. 2d 477 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1974); 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 076-66 (March ^4, 1976); Georgia: Ga.
Code Ann. § 19-3-33.1 (Supp. 1985); Op. Att'y Gen. Ga. No. 7549 (June 3, 1975); Hawaii: Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 574-1 (1976); Jech v. Burch, 466 F. Supp. 714 (D. Hawaii
1979); Illinois: Op. Att'y Gen. 111. No. S-711 (Feb. 25, 1974); Oji. Att'y Gen. 111. S-695
(Feb. 13,1974), both opinions indicating that Illinois does not follow Rago v. Lipsky,
327 111. App. 63, 63 N.E.2d 642 (1945) (country's sole case holding that a married
woman takes her husband's surname as her "legal" name at common law); Indiana:
In re Hauptly, 262 Ind. 150, 312 N.E.2d 857 (1974); Iowa: IoVa Code Ann. § 595.5
(West 1981); Op. Att'y Gen. Iowa (March 25,1980); Kansas: oJ>. Att'y Gen. Kan. No.
73-47 (Feb. 1, 1973) following Gallop v. Shanahan, No. 120, 456 (Dist. Ct. Shawnee
County, Nov. 2, 1972), noted in Note, Constitutional Law—Equal Protection and
Right of Suffrage Prohibits State From Cancelling Voter Registration of Newly
Married Woman—Women
Upon Marriage Do Not Necessarily Abandon Maiden
Name, 21 U. Kan. L. Rev. 588 (1972-73); Kentucky: Op. AttV Gen. Ky. No. 77-334
(May 23, 1977); Op. Att'y Gen. Ky. No. 77-239 (April 13, 1977); Op. Att'y Gen. Ky.
No. 74-902 (Dec. 26, 1974); Op. Att'y Gen. Ky. No. 74-349 (Malr 14, 1974); Memorandum Ky. Dept. Transportation (Oct. 30, 1981) (Kentucky Department of Transportation relinquishes position that a married woman must obtain driver's license in
her husband's surname unless she has a court-ordered name ("change"); Louisiana:
Pugh v. Theall, 342 So. 2d 274 (La. Ct. App. 1977), cert, denied 344 So. 2d 1055 (La.
1977); Succession of Kneipp, 172 La. 411, 134 So. 376 (1931); Boothe v. Papale, No.
74—939 (E.D. La. Feb. 12, 1975) (Order granting plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:34,A.(l)(a)(iii) (West 1984) (statute relating to
naming children at birth); Maine: In re Reben, 342 A.2d 688 (Me. 1975); Op. Att'y
Gen. Me. (April 4, 1978); Op. Atty. Gen. Me. (April 12, 1974) Maryland: Stuart v.
Board of Supervisors, 266 Md. 440, 295 A.2d 223 (1972), noted in The Right of a Married Woman To Use Her Birth-Given Surname For Voter Registration, 32 Md. L.
Rev. 409 (1973); Goldin v. Goldin, 48 Md. App. 154, 426 A.2^1 410 (Ct. Spec. App.
1981); Klein v. Klein, 36 Md. App. 177, 373 A.2d 86 (Ct. Spec. App. 1977); Op. Att'y
Gen. Md. (Jan. 20, 1983); Op. Att'y Gen. Md. (May 7, 1974); Op. Atty. Gen. Md.
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herself was established, she could not expect the law to recognize
(March 30, 1974); Op. Att'y Gen. Md. (Nov. 30, 1972); Massachusetts: Secretary of
the Commonwealth v. City Clerk of Lowell, 373 Mass. 178, 366 N.E.2d 717 (1977);
Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 46 § ID (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); Michigan Jones v. Sanilac
County Road Comm'n, 128 Mich. App. 569, 342 N.W.2d 532 (1983) Wood v. Detroit
Edison, 409 Mich. 279, 294 N.W.2d 571 (1980); Piotrowski v. Piotrowski, 71 Mich.
App. 213, 247 N.W.2d 354 (1976); Op. Att'y Gen. Mich. No. 4834 (Oct. 2, 1974); Mich.
Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.2824(1) (West 1980) (statute relating to niming children at
birth); Minnesota: Minn. Stat. Ann. § 517.08 (West Supp. 1985); Missouri: In re Natale, 527 S.W.2d 402 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Miller v. Miller, 670 S.W.2d 591 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1984); Johnson v. Pacific Intermountain Expr. Co., 662 S.W.2d 237 (Mo. 1983),
cert, denied 104 S. Ct. 2349 (1984); Montana: Op. Att'y Gen. Mdn. (May 1, 1974);
Nebraska: Simmons v. O'Brien, 201 Neb. 778, 272 N.W.2d 273 (197^); Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 71-640.01 (1984) (statute relating to naming children at birth); | New Hampshire:
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 126.6-a (1983) (statute relating to naming diildren at birth);
Moskowitz v. Moskowitz, 118 N.H. 199, 385 A.2d 120 (1978); New Jersey: In re Lawrence, 133 N.J. Super. 408, 337 A.2d 49 (1975); Op. Att'y Gen. N.J. No. 20-1975 (Aug.
26, 1975); New York: N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law §§ 14-a(l), 15(1), 240-a (McKinney Supp.
1985); N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§ 64, 65 (McKinney Supp. 1985); Ik re Halligan, 46
A.D.2d 170, 361 N.Y.S.2d 458 (App. Div. 1974); North Carolina: lit re Mohlman, 26
N.C. App. 220, 216 S.E.2d 147 (1975); O'Brien v. Tilson, 523 F. sJpp. 494 (E.D.N.C.
1981); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 130-A-101(c) (Supp. 1983) (statute relating to naming children at birth); North Dakota: Op. Att'y Gen. N.D. (March 20, 1974); Ohio: Krupa v.
Green, 144 Ohio App. 497,177 N.E.2d 616 (1961); Ball v. Brown, 450 F. Supp. 4 (N.D.
Ohio 1977); Oklahoma: Sneed v. Sneed, 585 P.2d 1363 (Okla. 1978); Op. Att'y Gen.
Okla. (Nov. 14, 1975); Oregon: Ore. Rev. Stat. § 106.220 (1983); Pennsylvania: Op.
Att'y Gen. Pa. No. 8 (Jan. 31, 1974); Op. Att'y Gen. Pa. No. 72 (Oct. 25, 1973); Op.
Att'y Gen. Pa. No. 62 (Aug. 20, 1973); Rhode Island: Traugott v. Petit, 122 R.I. 60,
404 A.2d 77 (1979); South Carolina: Op. Atty. Gen. S.C. (June 0, 1975); Op. Att'y
Gen. S.C. (Dec. 12, 1974); South Dakota: Op. Att'y Gen. S.D. N6. 77-31 (April 15,
1977) (interpreting Ogle v. Circuit Court, 89 S.D. 18, 227 N.W.2d 621 (1975)); Tennessee: Dunn v. Palermo, 522 S.W.2d 679 (Tenn. 1975); Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-3-305
(1983) (statute relating to naming children at birth); Texas: Op. Att'y Gen. Tex. No.
MW-225 (Aug. 21, 1980) (says that a married woman may vote under a hyphenated
last name, of her "maiden name" and her husband's name); Op. Att'y Gen. Tex. No.
H-432 (Oct. 25, 1974); Rice v. State, 37 Tex. Crim. 36, 38 S.W. 801 (1897); Vermont:
Op. Att'y Gen. Vt. No. 179 (Feb. 4, 1974); Virginia: In re MilleJ, 218 Va. 939, 243
S.E.2d 464 (1978); In re Strikwerda, 216 Va. 470, 220 S.E.2d 245 (1975); Op. Att'y
Gen. Va. (June 6, 1973) (re voting); Washington: Doe v. Dunnink 87 Wash. 2d 50,
549 P.2d 1 (1976); Op. Att'y Gen. Wash. 507 (1927-28) (right of l&arried woman to
use husband's name even though she is not living with him); West Virginia: Op.
Att'y Gen. W. Va. (April 30, 1975); Wisconsin: Kruzel v. Podell, kl Wis. 2d 138, 226
N.W.2d 458 (1975); Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. No. 7-77 (Jan. 31, 1977); Op. Att'y Gen. Wis.
(Sept. 21, 1982). The states not listed—Colorado, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico,
Utah, and Wyoming—have recognized the right of women to use their own names
but have not circulated opinions, memoranda or the like to the knowledge of the
writer. E.g., "The [Wyoming] Motor Vehicle Division has recently allowed the use
of a woman's maiden name as either a middle or last name on a driver's license and
has also allowed the use of hyphenated names on driver's licenses. This was done
pursuant to legal advice from this office." Kenneth G. Vines, Assistant Attorney
General Wyoming, letter to author (January 16, 1980). Some states expressly prohibit discrimination against women in the granting of credit because of their surnames. E.g. Act of May 28, 1985, ch. 243, § 5, 1985 Minn. Laws 77y (to be codified at
Minn. Stat. § 325G.041).
See also 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(b) (1982), interpreting the federal Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982) (prohibits creditors from refusing to open or
maintain a person's account in his or her "birth-given first name and a surname
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her legal right to name her children over the objection of her husband or ex-husband.
As a woman's right to determine her own surname became
recognized in the 1970s, married couples, by mutual agreement, bethat is the applicant's birth-given surname, the spouse's surnam, 0r a combined surname"). A requirement that a woman change her surname to tfyat of her husband
on employment records when she marries, in absence of a corresponding requirement for men violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l
to 17 (1982). Allen v. Lovejoy, 533 F.2d 522 (6th Cir. 1977).
The law is also well established that married and divorce4 women have the
right to change their names, statutorily or nonstatutory, irrespective of what
names the children in their custody use. Kg., In re Natale, 527 SLW.2d 402 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1975) (married woman adopting a brand new name unrelated to her husband's
surname or her own prior names); In re Hauptly, 262 Ind. 1^0, 312 N.E.2d 857
(1974); In re Erickson, 547 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977); Tra\igost v. Petit, 122
R.I. 60, 404 A.2d 77 (1979); In re Banks, 42 Cal. App. 3d 631,117 CM. Rptr. 37 (1974);
In re Hooper, 436 So. 2d 401 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Piotrowski v. Piotrowski, 71
Mich. App. 213, 247 N.W.2d 354 (1976); Egner v. Egner, 133 N.J. Sniper. 403, 337 A.2d
46 (1975).
An issue that needs to be litigated in the area of women's names involves the
right of women to use different surnames for different purposes* The right to not
change one's surname because of marriage is not identical to tpe right to retain
one's premarriage surname for some purposes and to change it fpr other purposes.
A woman who uses her husband's surname for any purpose may have difficulty not
using it, instead of another surname, for state recordkeeping purposes. However,
under the common law persons can use more than one surname. The one state attorney general who has expressly examined the issue reaffirmed the right of women to use one surname with one state agency (for example!, for voting) and
another surname with another state agency (such as for driving dr practicing a profession). Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. No. 7-77 (Jan. 31, 1977).
The right of women to name themselves does not depend on iheir husbands' or
ex-husbands' consent or acquiescence. Because attorneys raise the issue in pleadings and/or trial, mention of spousal consent appears in most of the name change
cases, but notably not in the name retention cases of the 1970$. See, e.g., In re
Strickwerda, 216 Va. 470, 220 S.E.2d 245 (1975) (plaintiff's attorney informed author
that mention of husband's agreement was deliberate tactic). Name retention cases
following Stuart v. Board of Supervisors, 266 Md. 440, 295 A.2d 22$ (1972) (antenuptial contract determined to be evidence of intent to use own name, not a requirement of Mary Emily Stuart's doing so) do not even mention spokisal opinion. See,
e.g., Kruzel v. Podell, 67 Wis. 2d 138, 226 N.W.2d 458 (1975); Durin v. Palermo, 522
S.W.2d 679 (Tenn. 1975).
'
See generally Herma Hill Kay, Sex-Based Discrimination: Text, Cases and
Materials 171-77 (2d ed. 1981); Kathleen A. Ryan Carlsson, Surnames of Married
Women And Legitimate Children, 17 N.Y.L.F. 552 (1971); Roslyn Goodman Daum,
The Right of Married Women To Assert Their Own Surnames, 8 \J. Mich. J.L. Ref.
63 (1974); Julia Lamber, A Married Woman's Surname: Is Custom Law?, 1973
Wash. U.L.Q. 779 (1973); Priscilla Ruth MacDougall, Women's, Men's, Children's
Names: An Outline and Bibliography, 7 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 4Q13-18 (March 17,
1981) and sources cited therein; Richard Thornton, Married WomJen and The Name
Game, 11 Rich. L. Rev. 121 (1976). A very fine recent article espouses the value of
nonjudicial name change. Patricia A. Felch, The Common Law Right For An Adult
To Assume A New Name Without Court Approval, VIII Women's Law Reporter
(Loyola U School of Law) 1 (Fall 1984) (article, however, mistakenly attributes a
statement of Elizabeth Cady Stanton to Lucy Stone, which will be noted in a future
addition of the Women's Law Reporter).
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gan giving their children hyphenated names, maternal names, or
entirely new surnames. They immediately encountered resistance
from state agencies which refused to register marital children in
any other surname than the paternal. At the same time, unmarried mothers met resistance in giving their children the surnames
of their biological fathers whether the men agreed with their
choice or not.10
As this article demonstrates, where women have the approval
of their children's fathers, state resistance to women's choices of
their children's surnames ultimately fails. The government simply
cannot tell parents what to name their offspring.
In contrast, when a woman wants to name her children one
way and the father does not agree, a woman finds herself facing an
almost insurmountable legal obstacle. Except in some cases involving nonmarital children, the courts have traditionally and expressly upheld the right of the father to control the naming of
children, irrespective of what surname best serves tne children.
This legal brick wall blocks the parental influence of women
on their own children and in their own homes. It tells children
that their mother's authority remains secondary to that of their father even after their parents are divorced. Women must topple
this brick wall, as it stands in the way of their responsibility and
authority to rear their children.
Children's names are a women's issue regardless of the origin
of the name chosen by a woman. This article neither espouses that
a child should bear any particular surname11 nor advocates that
women should give their children the maternal name or any other
nonpaternal name. It is, however, a fundamental feminist concern
that society and its courts respect women for wanting to pass their
surnames onto their children or to give them surnames which dif10 Most of these situations were resolved by attorney general opmions which
caused agencies to recognize the legal rights of parents to name their children Unfavorable attorney general rulings or failure of agencies to follow favorable opinions resulted m litigation See,eg,
Secretary of the Commonwealth v City Clerk
of Lowell, 373 Mass 178, 366 N E 2d 717 (1977) For a list of the state attorney gensee MacDoueral opmions respectmg the right of women to use their own n
gall, supra note 9, at 4017-18
11 When "name" is used m this article it usually refers to a last name Men
assert their authority over women in naming children primarily) m the context of
surnames Men also claim the right to determine children's first {and middle names
and to require women to name sons for them with the designatuion " Jr " Courts
have, therefore, m a few cases also adjudicated the relativei rights of parents m selectmg first and middle names which are also referred to as given names Women have always prevailed m cases involving conflicts of auth|>rity over first or
middle names In re Nguyen, 684 P 2d 258 (Colo App 1983), cert dented, 105 S Ct
785 (1985), Webber v Parker, 167 So 2d 519 (La Ct App 1964) writ refused, 246
La 886, 168 So 2d 269 (1964), In re M L P , 621 S W.2d 430 (Tex Civ App 1981)
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fer from those of the children's fathers. It is a fundamental women's issue that women should and must have a legally recognized
and enforceable right to name their children on an equal basis to
men. Further, it is a fundamental women's concern that women
who are custodial parents have the same legally recognized decision-making power respecting their children's names as they have
over other aspects of their children's lives.
Recognition of the right of women to name meir children
also promotes the rights of children. Such recognition will result
in children being allowed to bear names which arej in fact, good
for their welfare,12 rather than requiring them to use their fathers'
names whenever their fathers want them to.
Despite these interests of children and women, courts are
quick to respect men's desire to control their children's names. In
March 1982, the United States Supreme Court declined to review
the first case to reach it involving the right of women to name
their children. In Saxton v. Dennis ,13 the Court refused to review
the Minnesota Supreme Court's denial to a custodial mother and
her two children of the right to statutorily change the children's
surnames to a hyphenated name of both parents' names. The father had objected and insisted that the children continue to use
only his surname. A month later, the Nebraska Supreme Court
became the first appellate court to construe a state statute which
specified what surnames could be given newborn marital children
on their birth certificates. The court accepted one of the non-custodial father's choices of a name—a hyphenated name with the father's name first—over the wishes of the custodial mother to have
the children bear only her surname.14
Similarly, courts and legislatures are allowing unmarried fa12. The legal term used in family law is the child's "best interests." See infra
notes 120-132, 139, 200-206, 216-217, 227-237 and accompanying text.
13. In re Saxton, 309 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. 1981), cert, deniedl 455 U.S. 1034
(1982), Noted in Note, Family Law-Parental Rights in Changing Child's SurnameIn re Saxton, 9 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 484 (1983) and Note, Like Father, Like Child:
the Rights of Parents in their Children's Surnames, 70 Va. L. Rev. 1303 (1984). The
court denied certiorari in Saxton ten years and sixteen days from the day that it
summarily affirmed Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala 1911), offd per
curiam, 405 U.S. 970 (1972). See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
14. Cohee v. Cohee, 210 Neb. 855, 317 N.W.2d 381 (1982) (rehearing denied May
12, 1982). The father asked that the child bear only his name or m e hyphenated
name.
The Nebraska Supreme Court recited and deferred to the standards established
by courts over the years to protect divorced noncustodial fathers' right to control
the naming of their children: 1) misconduct by "one of the parents" (i.e. the father); 2) failure to support the child; 3) failure to maintain contact with the child; 4)
the length of time a surname has been used, and 5) whether the surname is different from that of the custodial parent. The court neither made nor ordered any fac-
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thers rights almost equal to married fathers in naihing children if
they contribute to the children's support and express minimal interest in them.15 This is in spite of these fathers' limited success in
obtaining other rights over mothers to their children unless the fathers have demonstrated a considerable comn^itment to the
child.i6
Because the issue of a woman's right to name| her children is
only beginning to be recognized as a feminist issue, not many cases
have been litigated from a women's rights perspective and taken to
the appellate level. Therefore, with the exception of a few welllitigated cases and forward-looking judiciary17 the courts of this
country are not yet sensitized to the importance of the issue of
naming children as a women's and children's legal rights issue.
Nor are they aware to any depth of the extent o^ legal developments in the area over the past decade.
Women generally have been hesitant to express and assert
their desires and their rights to name their children over their
tual evaluation of the "best interests" of the child in question anjd denied rehearing
to clarify the meaning of the opinion.
The bid for rehearing was almost not filed. The father, whol had at first denied
paternity, gave up the child for adoption as the mother remarried, possibly raising a
mootness issue. One of the reasons D.R.S. v. R.S.H., 412 N.E.2d 1257 (Ind. Ct. App.
1980), was not pursued beyond an unsuccessful petition for rehearing was because
the unwed father relinquished any rights to the child, the mother married and her
husband adopted the child. Although the individual situations in such cases may
thus be rectified, the appellate opinions make bad law for later cases.
15. Donald J. v. Evna M-W, 81 Cal. App. 3d 929, 147 Cal. Rp^r. 15 (1978); D.R.S.
v. R.S.H., 412 N.E.2d 1257 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Winkenhofer v. Griffin, 511 S.W.2d
216 (Ky. 1974); Jacobs v. Jacobs, 309 N.W.2d 303 (Minn. 1981); Kirksey v. Abbott,
591 S.W.2d 751 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
16. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) ("the mere existence of a biological
link does not merit equivalent protection."). In re Baby Girl S., 628 S.W.2d 261
(Tex. Civ. App. 1982), cert, granted sub nom., Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of
Abilene, 459 U.S. 1145, vacated and remanded, 460 U.S. 1074 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (statute giving unwed mother butl not unwed father
right to block an adoption is a violation of equal protection; not denial of equal protection to deny unwed father who has participated in rearing of his child right to
veto adoption of child); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (Upholding Georgia
statute denying father who had not legitimated child right to sue for child's wrongful death); Quillon v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (unmarried father may not legitimate child and block adoption of child where adoption is in the child's best
interests); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). See further If ancy S. Erickson,
The Feminist Dilemma Over Unwed Parents* Custody Rights: > Mother's Rights
Must Take Priority, 2 Law & Inequality 447 (1984).
17. O'Brien v. Tilson, 523 F. Supp. 494 (E.D.N.C. 1981); J.
v. Burch, 466 F.
Supp. 714 (D. Hawaii 1979), noted in 18 J. Fam. L. 408 (1979-80); I\ re Schiffman, 28
Cal. 3d 640, 620 P.2d 579,169 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1980); Doe v. Han<
County Board of
Health, 436 N.E.2d 791 (Ind. 1982) (Hunter, J., dissenting);
itary of the Commonwealth v. City Clerk of Lowell, 373 Mass. 178, 366 N.E.2d 17 (1977); Doe v.
Dunning, 87 Wash. 2d 50, 549 P.2d 1 (1976).
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husbands* and families' expectations. 18 Such hesitation is based in
part on individual women's resistance to appear as if they are only
fighting domestic matters in public. No organization monitors development of this issue despite the fact that new casts are continuously arising and establishing new law that affects all women. The
right of women to name their children has not yet received the attention of feminist and civil rights activists as an issue in need of a
carefully planned strategy for necessary legal reform.
This article sets forth the law of naming children as it has
been inherited from England and developed in this country. It discusses the rights of the three people always involved in the determination of a child's name: the mother, the father, and the child.
Parts II and IV discuss the various naming rights women have
achieved: the right of married women and men in agreement to
name their children without state interference, and the invalidity
of state statutes requiring that children bear specific names on
their birth certificates. Part III explains the traditional right of
women to name nonmarital children, and part V considers the law
in disputes between fathers and mothers over naming infant marital and nonmarital children. Part VI analyzes disputes between
parents about naming older marital children originally given the
paternal name. Part VII sets forth the custodial parent presumption as a solution to determining which parent should be entrusted
with the right of naming children. Part VIII examines the arguments of fathers and the contention that the maternal name implies illegitimacy. Finally, part IX discusses the role of legislation,
constitutional challenges, and the Equal Rights Amendment in assuring a woman's right to name children on an equal basis to men.
The first section sets forth the the common law of names,
which is based on English common law, and followed generally in
the United States. This section further summarizes ihe context in
which litigation over naming children arises and sets forth the importance of developments of the past decade in the movement toward recognizing the right of women to participate ijri the naming
of their children.
A.

English Common Law

American states, except Louisiana, 19 expressly fallow English
18. One married woman rented a post office box for the sole purpose of corresponding with the author about the possibility of giving her child her name instead
of her husband's and still keeping her marriage intact. She anticipated unreasonableness and hostility to the idea from her husband.
19. Commentators and courts usually contend that Louisiana follows the civil
law and a married woman never loses her "patronymic" name alt3;hough "she has
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common law. In contrast to the civil law of the continent,20 the
common law recognizes the right of all persons to use and be
known for all legal and social purposes by the surname(s) they
choose as long as they do not do so for a fraudulent purpose.
Under the common law, fraudulent purpose meant intent to conceal one's person to avoid being recognized.21 A person can be
the right to use her husband's name in all acts of her civil life ahd even of her commercial life." 1 Marcel Plainiol & Georges Ripert, Traite El^mentaire De Droit
Civil, Pt. 1, p. 258, §§ 390, 392 (1935). Thus the fact that a remarried woman signed
her marriage license in her "maiden name" did not indicate she had not been previously married: "[I]n law, she still retained her maiden name, and bore Rupp's
name, if married to him, as a matter of custom." Succession of foieipp, 172 La. 411,
416, 134 So. 376, 378 (1931). Where defendents did not show that a woman was
known by her "maiden name" a lien in the woman's husband's name was not held
improper. Pugh v. Theall, 342 So. 2d 274 (La. Ct. App. 1977), «H*. denied, 344 So. 2d
1055 (La. 1977). Louisiana law recognizes the custom of a wife Rising her husband's
name. Welcker v. Welcker, 342 So. 2d 251 (La. Ct. App. 19^7), cert, denied sub
nom., Welcker v. Little, 343 So. 2d 1077 (La. 1977) (denying injunctive relief of man
against his ex-wife from continuing to use "his" name); Coyle v. Coyle, 268 So. 2d
520 (La. Ct. App. 1972) (denying injunction to man against his e^x-wife from continuing to use his full name proceeded by "Mrs."). Louisiana wom^n nonetheless have
had to litigate to vote using their birth names due to a re-registj*ation statute referring to changes of name by "marriage or otherwise." Boothe v. Papale, No. 74-1939,
Slip. Op. at 3 (E.D. La. Feb. 11, 1975) ("The Court . . . concludes that under the
Law of Louisiana a wife never loses her patronymic name.") (citing Planiol, supra);
Nett v. Parish Registrar of Voting, No. 568-265 (Civ. Dist. Ct1 Parish of Orleans,
April 2, 1976) (Judgment for Plaintiff on Motion for Summary Judgment).
A 1950 Tulane Law Review note analyzed Louisiana as a tommon law names
state. Note, Names—Change of Name, 24 Tul. L. Rev. 496 (1^50) and the case of
Wilty v. Jefferson Parish Dem. Exec. Comm., 245 La. 145, 197 So. 2d 718 (1963)
leave room for doubt as to how Louisiana law really differs frojn the common law.
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:34(l)(a)(iii) (July, 1983) repealed the law requiring newborn marital children to be given their fathers' names on their fcirth certificates. It
specified that marital newborns be given the husband's name, or, if both parents
agree, the "maiden" name of the mother or a combination of the two, rendering
references to a woman never losing her "patronymic" name obsolete. A bill to delete the preference for the paternal name and the superior right of the father to
veto any other name died in committee during the 1985 Legislative Session. S. Bill
No. 227 (1985).
20. Noncommon law countries regulate personal names by statutory prescription. Charles F. Blackman, The Civil Sacrament: Law and Practice of Soviet Weddings, 28 Am. Jur. Comp. L. 555 (1980); Symposium on the Status of Women in
Various Countries, 20 Am. Jur. Comp. L. 585, 588 (Ruth Bader Ginsburg ed. 1972);
Symposium on Law and the Status of Women, 8 Colum. Hun*. Rts. L. Rev. 1, 15
(1976).
21. The Marriage Act of 1823, 4 Geo. 4, c. 76, ss. 7 and 22 (repealed, Marriage
Act of 1949, c. 76, s. 25) required persons to publish notice of their marriage in their
"true" Christian and surnames. A marriage published "knowingly and wilfully . . .
without due publication" was void. Sullivan v. Sullivan (1818) 2 Hag. Con. 238 ("I
am of the opinion that the interposition of the name of Holmes is not calculated to
conceal the identity of the woman"); Wiltshire v. Prince (1830) ? Hag. Ecc. 332, 334,
27 Digest 48, 162 E.R. 1176 ("both the man and the woman were aware that the
banns had been published in a manner calculated to conceal thte identity of one of
the parties"); Tooth v. Barrow (1854), 1 Ecc. and Ad. 371, 164 E.R. 214; Dancer v.
Dancer (1948) 2 All E.R. 731; Chipchase v. Chipchase, (1941) 2 All E.R. 560. A
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known by more than one surname, although at old English common law, one could have only one first—Christiar*— name which
could be changed only at baptism, confirmation or royal decree.22
A person's "full" name usually includes a first and last name; middle names are not required or strictly part of a person's name in
the sense that they must be used.23 Courts do not deem prefixes
and titles such as Ms., Mr., Miss, Mrs., or Dr., suffixes such as Jr.
or Sr., or education degree initials part of a person'? name.24
Pursuant to the common law, people can change their names
at will, without judicial proceedings. State name change statutes
"maiden" name could conceal or be used to conceal identity when the woman was
no longer known by it. Fendall v. Goldsmid (1877), 2 P.D. 263.; Allen v. Wood
(1834), 1 Bing. N.C. 81, 4 Moo. and S. 510, 3 L.J.C.P. 219, 131 E.R. 1020; Parks v.
Tolman, 113 Mo. App. 14, 87 S.W. 576 (1905), although a "maided name" is not per
se an alias. State v. Braxton, 294 N.C. 446, 242 S.E.2d 769 (1978). As a criminal
standard for the fraudulent use of a name, concealing one's identity in itself is constitutionally vague. Esco v. State, 43 Ala. App. 61,179 So. 2d 766 (1965). See United
States v. Wasman, 484 F. Supp. 54 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (adopting name to conceal being
Jewish to trade with Arab merchants constitutes fraudulent name usage); People v.
Briggins, 50 N.Y.2d 302, 406 N.E.2d 766, 428 N.Y.S.2d 909 (198<b (using assumed
name to hide finances from wife not a fraudulent usage as to creditor).
22. Co. Litt. 3a; Re Parrott (1946) 1 All E.R. 321; Personal Naikes, 26 The Solicitors Journal 689 (Sept. 9, 1882); Lawyer, The Legal Status of a Name, 40 Cen L.J.
316 (1895). The old English rule has been eroded and considered no longer in effect
by legal commentary. Names and Arms, Change of, 22 Halsb. L. Eng. 1211 (3d ed.);
W.E. Lisle Benthan, What's In a Name? Justice of the Peace ana Local Gov't Rev.
616 (Sept. 29, 1951); Vincent Powell-Smith, Change of Name Problems, The New
L.J. 1027 (July 7, 1966). American courts have not carved out an exception to the
common law right of name change to first names. In re Faith's Application, 22 N.J.
Misc. 412, 39 A.2d 638 (1944); Roberts v. Mosier, 35 Okla. 691, 132 P. 678 (1913) (citing examples of Presidents Cleveland and Grant and others who changed first
names); Stevenson v. Ellisor, 270 S.C. 560, 243 S.E.2d 445 (1978); Op. Att'y Gen.
Ken. (May 14, 1974); Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. (March 4, 1976) (President Carter's first
name a change, not a nickname). State legislatures in the U.S. are deleting the
term "Christian" name from their statutes. E.g., 1979 Wis. Laws 337 amending Wis.
Stat. §§ 443.01(8), 446.02(2), 447.05(7), 447.08(7).
23. 57 Am. Jur. 2d Name § 4 (1971); 65 C. J.S. Names § 4; G.S. Arnold, Personal
Names, 15 Yale L.J. 227, 228 (1905-06); Perays Morris, The Middle Initial, Dicta 361
(Nov.-Dec. 1960); Turner v. Gregory, 151 Mo. 100, 52 S.W. 234 (1899); ImperialYumo Production v. Hunter, 609 P.2d 1329, 1330-31 (Utah 1980). Generally courts
give middle names or initials little legal significance. This approach, which is
rooted in the common law recognition of only one Christian name, is not without
exception.
24. 57 Am. Jur. 2d Name § 1; 65 C.J.S. Names § 3 (1966). "Mrs " is not part of a
name and raises no presumption in law that the person using it is married. Davis v.
Roos, 326 So. 2d 226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Carlton v. Phelan, 100 Fla. 1164, 131
So. 117 (1930); Hubbard v. State, 123 Ga. App. 597, 181 S.E.2d 890 (1971); Bank of
America Nat. Trust and Savings Ass'n v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 90 Ga. App. 332, 83
S.E.2d 66 (1954); City of Camilla v. May, 70 Ga. App. 136, 27 S.E.2d 777 (1943); Guyton v. Young, 84 Ga. App. 155, 65 S.E.2d 858 (1951); Wrightsville and T.R. Co. v.
Vaughan, 9 Ga. App. 371, 71 S.E. 691 (1911); Brown v. Reinke, 159 Minn. 458, 199
N.W. 235 (1924); State ex rel Rainey, M.D. v. Crowe, 382 S.W.2d 38 (Mo. Ct. App.
1964); In re Dengler, 246 N.W.2d 758 (N.D. 1976); Hamilton v. Stat^ 555 S.W.2d 724
(Tenn. 1977); Walker v. Jackson, 391 F. Supp. 1395 (E.D. Ark. 197^).
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are meant to be in aid of that right, as optional meakis of making a
record of a name change. In England, changing oners name is statutorily defined as "exercising a deed poll."25
At common law no one has a property rightl to a personal
name such that she can keep another from using ii. 26 Consistent
with the right to change one's name is the right not to change it at
marriage as most women traditionally have done.27 A woman has
the right to discard her pre-marriage name by failing to use it; failure to use a name can lead to its extinction as a reliable means of
25. Enrollment of Deeds (Change of Name), Regulations 1949, S.I. 1949 No. 316
as amended by S.I. 1951 No. 377 and S.I. 1969 No. 1432; Olive Stone, The Status of
Women in Great Britain, 20 Am. J. Comp. L. 592 (1972); Smith v. United States
Casualty Co., 197 N.Y. 420, 90 N.E. 947 (1910); In re Snook, 2 ffilt. Rep. 566 (N.Y.
1859); In re Useldinger, 35 Cal. App. 2d 723, 96 P.2d 959 (1939); Iri re Ross, 8 Cal. 2d
608, 67 P.2d 94 (1937); noted in Discharge in Bankruptcy as Affecting
Individuals
Right to Change Name, 26 Cal. L. Rev. 268 (1938); In re HauptR 263 Ind. 150, 312
N.E.2d 857 (1974); Loser v. Plainfield Savings Bank, 149 Iowa 672, 128 N.W. 1101
(1901); In re Buyarsky, 322 Mass. 335, 77 N.E.2d 216 (1948); In \e Merolevitz, 320
Mass. 448, 70 N.E.2d 249 (1946); In re Falcucci, 355 Pa. 588, 50 A.2d 200 (1947); Laflin and Rand Co. v. Steytler, 146 Pa. 434, 23 A. 215 (1892).
26. Arnold, supra note 23; Weingand v. Loire, 231 Cal. AjJp. 2d 289, 41 Cal.
Rptr. 778 (1964); George Cohen, The Law Concerning Change of Personal Names, 2
Conn. B.J. 110 (1928); In re Falcucci, 355 Pa. 588, 50 A.2d 200 (1947), noted in Clark,
Name Case of Falcucci To Frame, 3 J. Mo. B. 80 (May, 1947); DuBoulay v. DuBoulay (1869) L.R. 2 P.C. 430; Cowley v. Cowley (1901) A.C. 450.
Accordingly, women have adopted names of men with whom they live. Clark
v. Clark, 19 Kan. 522 (1878). A wife is entitled to adopt her husband's name but has
no right to enjoin others from using the same despite personal displeasure or embarrassment. O'Brien v. Eustice, 198 111. App. 510, 19 N.E.2d 137 (1939); Lowe v.
Lowe, 265 N.Y. 197,192 N.E. 291 (1934); Bauman v. Bauman, 250 JN.Y. 382, 165 N.E.
819 (1929); Somberg v. Somberg, 263 N.Y. 1,188 N.E. 137 (1933). One court denied a
minor son the right to enjoin another woman from using "Mrs " and his father's
full name. Bartholomew v. Workman, 197 Okla. 267,169 P.2d 1012 (1946). Another
court denied a married woman the right to preclude the other woman from naming
her nonmarital child with the woman's husband's surname. In re\ M, 91 N.J. Super.
296, 219 A.2d 906 (1966). While assumption of the man's name is evidence of an intent to hold herself out as his wife, courts do not require such assumption in a common law marriage. State v. Durnam, 49 Ohio App. 2d 231, 360 N.E.2d 743 (1976); In
re Glasco, 619 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981). But see In re Liijda Ann, 126 Misc.
2d 43, 480 N.Y.S.2d 996 (Sup. Ct. 1984) in which a New York City trial court refused
to grant an unmarried woman's petition for a court order changing her surname to
that of her lover whom the court presumed was married to another woman
although recognizing that pursuant to the common law no judicial proceeding is
necessary to change a name.
27. Vera Brittain, Surnames of Married Women, 12 Equal Rts. 317 (Nov. 14,
1925); Stone, supra note 25, at 606; Note, Bill 28—An Act to Am&nd the Change of
Name Act, 41 Sask. L. Rev. 177 (1976-77); Cowley v. Cowley, (19^1) A.C. 450; In re
Fry Reynolds v. Denne (1945), 1 Ch. 348; The King v. Inhabitantiof St. Faith's, III
Dow. and Ry. 348 (K.B. 1823), discussed in Helena Normanton, The Institution of
the Surname, 12 Equal Rts. 30, 31 (March 7, 1925); Cecil Henry Ewen, History of
Surnames of the British Isles 391-92 (1931); Rainey, The OrigirJs of English Surnames 82-85 (1962); Leslie Gilbert Pine, The Story of Surnames £3 (1966); M. Turner-Samuels, The Law of Married Women (1957).
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identification.28
A person's right to use and change names und^r the common
law does not depend upon one's right or marital status or sex.
Men can change their names to those of their wives or to any
other name. This custom is not uncommon at old English common
law and has received some recent legal and social attention in the
United States.29 Clearly set forth in Halsbury's\Laws of England ,30 this common law of personal names should py now be part
of common legal knowledge.31
28. A woman can lose the right to use her birth name as her "true" name by
nonusage. Fendall v. Goldsmid, (1877) 2 P.D. 263; Allen v. Wcjod, (1834) 1 Bing.
N.C. 81, 4 Moo. and S. 510, 3 L.J.C.P. 219, 131 E.R. 1020; Chipcfiase v. Chipchase,
(1941) 2 All E.R. 560.
29. Pine, supra note 27. Some state statutes provide for nken to adopt their
wives' names and hyphenate their names when they marry or divorce. Supra note
9. The Tennessee Supreme Court stated that a statute requiring a person to re-register within 90 days "after he changes his name by marriage or otherwise" is
"equally susceptible of the construction that when either party to the civil contract
of marriage elects to use the name of the other, the registration will be changed."
Dunn v. Palermo, 522 S.W.2d 679, 680 (Term. 1975). Three attorneys general have
issued opinions recognizing men's common law right to change their names because
of marriage. Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. (Aug. 25, 1984); Op. Att'y Ge^i. Mich. (April 14,
1980); Op. Att'y Gen. Me. (April 4, 1978).
The modern man who changes his name to that of his wife currently receives
media attention similar to, but somewhat less sympathetic than, that which women
received a decade ago when they did not change theirs. Detroit Free Press columnist Nickie McWhirter commented: "So far . . . we haven't taken the next step.
That would be for a man to trade his surname for his wife's. . . . I guess they won't
do that, not until she is president of Seagram's anyway." Nickie McWhirter, Next
Play in the Name Game is for Him to Adopt Hers, Detroit Frpe Press, June 11,
19S2
Without court orders men have experienced difficulty using their wive's names.
Men's difficulties, however, are not comparable to the obstacles women experienced exercising their right to not change their names. See, e.g. J Dave Gourevitch,
Double Standard Irks Spouse of Electrician, Palm Beach Post, June 25, 1982 (man
denied driver's license in new marital name). In contrast to the support his predecessors gave the issue of women's names, the Florida attorney general declined to
intervene in this situation. He advised a state legislator that the correct agency
must inquire in order to render an opinion on the issue. Letter to William G. Myers, Representative, from Jim Smith, Florida Attorney General (^July 13, 1982) and
to author (August 6, 1982).
30. Husband and Wife Assumption by Wife of Husband
m e , 22 Halsb. L.
of Eng., § 1018 at 633 (4th ed. 1979).
31. "A woman is not legally obligated to assume her husband's name when she
marries him," reads a trivia book. E.C. McKenzie, Salted Peanuts, A Fun-Filled
Collection of 1800 Tantalizing Facts (1972). Most advice columnists have acknowledged the right. See, e.g., Abigail Van Buren advises addressing two surnamed
couples "Mr. Peter Smith and Ms. Joan Jones." Dear Abby, Faulty
Invitations
May Miss This Ms., Fairmont Sentinel, Dec. 5,1982. The beleaguered Environmental Protection Agency head Anne Burford was criticized for changing her name
when she married, thereby deflecting the adverse publicity against her. Susan
Trausch, New Name Stirs Brouhaha, Boston Globe, March 3, 198a.
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The law recognizes names as words 32 which identify a person,
the "designation or appellation used to distinguish one person
from another." 33 Courts deem irrelevant the intrinsic or personal
meaning people give to their names. The name "is not the person,
but only a means of designating the person intended." 34 A name
assists the state's interest in proper identification. As stated by the
Pennsylvania attorney general, in interpreting state law requiring
persons to vote in their "surname," a citizen must g|ve her or his
name
for the same reason that he or she must provide information
as to height, color of hair and eyes, and date of birth: this is
the means by which an identity is established, so that the applicant may be assured of the right to exercise the franchise,
while the state may guard against any fraudulent exercise of
that right.35
A person's name in law is merely evidence of ofte's person, a
symbol of one's identity. The term "legal" name, carelessly used
in the United States as a registered inflexible name equivalent to a
social security number and dependent upon one's marital, sex or
birth status, is unknown to the common law. "[T]here is no such
thing as a legal name' of an individual in the sense that he may
not lawfully adopt or acquire another and lawfully do business
under the substituted appellation" wrote the Iowa Supreme Court
in 1901 in a frequently cited case. 36
32. A number is not a name. In re Dengler, 287 N.W.2d 637, 639 (Minn. 1979),
appeal dismissed, 446 U.S. 949 (1980); In re Dengler, 246 N.W.2d [758 (N.D. 1976)
(number 1069 is not a "name"). In re Ritchie III, 159 Cal. App. 3d 1070, 206 Cal.
Rptr. 239, (1984) (Numeral III is not a name, following the Dengler cases). See
Thomas Lockney & Karl Ames, Is 1069 a Name?, 29 Names 1 (1981).
33. Romans v. State, 178 Md. 588, 596, 16 A.2d 642, 646 (1940).
34. Emery v. Kipp, 154 Cal. 83, 87, 97 P. 17, 19 (1908). "The Waning of the
word constituting the name of a person is of no importance, for, considered as a
name, it derives its whole significance from the fact that it is the mark or indicia by
which he is known." In re Snook, 2 Hilt. Rep. 566, 566-67 (1859). The periodical,
Names, published by the American Names Society, regularly contributes to the
literature on the meaning and derivation of names which is beyond the scope of
this discussion. See also Elsdon Smith, The Story of Our Names (1970) and Smith
v. United States Casualty Co., 197 N.Y. 420, 90 N.E. 947 (1910). The Snook and
Smith cases relate most of the history of surnames discussed in leg^l commentary
and judicial opinions.
35. Op. Att'y Gen. Pa. No. 72 (Oct. 25, 1973).
36. Loser v. Plainfield Savings Bank, 149 Iowa 672, 677, 128 N.W.
N.V 1101, 1103
(1910):
|
In the absence of any restrictive statute, it is the common-law right of
a person to change his name, or he may by general usage or habit acquire a name notwithstanding it differs from the one given him in infancy. A man's name for all practical and legal purposes is tne name
by which he is known and called in the community where he lives and
is best known.
An English law professor summarized the common law of names in 1972: "In Eng-
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Just as English common law never required a married woman to adopt her husband's name, never has it required parents to
name marital children with their fathers' names.37 Nor does the
common law require nonmarital children to bear their mothers'
surnames. At common law a "bastard" had no name based on parentage, but was a "filius nullius"—a child of no one—and could
gain a name only by becoming known by it.38 By custom, however,
because mothers were the identified parents and took the care,
custody, and control of the children, the mothers named them,
usually but not always with their own surnames.3?
Minors' names at English common law weije established by
usage and could be changed at will, just as adults names could be
changed.40 Because parents had control of children, they generally
lish law, contrary to the law of most countries, there are ho rules about legal
names. The surname of any person, male or female, is the name by which he or
she is generally known, provided that the name was not assumed for any fraudulent purpose." Stone, supra note 25, at 606.
37. Cf. Secretary of the Commonwealth v. City Clerk of Lowell, 373 Mass. 178,
366 N.E.2d 717 (1977).
The California Supreme Court in In re Schiffman made the misleading statement that Henry VIII "required recordation of legitimate births in the name of the
father. Thence the naming of children after the fathers became the custom in England." 28 Cal. 3d at 643, 620 P.2d at 580, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 920, ttting Note, The Controversy Over Children's Surnames: Familial Autonomy, Equal Protection and the
Child's Best Interests, 1979 Utah L. Rev. 303, 305. The articte asserts that Henry
VIII caused a "record to be kept in every parish of the births, marriages, and deaths
of the parish inhabitants, with legitimate births generally being recorded in the
name of the father," id. at 305-06. The article cited In re Silook, 2 Hilt. 566, 571
(C.P.N.Y. City and County 1859), which advised that "a record was required to be
kept in every parish of births, marriages and deaths. . . . [T]nis recording of such
events in every family, led to the use of one name to designate members of one
family." However, until the Births and Deaths Registration Act of 1874 (37 and 38
Vict. c. 88) registration was voluntary according to the introductory notes to Halsbury's Laws of England. The 1874 Act referred to registering 'the names, if any, by
which it was registered is altered, or if it was registered without a name; when a
name is given to it." Sec. 25, Name reads "In column 2 (Name, if any)." Current
regulations read "(3) With respect to space 2 (Name and surname) the surname to
be entered shall be the surname by which at the date of the registration of the
birth it is intended that the child shall be known and, if a name is not given, the
registrar shall enter the surname by a horizontal line." S.I. 1968, 2049 18(3). It is
not an error of fact or substance per se to record a child in a name other than the
father's. D. v. B. (1979) 1 All E.R. 92. See generally In re SMpley, 26 Misc. 2d 204,
205 N.Y.S.2d 581 (Sup. Ct. Nassau, 1960); In re Snook, 2 Hift. 566 (C.P.N.Y. Cty.
1859); Smith v. United States Casualty Co., 197 N.Y. 420, 90 N.E. 947 (1910); In re
Falcucci, 355 P. 588, 50 A.2d 200 (1947).
I
38. W. Hooper, The Law of Illegitimacy (1911); Estate of Lund, 26 Cal. 2d 472,
159 P.2d 643 (1945); DuBoulay v. DuBoulay, (1869) 2 L.R.-P.C. 430: Shannon v. The
People, 5 Mich. 71 (1858).
39. Sullivan v. Sullivan (1818) 2 Hag. Con. 238,161 Eng. Rip. 728, affd, (1819) 3
Phill. Ecc. 45, 161 Eng. Rep. 1253; Wakefield v. MacKay (1807) 1 Hag. Con. 394, 161
Eng. Rep. 593; Wilson v. Brockley (1810) 1 Phill. Ecc. 132, 161 Eng. Rep. 937.
40. The cases under the old English statute requiring publication of an impending marriage (marriage banns statute) reflect examples of young persons who have
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caused them to be known by a certain name. 41 By custom, marital
children were initially named with their fathers' surnames and
thereafter known by them. 42 Children of married parents, however, sometimes took their mothers' surnames at birth or thereafter. 43 As the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated in
1977 in the United States' most comprehensive opinion on the
common law naming rights of adults and children, Secretary of the
Commonwealth v. City Clerk of Lowell :44 "[T]he common law
principle of freedom of choice in the matter of names extends to
the name chosen by a married couple for their chila."45
However, where parents have originally given a child the father's surname, the English courts have traditionally accorded
men superior naming rights in disputes between the parents over
changing the children's patronymic after divorce or separation.46
They have based this right on the man's prerogative to decide his
been known by different surnames throughout their minority. See supra note 21.
The right of minors to change their names (subject to their parents' authority)
without statutory proceedings is recognized in American caselaw. Clinton v. Morrow, 220 Ark. 377, 247 S.W.2d 1015 (1952); Burke v. Hammonds, $k S.W.2d 307 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1979); Hall v. Hall, 30 Md. App. 214, 351 A.2d 917 (1976) In re Natale, 527
S.W.2d 402 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Bruguier v. Bruguier, 12 N.J. sliper. 350, 79 A.2d
497 (1951). It must be noted that minors have never had a common law right to
name themselves independent of their parents. The State only recognized that minors' names could be changed without judicial proceedings. A recent valuable law
review note on In re Saxton, 309 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. 1981), cert^ denied, 455 U.S.
1034 (1982) did not emphasize this important distinction. Note, \Like Father, Like
Child: the Rights of Parents in their Children's Surnames, 70 Va.|L. Rev. 1303,1309
(1984)
41. Supra note 27 and accompanying text.
42. Supra note 30.
43. A prime example of this accepted variance in custom is Thomas Littleton,
son of Elizabeth Littleton and her husband Thomas Wescott. Co. Litt. 3a. The Ontario Law Reform Commission, used this example in its comprehensive study of
naming customs and laws in Ontario. Report on Changes of Name (1976); Mark
Anthony Lower, English Surnames: An Essay on Family Nomenclature, Historical,
Etymological, and Humorous 52 (1875); Rainey, supra note 27; Ewen, supra note 27.
44. 373 Mass. 178, 190, 366 N.E.2d 717, 725 (1977).
Courts and state attorney generals have accepted naming one's children as an
incident of childrearing: "The naming of a child is a right and privilege belonging to
the child's parents." D'Ambrosio v. Rizzo, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 926, 425 N.E.2d 369
(1981); See also L.A.M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827, 832 (Alaska 1976); Parks v. Francis's
Administrator, 50 Vt. 626 (1878); Hosmer v. Hosmer, 611 S.W.2d 32 (Mo. Ct. App.
1980). The Attorney General of Connecticut wrote in 1975:
The natural parents, or parent, as the case may be, have legal responsibility for the children which may be terminated only after pertain procedures and findings are followed and made. . . . Until sucjh time, the
parents have the prerogatives as well as the responsibilities and duties
which devolved upon them. One of the prerogatives is naming the
child.
'
Op. Att'y Gen. Conn. 5 (Jan. 23, 1975).
45. 373 Mass. 178, 190, 366 N.E.2d 717, 725 (1977).
46. E.g., W. v. A. (1981) 2 W.L.R. 124, noted in Note, Changelof Child's Name,
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children's names, and the supposed best interests [of the children,
and not on a factual or legal presumption that minors should not
change their names at all during their childhood.
B.

Erosion of the Common Law

Several states, in various contexts, have erodfed the common
law right to name children.47 A few states have |imited parents'
rights in naming marital children on their birth certificates. At
the beginning of the 1970s only Hawaii and Nortjh Carolina had
statutes requiring the father's name to be given to| newborn marital children. During the 1970s Florida, Louisiana 4nd New Hampshire passed similar laws. All of these statutes have been
invalidated as unconstitutional48 or repealed and replaced.49
Twelve states have passed statutes requiring that the
mother's name be given newborn nonmarital children on their
birth certificates absent an acknowledgement or determination of
paternity or legitimation.50 Three states statutorily mandate that
97 Law Q. Rev. 197 (1981); Re T (1963) 1 Ch. 238; Evelyn Ellis, pie Choice of Children's Surnames, 9 Anglo-Am. L. Rev. 92 (1980).
47. See infra notes 102-113 and accompanying text.
48. Jech v. Burch, 466 F. Supp. 714 (D. Hawaii 1979), declared Hawaii's statute
an unconstitutional infringement on parental liberty. A federal district court likewise invalidated North Carolina's statute as an unconstitutional infringement on
parents' right to privacy. O'Brien v. Tilson, 523 F. Supp. 494 (EjD.N.C. 1981). This
court also noted that the statute created a classification on the basis of gender and
birth status, and granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs. Id. Florida's statute
was invalidated as an unconstitutional intrusion on the parents' "constitutionally
protected right to choose the name of their child." Sydney v. Pingree, 564 F. Supp.
412, 413 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
49. Louisiana replaced its statute in July, 1983 with a provision which limits parental choices to the father's name, the mother's "maiden" name or a combination
thereof and gives the husband veto power over the latter two options by requiring
both parents' consent. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40.34(1)(a)(iii) (WJ>st Supp. 1985). A
recent attempt was made to revise this statute. See supra, note 19; infra, note 52.
North Carolina replaced its statute in 1983 with a provision that "[t]he surname of
the child shall be the same as that of the husband, except that upon agreement of
the mother and father . . . any surname may be chosen." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 130A101(e) (Supp. 1983). The New Hampshire legislature replaced its statute in 1979
with a law limiting parental naming options to "either the father or the mother or
any combination thereof." N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 126:6, V(a) (Repealed 1983). In
June, 1983 New Hampshire removed these limitations and amended the statute to
read that "[t]he surname of the child shall be any name chosen by the parents."
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 126:6-a, 1(a) (Supp. 1983). In case of separation or divorce at
the time of birth, "the choice of surname rests with the parent Who has actual custody following birth." Id.
50. D.C. Code Ann. § 6-205(e)(5) (Supp. 1984); Fla. Stat. I n n . § 382.16(5)(e)
(West Supp. 1983); Ga. Code Ann. § 31-10-9(e)(5) (Supp. 1984); I Hawaii Rev. Stat.
§ 574-3 (Supp. 1984); Ind. Code Ann. § 16-1-16-15 (Burns 1983); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§213.050(1) (1982); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40-34(l)(a)(iii) (West! 1985); N.D. Cent.
Code § 23-02.1-13(6) (1983); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3705.14 (Page 1980); Tenn. Code
Ann. § 68-3-305(b) (1983); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-1-411 (1977). A new law in North
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upon a determination or acknowledgement of paternity or legitimation the surname on a child's birth certificate automatically becomes the same as the father's, or that the father hps the right to
choose the name. 51
Louisiana,52 Nebraska,53 and Tennessee54 currently restrict
marital newborn children's surnames on their certificates to those
of the mother, father or a combination thereof. Several states
have regulations to the same effect.55 Similarly, nine states statutorily limit the surnames given to nonmarital children on their
Carolina recognizes the father's right to participate in the naming, but requires the
mother's name be given a nonmarital child m cases of disagreement N C Gen
Stat § 130A-101(f) (Supp 1983) For a statutory compilation, seeJNote, The Controversy Over Children's Surnames
Familial Autonomy, Equal Protection and the
Child's Best Interests, 1979 Utah L Rev 303, 335-45 The author'L categorization of
changes m birth certificate records as a "change of name" is not accurate Whether
or not a change m the name on a birth certificate amounts to a "change of name"
depends on the age of the child when the birth certificate is changed and the name
by which the child has been known In considermg the names of infants or very
young children who do not yet know their names, the courts give mconsistent attention to the issue of whether a determmation of the child's name is really a
change at such an age See infra notes 114-148 and accompanying text
51 Indiana, Kentucky and South Carolina still have such laws Statutes in Alabama, North Carolina and South Dakota have been invalidated as unconstitutional
Roe v Conn, 417 F Supp 769 (M D Ala 1976), Jones v McDowell, 53 N C App
434, 281 S E 2 d 192 (1981), Boelter v Blair, No Civ 81-4217 ( S D S D April 21, 1982)
(Judgment) The Kentucky statutes are currently bemg reviewed for revision
Conversation with John H Walker, Counsel to the Kentucky Department For
Human Resources (June 7, 1985)
52 La Rev Stat Ann § 40 34(A)(a)(l)(ui) (West 1984)
The surnames of the child shall be the surname of the husband of the
mother if he was married to the mother at the time of conception and
birth of the child or had not been legally divorced from the mother of
the child for more than three hundred days prior to the birth of the
child, or, if both the husband and mother agree, the surname of the
child may be the maiden name of the mother or a combination of the
surnames of the husband and the maiden name of the mother
The defeated bill to correct this statute provided "The surname of the child shall
be the surname agreed upon by the mother and the husband of the mother " S
Bill No 227 (1985)
53 Neb Rev Stat § 71-640 01(1) (1981)
[T]he surname of the child shall be entered on the certificate as being
(a) the same as that of the husband, unless paternity has been determined otherwise by a court of competent jurisdiction, (b) the surname
of the mother, (c) the maiden surname of the mother, or (d) the hyphenated surname of both parents
54 Tenn Code Ann § 68-3-305(a) (1983)
The surname of the child shall be entered on the certificate as that of
the natural father, except that where the mother though married has
retained her married surname, then on sworn application of both parents, the child's surname to be entered on the birth certificate may be
the maiden surname of the child's mother, or both surnames as the
parents mutually agree
55 See, eg , Sec 4(e)(1) Ark Rules and Regulations Pertaining to Vital
Records (1981), N J Admin Code tit 8 § 2-1 l(a)(l)(u) (1975) (New Jersey Department of Health Rules Recording and/or Correctmg Original Birth Certificate of a
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birth certificates to the mother's, the father's, or a combination of
both upon their joint request following acknowledgement or determination of paternity or legitimation.56
The consequence of this erosion of the commbn law has been
to generate a new type of litigation, that by parents against the
state instead of against each other.
C.

Contexts of Litigation

Litigation over children's names generally arises between
separated or divorced parents over the change of tlhe child's name
from the father's name. The language in United States cases concerning children bearing the paternal name and regarding the father's "natural," "primary," "time-honored,!' "legal" or
"protectible" right 57 to name marital children derives from disputes of this kind, not from any state requirements that children
bear certain names. No reported case involves a parental dispute
over naming children in an ongoing marriage, either at birth or
thereafter.58
Child Born In or Out of Wedlock); Sec. 1-311(I)(B) (1982) Oklahoma Rules and
Regulations Governing Vital Statistics Registration of Birth Certificates.
56. E.g., D.C. Code Ann. § 6-205(e)(3) (Supp. 1984); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 382.16(5)(c)
(West Supp. 1983); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 574-2 (Supp. 1984); I^eb. Rev. Stat. § 71640.01(2) (1981); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 126:6-a(II)(a) and (IV) (1983); Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 3705.14 (Page 1980); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 34-25-15 (Supp. 1984);
Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-3-305(b) (1983); Va. Code § 32.1-269(D) (Supp. 1984); Wyo.
Stat. Ann. § 35-l-411(d) (1977).
57. See generally In re Tubbs, 620 P.2d 384 (Okla. 1980); kobinson v. Hansel,
302 Minn. 34, 223 N.W.2d 138 (1974); Application of Lone, 134 N.J. Super. 213, 338
A.2d 883 (1975). A trial court in New Jersey recently refused to follow the Lone
reasoning in In re Rossell, 196 N.J. Super. 109, 481 A.2d 602, 605 (1984)
The principle which it \Lone] espouses denies equality. The right of
the father to have his child bear his name is no greater than the right
of the mother to have her child bear her name. The deference which
Lone accords the father is a deference rooted in an antiquity.
58. A singular case involved a child who had always born her mother's birth
given surname. In a divorce action the trial court, on its own motion, referred to
the child by the husband's surname. The father, however, w4s not attempting to
change the child's name and the appellate court said that the lower court's reference did not operate to change the child's surname. In re Ramirez, 31 Or. App. 959,
571 P.2d 1280 (1977).
As head of the household under the common law, the father in an ongoing
marriage probably would have been judged to have the primary right of naming—
first, middle and last names—over the mother. See Kathleen A. Ryan Carlsson,
Surnames of Women and Legitimate Children, 17 N.Y.L.F. 852 (1971).
At common law the father had absolute control and custody of his marital children after divorce. Herma Hill Kay, Sex-Based Discrimination: Text, Cases and
Materials 299 (1981). Commonwealth recognized the father's absolute control by
citing cases in which fathers contracted with third persons for money in exchange
for naming their children for them. 373 Mass. 178, 366 N.E.2d 717 (1977). Gardner
v. Denison, 217 Mass. 492, 105 N.E. 359 (1914); Eaton v. Libbekr, 165 Mass. 218, 42
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Courts would have certain jurisdiction to entertain disputes
over children's names in ongoing marriages in two contexts: 1)
statutory name change proceedings, probably in a state not requiring both parents to petition for consent to the chandi]e, or 2) actions
against the state for recognizing one parent's choic^ of name over
the other's for driving, school registration, or the like Most likely
courts will discuss the relative rights of parents ir\ ongoing marriages to name infants and older children in
J between divorced parents who have legal and actual joint cu^iItody following
divorce. 59
Recent litigation has, additionally, arisen in %he context of
parents challenging statutory or other state requirements that
they name their children in a particular way at bikh or thereafter. 60 Statutes recognizing a superior naming righ^ in the father
generate litigation by women against the state. 61
D.

Developments

of the 1970s and Early 1980s

To plan legal action and strategy for the next qecade it is necessary to articulate the precise extent of women's legal right to
name their children. Summarizing the advances made to date acknowledges our history and sets the stage for an evaluation of our
future. The last several years have seen the following recognition
N.E. 1127 (1896). There is, however, no case on the issue of a parental dispute in an
ongoing marriage.
Several of the earliest state attorney general opinions state that a father's
change of name does not automatically change his children's names absent their usage of the same. Op. Att'y Gen. Cal. (Sept. 25, 1969); Op. Att'y (pen. Cal. (Nov. 26,
1943); Op. Att'y Gen. Mo. (May 15, 1951); Op. Att'y Gen. Mo. (March 22, 1951).
Some state name change statutes have provided that a change bf name of a man
changes his wife's and children's names also. Vermont repealed the country's last
such statute in 1979. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 814 (1974), repealed^ by 1979 Vt. Acts,
No. 142 (Adj. Sess.), Sec. 26.
As a general rule, absent criminal action or child abuse or neglect, the state
does not interfere with ongoing marriages and the rearing of children. See generally Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944);
Dike v. School Board of Orange County, 650 F. 2d 783, 786 (5th Cir. 1981)
59. In a recent decision the Minnesota Court of Appeals treated a situation involving joint legal custody in which physical custody was with the mother no differently than if the mother had sole legal custody. Young v. Your>g, 356 N.W.2d 825
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
60. See infra notes 81-96 and accompanying text.
61. See, e.g., Jones v. McDowell, 53 N.C. App. 434, 281 S.E.^d 192 (1981). The
Louisiana, North Carolina and Tennessee birth certificate statutes which require
the father's name be given a newborn marital child on its birth certificate unless
the father agrees otherwise are certain to create litigation which could be destined
for Supreme Court review within the next decade if they are r|ot repealed or revised. See supra notes 52-54.
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of the rights of parents to name their marital knd nonmarital
children:
1. Courts and state legislatures, attorneys gdneral and registrars of vital statistics have generally recognized that married parents have the common law right to name their newborn children
any surname they choose. 62
2. Courts and state attorneys general and registrars of vital
statistics have generally recognized that, absent & statute to the
contrary, unmarried women have the right to name their newborn
children either as a right superior to the father's or in the absence
62. The highest courts of two states have recognized the
law right of
parents to name their children with any surname they wish, Secretary <
of the Commonwealth v. City Clerk of Lowell, 373 Mass. 178, 366 N.E.24 717 (1977); Doe v.
Dunning, 87 Wash. 2d 50, 549 P.2d 1 (1976). On remand, the Fl4rida Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services determined that a statute
ng the father's
surname on its birth certificate encompassed a hyphenated ijiame including the
mother's surname. Rice v. Department of Health and Rehabil Services, 386 So. 2d
844 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (Case No. 80-1674) (on remand, Rjecommended Order
and Findings of Fact of Div. of Administrative Hearings, Dec. 3i,, 1980. Final order,
Jan. 13, 1981). Prior to the passage of the statute the Florida Attorney General had
ruled that parents had the right to give their children any surname. Op. Att'y Gen.
Fla. No. 076-235 (Dec. 21, 1976). The present statute was invalidated in 1982. Sydney v. Pingree, 564 F. Supp. 412 (S.D. Fla. 1982). Numerous state attorney generals
have recognized this common law right. Op. Att'y Gen. Alask^i (May 5, 1976); Op.
Att'y Gen. Conn. (Jan. 23,1975); Op. Att'y Gen. Me. (Aug. 18, 1076;; March 22,1977);
Op. Att'y Gen. Md. (Nov. 9, 1978); Op. Att'y Gen. Mass. (Jan. 24, 1974); Op. Att'y
Gen. Mich. (April 14, 1980); Op. Att'y Gen. Mo. (May 1, 1953); reaffirmed by Mo.
Att'y Gen. June 6, 1974; Op. Att'y Gen. Vt. No. 81-75 (March 10[ 1975); 63 Op. Att'y
Gen. Wis. 501 (Oct. 7, 1974).
Several state health agencies expressly recognize this; parental right and do not
require parents to choose a specific surname, e.g., "Illinois law does not specify
what name a child shall be given when a birth record is prepare^, Children of married or unmarried parents may be given any surname the parent or parents request." Letter from Aaron Bengeison, Deputy State Registrar}, to author (Feb. 3,
1982). "Iowa law does not specify as to, between two parents, who '.has the right to
determine surname for the child shall control. If parents disagree; it would seem
that the name provided on the child's birth certificate would control unless and until that name is changed pursuant to a court order." Letter from Ass't Attorney
General Jeanine Freeman to author (April 19, 1982). Mich Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 333.2824(1) (West 1980) provides that "the surname of the child [born to married
parents] shall be registered as designated by the child's parentis, N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 126:6-(a)(I)(a) (1983) reads: "The surname of the child shall be any name
chosen by the parents. . . . " S.C. Code Ann. vol. 24 A, R. 61-19 ^(g)(l) (Law. Co-op.
1982) reads: "The child's surname shall be entered on the certificate as designated
by the parents." Pennsylvania's published regulation, 28 Pa. (pode § 1.7(a) (1985)
reads: "The designation of a child's name, including surname is the right of the
child's parents. Thus, a child's surname . . . may be the surnarine of either or both
of the child's parents, a surname formed by combining the
i of the parents
in hyphenated or other form, or a name which bears no> relationshipto the surname
of either parent."
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of an objection by an acknowledged father.63
3. State registrars and health officials fori the most part
abide by the general rule of law that in the absence of a specific
statute to the contrary parents have the mutual right to name
their newborn marital children with any surname. 64 These officials also recognize an unmarried women's right td name newborn
nonmarital children with any surname on their birth certificates.65
63. Doe v. Dunning, 87 Wash. 2d 50, 549 P.2d 1 (1976); Secretary of Commonwealth v. City Clerk of Lowell, 373 Mass. 178, 366 N.E.2d 717 U977)
Several state attorney generals have recognized the commop law naming rights
of unmarried women. Op. Att'y Gen. Conn. (Jan. 23, 1975);
(April 8, 1977); Op. Atty. Gen. Me. (Feb. 23, 1978); 63 Att'y GeiL Md. 70 (1978); Op.
Att'y Gen. Pa. No. 75-8 (Feb. 19, 1975); Op. Att'y Gen. Tex. No. H-1078 (Oct. 26,
1977); Op. Att'y Gen. Vt. No. 81-75 (March 10, 1975); 63 Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. 501
(1974). Op. Att'y Gen. Mo. (May 1, 1953) was reaffirmed by the Missouri Attorney
General by opinion June 6, 1974. Statutes giving a father the right to name a child
upon legitimation or determination of paternity have been successfully challenged
in Alabama, North Carolina and South Dakota. See supra note 51.
64. Some registrars, however, convey to citizens their views of how parents
should name children.
There are no restrictions on the bestowing of surnames of children
born in Missouri. However, our experience has been that when a surname other than that of the father's is bestowed upon the issue of a
legitimate marriage problems with the record result for the parents
and child. . . . The mother of a child born out of lawful wedlock may
bestow upon the child any surname that she chooses. Again, this frequently causes problems for if she applies for public assistance, she
usually furnishes the agency with a different surname wfhich makes it
extremely difficult to identify the child's record so that the child may
qualify for any benefits that might be available.
Letter from Charles L. Bell, Director, Bureau of Vital Statistic^, Mo. Dept. of Social
Services, Division of Health to author (Jan. 22, 1982).
65. Several state health agencies expressly recognize this parental right of the
mother and do not require her to choose a specific name. E.g. 24A S.C. Code Ann.
Reg. 61-19(8)(g)(2) (Law. Co-op. 1983) ("In any case in which the mother was not
married either at the time of birth or conception and there is do paternity acknowledgment . . . the surname of the child shall be entered as designated by the
mother.").
"In the case of a child born out-of-wedlock, the mother niay choose any name
she wishes and that name is entered on the child's birth certificate." Letter from
Muriel E. Cedeno, Iowa State Department of Health, to authok- (Feb. 18, 1982).
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.2824 (West 1980) provides that, if the father is
named, at the consent of the mother and father, the name is| chosen by both parents. If the father is named as a result of a paternity suit as when a father is not
named at all, "[t]he surname of the child shall be entered on tke certificate of birth
pursuant to the designation of the child's mother."
"Mothers in Nevada, are allowed to name their child whatever they wish."
Letter from Mary Howard, Management Ass't, Nevada State Division of Health to
author (Feb. 23, 1982).
See supra note 63 for the two state court decisions recognizing women's common law rights in naming nonmarital children.
Several states operate pursuant to administrative regulations specifying what
names shall be given newborns. The validity of these regulations depends on the
states. Statutes prescribe names; record keepers do not. Sidney Norton, L^egal Aspects of Illegitimacy for the Registrar, 12 Md. L. Rev. 181 (1951).
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4 Wherever challenged, statutory requirements that either
a marital or nonmarital child bear its father's surname or its father's choice of surname on its birth certificate at birth 66 after acknowledgement or determination of paternity,67 or legitimation68
have been invalidated as unconstitutional.
5. In several of the appellate cases involvingI the naming of
marital children at birth or in their first few years where the parents disagree and the mother, who usually uses her birth given
surname, has custody, the courts have rejected the traditional superior naming right of the father and have awarded the naming
right to the custodial mother in one of three ways: 1) by declining
jurisdiction, 2) by a direct ruling, or 3) by remanding for a determination of the child's best interests. 69
6. Courts have moved in the direction of recognizing new
rights of men to name nonmarital children.70 As custodial parents
of nonmarital children, women, however, usually maintain their
right to determine their children's names at least when the children have been given a non-paternal name on their birth certificates or in early infancy.71
66 Sydney v Pingree, 564 F Supp 412 (S D Fla 1982), O' Brien v Tilson, 523
F Supp 494 (E D N C 1981), Jech v Burch, 466 F Supp 714 (D Hawaii 1979)
67 A statute requiring that a child bear the patronymic aftek* acknowledgment
or determination of paternity was invalidated in Boelter v Blair, No Civ 81-4217
(S D S D April 21, 1982) (Judgment)
|
68 Roe v Conn, 417 F Supp 769 (M D Ala 1976), Jones v McDowell, 53 N C
App 434, 281 S E 2d 192 (1981)
I
69 In re Schiffman, 28 Cal 3d 640, 620 P 2d 579,169 Cal Rpt^ 918 (1980), In re
Nguyen, 684 P 2 d 258 (Colo App 1983), cert denied, 105 S Ct ff85 (1985), Blasi v
Blasi, 648 S W 2d 80 (Ky 1983) (divorce court refused to exercise| jurisdiction to order mother to change infant's name back to father's by a statutory name change),
Webber v Parker, 167 So 2d 519 (La Ct App 1964), writ refused 264 La 886, 168
So 2d 269 (1964) (dispute over given names), Jacobs v Jacobs, 309 N W 2 d 303
(Minn 1981), Cohee v Cohee, 210 Neb 855, 317 N W 2d 381 (1982) (father's choice
honored—hyphenated name with his name first), In re Schidlmeier, No J 27018-85,
slip op (Pa Super Aug 9, 1985), In re M L P , 621 S W 2d 430 (Tex Civ App
1981), Hurta v Hurta, 25 Wash App 95, 605 P 2 d 1278 (1979) ty Laks v Laks, 25
Ariz App 58, 540 P 2d 1277 (1975) the court stated m dicta that parents have equal
rights to name marital children at birth The court did not indicate whether these
rights exist within or without an ongomg marriage
70 In re Schiffman, 28 Cal 3d 640, 620 P 2 d 579, 169 Cal Rj>t;r 918 (1980) (citing Donald J v Evna M , 81 Cal App 3d 929, 147 Cal Rptr 15 (1978)), Jacobs v
Jacobs, 309 N W 2d 303 (Minn 1981) (equal naming right at birtfi), Kirksey v Abbott, 591 S W 2d 751 (Mo Ct App 1979), Hardy v Hardy, 269 iMd App 412, 306
A 2d 244 (1973) (framing the father's right as an mterested part^ with information
pertaining to the child's mterests) In Kirksey, 591 S W 2d at 752, the court stated
"Neither parent has an absolute right for the child to bear his qr her name " The
Massachusetts Supreme Court did not explain whether or not the distinction between wed and unwed fathers was significant m a factually unclear setting Fuss v
Fuss, 371 Mass 64, 368 N E 2d 271 (1977)
|
71 Sullivan v McGaw, 134 111 App 3d 455, 480 N E 2 d 1283 (1985), In re
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Thus, wherever married parents are in agreement or there is
a statute requiring that a marital child be giver} its father's surname or choice of surname on its birth certificate, parents suing
jointly have prevailed in all challenges to mandatory state requirements. Courts hold that the requirements interfere with parental
liberty and privacy to rear children and discriminate on the basis
of sex or birth status.72 Only one reported case has challenged a
statute requiring the mother's name to be given a newborn marital
child on its birth certificate. The Indiana Supreme Court rejected
the challenge in a one-paragraph opinion, but a long dissent reasoned that the statute was unconstitutional.73 Where children are
newborn or very young (under three), until 1982 courts were upholding custodial mothers' judgments as to their children's names.
The courts in all such cases nevertheless consistently articulated
that women and men have equal rights in naming marital children
at birth. Since 1982,74 however, courts have retreated from awardG.L.A., 430 N.E.2d 433 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). G.L.A. overruled decision of the same
court rendered a year previously. D.R.S. v. R.S.H., 412 N.E..4d 1257 (Ind. Ct. App.
1980). D.R.S. awarded the primary naming right to the father as if he had been a
married father. G.L.A. was litigated expressly to undo the pad law articulated in
D.R.S. Although D.R.S. was on appeal when G.L.A. was; pending,;, the attorneys litigating G.L.A. did not know about the case until the decision appeared in the local
newspapers. The same appellate division decided the two
;. It went as far as
any court could be expected to in rectifying its own mistake bf only a few months
before. It is too early in litigation to evaluate if mothers of nonmarital children are
maintaining their naming right because they are the custodial parents. Courts have
always held that third persons have no legal interest in statutory name changes of
nonmarital children. In re Dunston, 18 N.C. App. 647, 197 S.E.2d 560 (1973);
Winkenhofer v. Griffin, 511 S.W.2d 216 (Ky. Ct. App. 1974); Ir\,re Toelkes, 97 Idaho
406, 545 P.2d 1012 (19 7 6).
72. See infra notes 81-96 and accompanying text.
73. In Doe v. Hancock County Board of Health, 436 N.E.:2d 791 (Ind. 1982), the
Indiana Supreme Court dismissed a challenge to the statute requiring the mother's
name to be given to a nonmarital child on its birth certificate The state moved to
dismiss because the Indiana Court of Appeals refused to accept its late-filed brief,
The Supreme Court granted the State's motion. Review beyond rehearing was not
sought because of the procedural posture of the case and because the parties intermarried.
An Indiana law, the constitutionality of which is yet to be tested,
mandatorily gave the parents the relief they sought as an automatic result of their
marriage—the father's name for the child. A long dissent reviewed the case on the
merits and concluded that the state cannot constitutionally interfere with unwed
parents' right to name their children.
Lawsuits against mother's name requirements are difficult to locate for three
reasons: 1) the parents intermarry and states will then change:e the children's birth
certificate names, 2) the mother or both parents want the mother's name and/or 3)
the mother or parents do not know where to get legal assistance, That new birth
certificates thus issued do not appear as an original marital child'ss birth certificate
has been ruled to not constitute discrimination on the basis of birth status. Dorian
v. Johnson, 297 N.W.2d 175 (S.D. 1980). Compare Doe v. Duikning, 87 Wash. 2d 50,
549 P.2d 1 (1976).
74. In re Saxton, 309 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. 1981), cert, denie^:, 455 U.S. 1034 (1982).
Cohee v. Cohee, 210 Neb. 855, 317 N.W.2d 381 (1982).
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ing women the right to name infant children over fathers* objections. They have almost unanimously upheld the demands of
divorced fathers to have children bear the patronymic.75
The naming of children is necessarily an orchestration of the
relative rights of parents against the state and each other.76 No
state has ever required a child to bear a certain surname simply
because of its birth status or parentage. Until very recently, all
states have expressly or indirectly accepted the primary right of
fathers over mothers to determine marital children':
a dispute between the parents arises. They have accepted a presumption that children are best off keeping their father's surnames if fathers want them to use them. 77 The recent at-birth
75. In re Presson, 102 111. 2d 303, 80 111. Dec. 294, 465 N.E.2d 85 (1984); In re
Meyer, 471 N.E.2d 718 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); Young v. Young, 356 N.W.2d 823 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1984); Lassiter-Geers v. Reichenbach, 303 Md. 88, 492 A.2d 303 (1985);
Overton v. Overton, 674 P.2d 1089 (Mont. 1983); Cohan v. Cunnijigham, 104 A.D.2d
716, 480 N.Y.S.2d 656 (1984); In re Newcomb, 15 Ohio App. 3d 1<W, 472 N.E.2d 1142
(1984); Brown v. Carroll, 683 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984). But see In re Goldstein, 104 A.D.2d 616, 479 N.Y.S.2d 385 (N.Y. App. 1984); compdre In re Fletcher,
144 Vt. 419, 468 A.2d 627 (1984). Ex parte Stone, 328 S.E.2d 346 (S.C. 1985). Trial
courts have also moved in the direction of sustaining the male naming power. In re
Petras, 123 Misc. 2d 665 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1984).
76. The yardstick used to measure these rights is supposedly the children's best
interests. See Annot., Rights and Remedies of Parents Inter Se With Respect to the
Names of Their Children, 92 A.L.R.3d 1091 (1979). Note, Domestic
Relations:
Change of Minor's Surname: Parental Rights in Minor's Surname: Sobel v. Sobel,
46 N.J. Super. 284, 134 A.2d 598 (Ch. 1957); Marshall v. Marshall, 93 So. 2d 822
(Miss. 1957), 44 Cornell L.Q. 144 (1958).
J
77. Arkansas: Norton v. Norton, 268 Ark. 791, 595 S.W.2d 709 (Ark. Ct. App.
1980); Carroll v. Johnson, 263 Ark. 280, 565 S.W.2d 10 (1978); Clinton v. Morrow,
220 Ark. 377, 247 S.W.2d 1015 (1952); Arizona: Laks v. Laks, 25 Ariz. App. 58, 540
P.2d 1277 (1975); California: see cases cited in In re Schiffman, i 8 Cal. 3d 640, 620
P.2d 579, 169 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1980); Delaware: Degerberg v. McCbrmick, 41 Del. Ch.
46, 187 A.2d 436 (1963); Degerberg v. McCormick, 40 Del. Ch.|471, 184 A.2d 468
(1962); District of Columbia: Nellis v. Pressman, 282 A.2d 539 (B.C. 1971), cert denied, 405 U.S. 975 (1972); Florida: Arnett v. Matthews, 259 So. 2d 535 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1972); Lazow v. Lazow, 147 So. 2d 12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Georgia: Doe
v. Roe, 235 Ga. 318, 219 S.E.2d 700 (1975); Illinois: In re Pressok, 116 111. App. 3d
458, 71 111. Dec. 816, 451 N.E.2d 970 (1984); In re Omelson, 112 111. App. 3d 725, 445
N.E.2d 951 (1983); Weinert v. Weinert, 105 111. App. 3d 56, 433 N-E.2d 1158 (1982);
Indiana: In re Meyer, 471 N.E.2d 718 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); Iowa: Green v. Sherman,
173 N.W.2d 843 (Iowa 1970); Kentucky: Burke v. Hammonds, 586 S.W.2d 307 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1974); Maryland: West v. Wright, 263 Md. 297, 283 A.2d 401 (1971); Hall v.
Hall, 30 Md. App. 214, 351 A.2d 917 (1976); Lassiter-Geers v. Reiihenbach, 303 Md.
88, 492 A.2d 303 (1985); Massachusetts: Margolis v. Margolis, 338 Mass. 416, 155
N.E.2d 177 (1959); Mark v. Kahn, 333 Mass. 517, 131 N.E.2d 758 (1956); Minnesota:
Robinson v. Hansel, 302 Minn. 34, 223 N.W.2d 138 (1974); In re Skxton, 309 N.W.2d
298 (Minn. 1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 1034 (1982); Young v. Yourlg, 356 N.W.2d 823
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Mississippi: Marshall v. Marshall, 230 Miss. 719, 93 So. 2d
822 (1957); Montana: Firman v. Firman, 187 Mont. 465, 610 P.2d 178 (1980); Nebraska: In re Spatz, 199 Neb. 332, 258 N.W.2d 814 (1977); New Jersey: In re Lone,
134 N.J. Super 213, 338 A.2d 883 (1975); W. v. H., 103 N.J. SuperL 24, 246 A.2d 501
(Ch. Div. 1968); Sobel v. Sobel, 46 N.J. Super. 284,134 A.2d 598 (Ch. Div. 1957); New
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naming cases were beginning to erode this right aiid presumption,
but to date only the California Supreme Court, in the landmark
case In re Schiffman , 78 has expressly rejected this niale power and
overturned all the state's precedent 79 based on it. In the cases involving older children, women prevail rarely and phen only when
they succeed in rebutting the superior right of thb father to control the naming of children, usually where the children have already been known by the name selected by the mother and/or
children. 80 Women have made some gains in naming children, but
York Cohan v Cunningham, 104 A D 2d 716, 480 N Y S 2d 656 (App Div 1984), In
re Goldstein, 104 A D 616, 479 N Y S 2 d 385 (1984), (trial ^evel cases) In re
Determan,Ar</LF 13 (Sup Ct Nassau Co Feb 23, 1982), In re\ Good, 8 F L R 2377
(Sup Ct Queen's Co April 15, 1982) and cases cited therem, In, re Cohn, 181 Misc
1021, 50 N Y S 2d 278 (Sup Ct N Y Co 1943), In re Hinnchs, 4 i :Misc 2d 422 (Sup
Ct Westchester 1964), In re Yessmer, 61 Misc 2d 174, 304 N ^ S 2d 901 (N Y City
Kings County 1969), In re Fern, 51 Misc 2d 1012, 274 N Y S 2d;547 (Civ Ct N Y
1966), In re Epstem, 121 Misc 151, 200 N Y S 897 (City Ct N ^ 1923), Ohio In re
Newcomb, 15 Ohio App 107, 472 N E 2d 1142 (1984), In re Russek,, 38 Ohio App 2d
45, 312 N E 2d 536 (1974), Dolgin v Dolgin, 1 Ohio App 2d 430, 205 N E 2d 106
(1965), Logan v Logan, 111 Ohio App 534, 170 N E 2d 922 (1060), Kay v Bell, 95
Ohio App 520, 121 N E 2d 206 (1953), Kay v Kay, 65 Ohio Abst(;[ 472, 112 N E 2d 562
(1953), Oklahoma In re Tubbs, 620 P 2 d 384 (Okla 1980) Reid v Reed, 338 P 2d
350 (Okla 1959), Oregon Walberg v Walberg, 22 Or App 11^,, 538 P 2d 96 (1975),
Ouellette v Ouellette, 245 Or 138, 420 P 2 d 631 (1966), Pennsylvania In re
Christjohn, 286 Pa Super 112, 429 A 2d 597 (1981), In re Fink, 75 Pa D and C 2d
234 (C P Lycoming 1976), Rothstein's Petition, 28 Pa D and q\ 2d 665 (Com Pleas
Mont 1962), Rounick's Petition, 47 Pa D and C 71 (Com Ple^s Mont 1962), Tennessee Pendray v Pendray, 35 Term App 284, 245 S W 2 4 204 (1951), Texas
Brown v Carroll, 683 S W 2d 61 (Tex Civ App 1984), In re Baird,, 610 S W 2d 252
(Tex Civ App 1980), Jochec v Jochec, No 12965 (Tex Civ App 1979) (unpubhshed), Bennett v Northcutt, 544 S W 2d 703 (Tex Civ App 1976),, Eschnch v Wilhamson, 475 S W 2d 380 (Tex Civ App 1972), Newman v
King, 433 S W 2d 420
(Tex 1968), Plass v Leithold, 381 S W 2d 580 (Tex Civ App J964)
}.964), Ex parte Taylor, 322 S W 2d 309 (Tex Civ App 1959), Virginia Flowers v Cam,, 218 Va 324, 237
S E 2d 111 (1977), West Virginia In re Harris, 236 S E 2d 426
Va 1977) Other
cases, while not recitmg the standard of the father's right,
implied that m a
have right Green v
dispute situation the court would pronounce a primary
Sherman, 173 N W 2d 843 (Iowa 1970), In re Dillen, 423 A paternal
2d
(Pa Super, 1980),
Niesen v Niesen, 38 Wis 2d 599, 157 N W 2d 660 (1968), or 4^6 if the court had
that
jurisdiction of the dispute it would recognize the right Monteux
Monteux, 5
Ohio App 2d 34, 213 N E 2d 495 (1966)

(k

78 28 Cal 3d 640, 620 P 2d 579, 169 Cal Rptr 918 (1980) William Carlsen, Fa
thers Lose Ruling on Last Names, S F Chronicle, Dec 23, 1980, at 1, What to Call
What's-His-Name, Virginia Pilot, Jan 5, 1981, at A-10, col 1 (Jdit<;onal)
79 In re Trower, 260 Cal App 2d 75, 66 Cal Rptr 873!(1968) , In re Worms, 252
Cal App 2d 130, 60 Cal Rptr 88 (1967), Montandon v Montanaon. 242 Cal App 2d
886, 52 Cal Rptr 43 Q966), In re Larson, 81 Cal App 2d 258, (L83P2d688 (1947)
80 Clmton v Morrow, 220 Ark 377, 247 S W 2d 1015 (1952) , Nellis v Pressman,
282 A 2d 539 (D C 1971), cert denied, 405 U S 975 (1972), Weinert v Weinert, 105
111 App 3d 56, 433 N E 2d 1158 (1982), W v H , 103 N J Super 24, 246 A 2d 501
(1968), In re Williams, 381 N Y S 2d 994 (City Ct N Y Queens County 1976), In re
Loerch, N Y L T 16 (June 8, 1981), In re Robmson, 74 Misc 2d 63, 344 N Y S 2d 147
(City Ct N Y 1972), In re Determan, N J L T 13 (Nassau Co Feb 23, 1982), In re
Russek, 39 Ohio App 2d 45, 312 N E 2d 536 (1974), Bilenkin
Bilenkin, 78 Ohio
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major, perhaps insurmontable, barriers still stand. It is important
to note that the cases of old involved women seeking to give their
children a new marital name. Where women have made recent
gains, they have sought to name their children with their own
names.
II.

The Right of Married Parents in Agreement to Name Their
Children Without State Interference

As set forth in the previous section, courts and state attorneys general have firmly established the right of married parents
in agreement to name their children without state interference.
The major case on this issue arose in Massachusetts in the mid1970s.81 When city and town clerks in Massachusetts refused to
follow the Massachusetts Attorney GeneraTs directive that parents
had the common law right to select or change the names of themselves and their children, the State Registrar of Vnal Records and
Statistics, represented by the Attorney General's office, brought an
action directly in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
The City Clerk's Association had unanimously adopted the position that "legitimate births would only be recorded in the surname
of the father and illegitimate births in the surname of the
mother" 82 in accordance with "custom and usage" for over 200
years. The clerks had asserted "a power to determine people's surnames according to customary rules regardless of m e people concerned." 83 In Secretary of the Commonwealth v.\ City Clerk of
Lowell, et al the court ruled in favor of the Attorney Greneral,
stating that "it is no part of the duty of the clerk to substitute his
legal judgment for that of the Attorney Greneral. . . . No tradition
of city and town clerks can override the law or tl^e rights of the
people." 84
The court, specifically disregarding cases involving parental
disputes, articulated that the common law principle of freedom of
choice in the matter of names "extends to the name chosen by a
married couple for their child." 85 Similarly, absent objection from
the father, the mother of a nonmarital child has "the same right to
App. 481, 34 Ohio Op. 198, 64 N.E.2d 84 (1945); Newman v. Kikig, 433 S.W.2d 421
(Tex. 1968); In re Yessmer, 61 Misc. 2d 174, 304 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1%4); In re Fein, 51
Misc. 2d 1012, 274 N.Y.S.2d 547 (1966); In re Christjohn, 286 Pa. ^uper. 112, 428 A.2d
597 (1981).
81. Secretary of the Commonwealth v. City Clerk of LowellJ 373 Mass. 178, 366
N.E.2d 717 (1977).
82. Id. at 181, 366 N.E.2d at 720.
83. Id. at 179, 366 N.E.2d at 720.
84. Id. at 183,185, 366 N.E.2d at 720, 722.
85. Id. at 190, 366 N.E.2d at 725.
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control the initial surname of the child as the parents of a legitimate child."86
Attorneys general in Alaska, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia,
Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Vermont and Wisconsin have similarly directed their birth registration record keepers that, absent a
statute to the contrary, couples have the right td give their children the mother's name, a hyphenated name, or a brand new
name. 87 "Parents are free to choose whatever surname they please
for their child,"88 wrote the Vermont Attorney (General in 1975.
"[I]t may be the mother's or the father's surname, or a combination of the two, or it may be a surname wholly different from the
parents' surnames." 89
i
It is not unusual, however, for state registrars to resist
change and to attempt to follow the traditional Model State Vital
Statistics Act90 or to make their own legal interpretations, rules or
regulations.91 Most registrars, however, follow the law that in the
86. Id. at 191, 366 N.E.2d at 726.
87. Supra note 62.
88. Op. Att'y Gen. Vt. 3 (March 10, 1975).
89. Id.
90. U.S. Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, Public Health Service, National Center for Health Statistics (1977 Revision) § 7(e)(l)-(5p. (marital children
should be given the paternal name and non-marital children the maternal name
unless the father and mother request the paternal).
91. The Kentucky State Registrar until 1982 refused to recognize married parent's right to give their children hyphenated names, citing uJ.S. for the law of
married women's names instead of Kentucky Attorney General opinions or Burke
v. Hammonds, 586 S.W.2d 307 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979). He pointed to the statutory requirement that a nonmarital child bear its mother's surname as indication of legislative intent to require that a marital child be given only its father's surname.
Letter from Omar L. Greeman, Registrar of Vital Statistics to a citizen (March 13,
1979). Following an opinion of May 14, 1982 from John H. Walker, counsel to the
Department for Human Resources, the Department changed its policy to recognize
the right of parents to name their marital children with the surname of their
choice. Letter from Omar L. Greeman to author (Jan. 31, 1983). The Maine Attorney General in 1976 ruled that married parents have the right to give their child a
hyphenated surname. At the time the state still had a statute, since repealed, requiring the mother's name be given a nonmarital newborn child. Op. Att'y Gen.
Me. (Aug. 18, 1976). Cf. Op. Att'y Gen. Ga. (Nov. 22, 1976) (itiarital child can be
given hyphenated name if parents use hyphenated name: requirement that
nonmarital child bear mother's surname on certificate of no bearing). Following
this opinion a married couple successfully litigated their right to give their child a
hyphenated name. Kibler v. Skelton, No. 31278 (Fulton County Georgia, 1978) (Order Granting Writ of Mandamus).
For an example of rules made by a state registrar, see Rules Governing the Registration and Certification of Vital Events in Mississippi, Rule 24 ("Name of the
Child" requires a marital child to bear her or his father's surname and a
nonmarital child her or his mother's "legal surname" or the father's if he acknowledges paternity, or the court's decision if there is a court determination of paternity).
Rules and Regulations Governing Vital Statistics Registration
(1977) Part
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absence of a statute to the contrary any name m^y be given newborn children.92 Where no such statute exists, litigants have needlessly conceded to the record keeper's version of the law.93 Such
agency impositions on parents' right to name their children have
no better chance of withstanding constitutional scrutiny than the
state statutes which have been successfully challenged.94
Parents faced with agency impositions can sue on constitutional grounds. A state mandamus action will, however, prove
more speedy for a client even if it may not guarantee attorneys'
fees. If state counsel do not simply rubber stamp their client agen
II(1)(B)(C) of Oklahoma required a marital child to be given its father's surname
and a nonmarital child its mother's name. In Miller v. Leavitt, No. CIV 82-369-E
(W.D. Okla., Dec. 24, 1982) (Journal Entry of Judgment) the registrar interpreted
its regulation to prohibit a couple from giving a marital child a hyphenated sur
name unless the father's name came last. A couple who wanted the father's name
first in the hyphenated name challenged the registrar. After losing a motion to dismiss, the state entered into a settlement changing the regulation so that it now
reads: "The child's surname shall be shown the same as either the father's or
mother's surname or a combination of both."
92. E.g., Utah Vital Statistics Regulations (Jan. 25, 1982) Surname of the Child
reads:
The surname given the child should be determined by bbth parents. It
clearly is not mandatory that the child have the father's
When the mother is not married she . . . may give the child a surname
different than her own surname. Additionally, the mother may name
the father on the birth certificate . . . and give the ctyild a surname
different that [sic] the father's.
State registrars have often vigorously opposed free naming choice In North
Carolina health officials lobbied against legislation sought by the plaintiffs in
O'Brien v. Tilson, 523 F. Supp. 494 (E.D.N.D. 1981), to amend the father's name requirement. The State Registrar of Vital Statistics was qiioted as saying that
"[u]nder common law it is the child's birth right to have his father's name." Janet
Fox, Couples Want Choice in Naming Babies, Winston-Salem Twin City Sentinel,
Aug. 8, 1979, at 1. After losing in Rice v. Department of Health and Rehabil. Services, 386 So. 2d 844 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980), Case No. 80-167^ (Recommended Order and Findings of Fact of Div. of Administrative Hearings, Dec. 31, 1980. Final
Order, Jan. 13, 1981), Florida officials changed their assertion bf state interest from
record keeping problems and perpetuation of custom to preserving the family and
preventing inappropriate names from being given children py their parents. At
oral argument Judge Gonzales asked if one's sense of liberty
the state imposition. Conversation with James K. Green, attorney for the couple
(November, 1982.) In Iowa, registrars lobbied for S.B. 301 in 1973 which would
have given the state registrar the authority to "refuse to register a certificate of
birth with an unacceptable name given in the same manner as a delayed certificate
of birth is refused registration" (referring to "obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, or
otherwise potentially harmful to the future of the child" names).
93. Kg., Miller v. Leavitt, No. CIV 82-369-E (W.D. Okla., Dec. 24,1982) (Journal
Entry of Judgment). See supra note 91. Instead of contesting the agency's prohibition of a hyphenated name as a violation of Oklahoma law J the parties went directly into federal court with a constitutional challenge to the requirement. This is
dangerous litigation strategy which risks a court's pronouncing as law a requirement that a child bear a certain name when, in fact, the legislature has not so mandated. E.g., Forbush v. Wallace.
94. Id. See infra notes 102-113 and accompanying text.
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cies' desires, most lawsuits can be avoided or cut short 95 with a little name law assistance to the agency. Because state attorney
general offices rarely designate an attorney responsible for directing agencies in the area of name law, the agency may simply
be ignorant in the matter of the law of personal names.
Federal agencies are not unaware of the issueJ The passport
office, for example, has recognized the right of parents to procure
a new passport for a child in a new name without a court order
since at least 1938.96 Married parents in agreement as to their children^ names will prevail against any state mandate that they
name their children a particular way.
III. The Traditional Right of Women to Name Nonmarital
Children Without Interference from the State or tlje
Biological Fathers
American courts have long recognized that a nonmarital child
may be known by a name other than its mother's. 97 Attorneys
general in Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Pennsylvania,
Vermont and Wisconsin have specifically ruled that nonmarital
children need not bear the mother's name on their birth certificates and that the right of naming lies primarily with the
mother. 98 In the absence of an objection from the father, courts
have always recognized the right of a mother of a nonmarital child
to statutorily change her child's name. 99 This right sjems from the
unwed mother's status as sole parent and custodian of her
95. As but one example, in Maine a lawsuit by a couple for a hyphenated surname for their marital child was resolved by the attorney general's issuing Op.
Att'y Gen. Me. (Aug. 18, 1976). Sheppard v. Labrack, No. 76-206 (Superior Court,
Penobscot Co. Oct. 12, 1976) (Judgment).
96. Passport Agents Manual (1978) E.O. 7856 (March 30, 1938) 22 C.F.R. § 51.3,
4, 5, 19 (1938). The Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction specifically recognizes out-of-court name changes for students and accepts the custodial parent's authority in registering children. Max Ashwill, Student May Change Name Without
Court Proceedings, Legal Corner, Wis. D.P.I. Newsletter, Nov. 19, 1978, at 6. Letter
from D.P.I. Legal Counsel Mary Brooks Fraser to author (Oct. 6, 1981).
97. E.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Buckley \/. State, 19 Ala.
App. 508, 98 So. 362 (1923); Don v. Don, 142 Conn. 309, 114 A.2d 203 (1965); In re
Toelkes, 97 Idaho 406, 545 P.2d 1012 (1976); People v. Gray, 251 111 431, 96 N.E. 268
(1911); Hardy v. Hardy, 269 Md. 412, 306 A.2d 244 (1973); In re CMobrisi, 7 F.L.R.
2721 (Westchester City Sup. Ct. July 21, 1981); In re M., 91 N.J Super. 296, 219
A.2d 906 (1966); In re Biegaj, 25 N.Y.S.2d 85 (1941); Pintor v. Martinez, 202 S.W.2d
333 (Tex. 1947); Pettus v. Dawson, 82 Tex. 18, 17, S.W. 714 (1891); But see Boston v.
Sears, 11 Ohio App. 2d 220, 229 N.E.2d 847 (1967).
98. E.g., Op. Att'y Gen. Vt. (March 10, 1975) at 3 ("The mother of an illegitimate child is its legal guardian. . . . As such, she is solely responsible for the naming of the child. In accordance with the common law, she may insert any surname
she pleases on the child's birth certificate.").
99. E.g., Winkenhofer v. Griffin, 511 S.W.2d 216 (Ky. Ct. App. 1974); In re Dun-
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nonmarital children. In 1974 the Wisconsin Attorney General concluded that biological fathers' rights had not expanded to the point
that they could participate in the at-birth naming of nonmarital
children. 100 Biological fathers, however, are now challenging this
right of women, with some success. 101
IV.

Constitutional Challenges to Statutory Requirements
That Children Be Given Specified Surnames on Their
Birth Certificates

Parents have successfully maintained constitutional challenges to statutory requirements that children bear specified
names on their birth certificates. The United States Supreme
Court has established the helpful precedent that in matters of
rearing one's children, absent abuse or neglect, the state has no legitimate interest in interfering with parental decisions. 102 N o n e theless, in Commonwealth,
the Massachusetts Supreme Court
declined to articulate a federal constitutional rijkht to name children. It was a federal district court, in 1979, in tjhe case of Jech v.
Burch,103 which elevated the "common law right [of parents] to
give their child any name they wish" 104 to federal constitutional
status. Parents wanting to give their marital child a surname differing from both their names (a fusion of their] names) on their
son's birth certificate challenged Hawaii's statute requiring the father's name. The court articulated that "[t]he naming <
of one's own
child comes within this catalogue of blessings of liberty" 105 under
the Constitution.
At the end of 1982 a Florida court invalidated an identical requirement in a challenge by a couple who also gave their son a
ston, 18 N.C. App. 647, 197 S.E.2d 560 (1973); In re Toekles, ?7 Idaho 406, 545 P.2d
1012 (1976).
100. Op. Atfy. Gen. Vt. 3 (March 10, 1975); 63 Op. Att'y IGen. Wis. 501 (Oct. 7,
1974). In the early 1970s issuing an opinion which simply affirmed that in the absence of a statute to the contrary, a parent could give a nonmarital newborn any
name, was highly controversial and many attorney generals were reluctant to deal
with the issue. The Wisconsin opinion, for example, was prepared in 1972 but the
Wisconsin Attorney General did not issue it until 1974 because of its potential controversial effect.
101. See generally discussion, infra notes 134-148. See (pollins v. Collins, 126
Misc. 2d 522, 483 N.Y.S.2d 151 (Sup. Ct. 1984).
102. See supra note 58.
103. Jech v. Burch, 466 F. Supp. 714 (D. Hawaii 1979). The| Hawaii attorney general had interpreted the requirement as encompassing a hyphenated name including the mother's. Id.
104. Id. at 719. See also Doe v. Hancock County Board of Wealth, 436 N.E.2d 791,
792 (Ind. 1982) (Hunter, J. dissenting) referring to "the constitutionally protected
common law right of parents to name their children."
105. Jech, 466 F. Supp. at 714.
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fused surname of their last names.106 The father's name requirement had been interpreted as not precluding a hyphenated
name, 107 but the couple wanted a fused name. In 1981 a federal
district court set aside the North Carolina's father's name birth
certificate statute as an unconstitutional infringement on family
liberty as well as discrimination on the basis of sex and birth status. 108 New Hampshire repealed its statute which restricted
names parents could choose to the mother's, father's, or a combination name in 1983. The legislature's guarantee that parents can
choose any name for their child directly resulted from a constitutional challenge by a couple seeking to name their child with a hyphenated name bearing no relation to either parent's name. 109
Courts have similarly questioned statutes specifying which
names may be recorded on nonmarital children's birth certificates.
Statutes mandating the change of a child's name on its birth certificate to its father's choice of name upon legitimation110 or pater
nityin have similarly been invalidated in recent years. In an
Indiana case,112 a long dissent on the merits analyzed a statute requiring nonmarital children to be given their mothers' names. The
dissent noted that the statute distinguishes between "legitimate
children, who may be given any name, and illegitimate children,
who must bear the mother's name." 113
106 Sydney v Pingree, 564 F Supp 412 (S D Fla 1982) I Sydney Anthony
Skybetter was named for columnist Sydney Harris, Susan B Anthony and his parents Chris Ledbetter and Dean Skylar and would have been giv^n the same moniker whether he had been a boy or a girl Conversation with Sydney's parents, May
20, 1982
107 Rice v Department of Health and Rehabil Services, 3#6 So 2d 844 (Fla
Dist Ct App 1980), on remand No 80-1674, Recommended Order and Fmdmgs of
Fact (Div of Administrative Hearings, Dec 31, 1980 Final OrdJr, Jan 13, 1981)
108 O'Brien v Tilson, 523 F Supp 494 (E D N C 1981) The <tase mvolved three
sets of married parents One couple wanted to name their child h
ish custom by combining the father's first name with the suffix "son " Another
wanted to give their child a hyphenated surname pursuant to Spanish custom The
third wanted to give their child a hyphenated name as a symbol Uof equality
109 1983 N H H B 729 amending § 126 6-a(i)(a) The parents, Pierce Barker and
Carol Frost, wanted to give their child the hyphenated surname of Smith-Cook, a
combmation of the names of maternal and paternal ancestors having no relation to
either parent's names Their first child, born in California, was given the hyphenated name Roth-Tubman, bearing no relation to his parents' or ancestors' names A
third child born September 30, 1984 was given the nonhyphenate|d surname Woods,
the name of the mother of the child's maternal grandmother, with no difficulty
Conversations with Pierce Barker (Jan 25, 1983, June 20, 1985)
110 Roe v Conn, 417 F Supp 769 (M D Ala 1976)
111 Boelter v Blair, No CIV 81-4217 (D C S D ) (Judgment April 21, 1981) (case
moot after passage of amendment to S D Codified Laws 34-25-15 (1984) deleting requirement that child be given father's name upon acknowledgment of paternity)
112 Doe v Hancock County Board of Health, 436 N E 2d 79 (Ind 1982) See
supra note 73 and accompanying text
113 Id at 794 (Hunter, J , dissenting)
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Wherever parents challenge statutes mandating a child be
given the father's surname, courts have found the (statute unconstitutional. In carefully litigated cases when pareikts are in agreement, no statute prescribing what names parenis can give their
children will withstand constitutional scrutiny.
Disputes Between Mothers and the Biological Fathers Over
Naming Newborn or Infant Marital and Nonmarital Children
The law establishing some right of women to name their marital children, where fathers disagree with their choice, is developing in situations involving the naming of children at birth or while
they are very young. The women usually use their birth given surnames and seek to give the same to their children.
A 1964 case provided favorable precedent for women. 114 In a
separation action the Louisiana Court of Appeals recognized the
court's jurisdiction to decide the child's name issue. The court denied the father the right to require the mother to rename their
child born during the proceeding, rejecting his clsqm to an absolute
legal right to name the child. The case involved a dispute over the
given names and a lineal designation for the child,
Ten years later, in Laks v. Laks , 115 an Arizona Court of Appeals denied a custodial mother's claim that she
constitutional right with the children's father to include her birth
surname in the names of the children, ages ten, tnirteen, and four
teen. The court, in a statement relied on by future courts, said:
"[T]here is merit in this contention. Howevpr, it must be
remembered that what we are concerned with
is not the initial naming of the child but a change of name Tfhe persons who
have the paramount interest are the children and their best interests are controlling." 116
In the companion cases of Application of Sexton117 and Jacobs v. Jacobs,118 the Minnesota Supreme Court,
the Laks reasoning as to the initial naming of cthildren. In re
manding a dispute over the naming of a marital child in a divorce
action, the court in Jacobs stated that "neither parent has a supe
n a Webber v. Parker, 167 So. 2d 519 (La. Ct. App. 1964), ityrit refused, 264 La.
886, 168 So. 2d 269 (1964).
115. 25 Ariz. App. 58, 540 P.2d 1277 (1975).
116. 25 Ariz. App. at 61, 540 P.2d at 1280. The Court did not! clarify
<
whether this
mutual right would be applicable in dissolution or separation situations, or in ongoing marriages, or both.
117. 309 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. 1981),cert, denied, 455 U.S. 1034 (1982)118. 309 N.W.2d 303 (Minn. 1981).
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rior right to determine the initial surname of their child." 119 In
Saxton the court denied any independent right to the custodial
mother of older children, ages seven and nine, to give the children
a hyphenated name of both parents' names over the objection of
the father. Stating that either name would serve the children's
best interests, the majority deferred to "the fact that the child has
borne a given surname for an extended period of time." 120
In 1979 and 1983 state courts in Washington and Kentucky
declined jurisdiction to decide a child's name or to order a woman
to statutorily change her child's name back to the ex-husband's
surname pursuant to the courts' divorce jurisdiction. 121 The Washington Court of Appeals stated, however, that if it |had jurisdiction,
it would have denied the father's motion to havej the child, born
during the action, renamed to bear his name instead of the
mother's. The father's motion would have been denied "because
there is nothing in the record to show that the proposal was con
sidered from the standpoint of the child, and it is the child's best
interests which control." 122 The refusals to take jurisdiction effectively confirmed the custodial mother's choice of | her birth name
for the children.
In 1981, on facts almost identical to those of iVebber, a Texas
Court of Civil Appeals refused to change the given names of a
child to those of the father's choice. 123 The court cited Webber
and reasoned that "the record . . . falls far short of even suggesting that the name chosen by the mother would prove detrimental to the child, now or in the future, or that the name
preferred by appellant would further the present op future welfare
of the child."12*
In 1980 the California Supreme Court rendered a landmark
decision. In re Schiffman125 held that "the rule giving the father,
as against the mother, a primary right to have his child bear his
surname should be abolished." 126 The court emphasized that the
119. Id. at 305.
120. 309 N.W.2d 298, at 302. In seeking United States Suprenie Court review, the
plaintiff argued that where both names serve the child's best interest, the Minnesota Supreme Court's rule favoring the paternal name compared to Oregon's former statute selecting fathers over equally qualified mothers in administering
children's estates. The Court invalidated Oregon's statutory solution in Reed v.
Reed, 411 U.S. 91 (1971).
121. Hurta v. Hurta, 25 Wash. App. 95, 605 P.2d 1278 (1979)|; Blasi v. Blasi, 648
S.W.2d 80 (Ky. 1983).
122. Hurta, 25 Wash. App. at 96, 605 P.2d at 1279.
123. In re Interest of M.L.P., 621 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. Civ. App. 11981).
124. Id. at 431.
125. 28 Cal. 3d 640, 620 P.2d 579, 169 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1980).
126. Id. at 647, 620 P.2d at 583, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 922.
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custodial mother gave the child, born during the I dissolution proceedings, her birth name. The court remanded the case to the trial
court for a ' 'finding whether the name change requested by the father is in the best interest of the child."127
Despite this precedent involving the naming lof newborns, in
1982 the Nebraska Supreme Court decided that the father's choice
of name—a hyphenated surname with his name first—would best
serve the child's welfare.128 This ruling was without regard to the
virtually nonexistent trial record on the child's best interests. The
trial court in Cohee v. Cohee had ordered the custodial mother to
change the child's birth certificate name from hers to one of two
names, the husband's name or a hyphenated surname with the
mother's name first. The supreme court said "No automatic preference as to the surname of a legitimate child now exists in Nebraska law. We believe each parent has an equal right and interest
in determining the surname of a child."129 The court, however, did
not follow this rule. Instead, it recited the tests traditionally used
by the courts to protect the primary right of the father to block
name changes of older children originally given his name and gave
the father his choice.130
Similarly, in 1983, the Montana Supreme Couk 131 stated that
parents have an equal right to name their children but then de127. Id. at 648, 620 P.2d at 584, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 923.
128. 210 Neb. 855, 317 N.W. 2 d 381 (1982).
129. Id. at 860, 317 N.W.2d at 384.
130. The court denied rehearing to clarify itself. Motion and Brief in Support of
Motion for Rehearing, No. 43923. The Supreme Court's decision does not report
that the trial court ordered a hyphenated name with the mother's name first, and
that the father demanded his name or a hyphenated name with his name first. The
decision only states that the father sought a hyphenated name and that the mother
sought only her name. A requirement that the father's name come first in a hyphenated name would be unconstitutional according to the Maine Attorney General. Op. Att'y Gen. Me. (March 22, 1977). Although the hyphenated names sought
by the women in Laks and Saxton included the mothers' name listed first, in
neither of those cases was the order of the names separated by a hyphen made an
issue. The fathers in both cases opposed the children using any names other than
the paternal alone.
131. Overton v. Overton, 674 P.2d 1089 (Mont. 1983). Petitions for Rehearing
and to Suspend the Rules to Rehear and Reconsider the Appeal and Decision were
denied. Where an appeal involves the review of a trial court order granting the father the right to name a child, higher courts seldom overrule the lower court.
Where a woman wins the right to determine her child's name at the trial court
level, however, appellate courts are likely to overturn the lower courts. The Montana Supreme Court was a classic example of this dynamic. In Firman v. Firman,
187 Mont. 465, 610 P.2d 178 (1980) the court overruled, as an abuse of discretion, a
trial court's judgment that children should bear their mother's new marital name.
The Montana Supreme Court has thus effectively cut off any enforceable legal
right of married women in that state to name their children over their ex-husband's objection.
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ferred to the trial court's order in favor of the noncustodial father.
The court declined to overturn the trial court's determination that
the two-year-old girl's name should be changed from her mother's
to her father's surname at the request of the father. The same
month, the Colorado Court of Appeals132 deferred to a trial court's
judgment in favor of a custodial mother. Because the mother had
custody the court reasoned that the mother could change the infant girl's first name despite the objection of ^he mother's exhusband.
In addition, this year Pennsylvania's intermediate court ruled
in favor of a custodial mother who had given her newborn daughter her birth given surname pursuant to Pennsylvania's published
regulation which expressly gives the right of naming to "the parent who has custody of the newborn child."133 The noncustodial
father waited over a year after the child's birtifi and then petitioned to change the child's surname.
These at-birth/infancy naming cases all respect a naming
right of women which is new to the law of naming marital children perhaps because, in the ones involving surnames, the women
all used their birth given surnames. However, since Schiffman
women have not prevailed at the appellate | level with few
exceptions.134
1984 was a particularly bleak year. Women I lost bids to give
the children in their custody their new marital names in appellate
courts in Illinois,135 Indiana,136 Minnesota,13^ New York,138
Ohio,139 and Texas.140 In South Carolina the s4preme court re132. In re Nguyen, 684 P.2d 258 (Colo. App. 1983), cert, denied, 105 S. Ct. 785
(1985).
133. In re Schidlmeier, No. J. 27018-85, slip op. (Pa. Super. Aug. 9, 1985). A Petition for Allowance of Appeal has been filed in this first case involving interpretation of 28 Pa. Admin. Code § 1.7 (Shepard's 1975). See infta notes 231-234 and
accompanying text.
134. These exceptions involved the mother's and child's use lof the mother's birth
name. In re Schidlmeier, No. J. 27018-85, slip op. (Pa. Super. Aug. 9, 1985). In In re
Goldstein, 104 A.D.2d 616, 479 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1984) the court denied a divorced father's appeal of a name change of his daughter from the name Goldstein, which he
no longer used, to the mother's birth name which the mother used as a middle
name with her new marital name. The court, however, recited the traditional standard in favor of the paternal name. In In re Fletcher, 146 Vt. 209, 486 A.2d 627
(1984), the supreme court remanded a case on appeal by the mother (name used by
mother and requested for child appears to be mother's birth (name, but opinion is
unclear).
135. In re Presson, 116 111. App. 3d 458, 71 111. Dec. 816, 45l| N.E.2d 970 (1984).
136. In re Meyer, 471 N.E.2d 718 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984).
137. Young v. Young, 356 N.W.2d 823 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)1.
138. Cohan v. Cunningham, 480 N.Y.S.2d 656 (App. Div. 3.984). See also Gershowitz v. Gershowitz, 491 N.Y.S.2d 356 (App. Div. 1985).
139. In re Newcomb, 15 Ohio App. 3d 107, 472 N.E.2d 1142 (1984).
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manded a decision unfavorable to a father 141 in 198J3. In May, 1985
Maryland's Court of Special Appeals denied a divorced woman
whose child was born when she was separated, tfye right to give
the newborn her birth-given surname. 142
In cases involving disputes between parents oVer the initial or
infancy naming of nonmarital children women prevail more frequently than the biological fathers, but the fathers are being recognized by the courts as having new naming rights over their
children if they contribute to, or are ordered to contribute, support
to them. In Jacobs , 143 a main issue was the birth status of the
child in question. The mother claimed that the child was
nonmarital and that she consequently had primary control over
rearing the child in all aspects. After determining that the child
was marital, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted that "a finding
of illegitimacy in the instant case would not have affected the resolution of the dispute as to the child's surname sinck Jacobs has asserted his parental rights and recognized his parental
obligations." 144
In In re G.L.A. , 145 the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed a
trial judge whose general practice was
to change the surname of children in paternity proceedings to
that of the father in the absence of good reasons shown to the
contrary. . . . I always point out that the man who is going to
support the children should have the children in his name unless there is some valid strong reason, like he is a piurderer or
a criminal of some kind that would keep him from—the chil140. Brown v. Carroll, 683 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984).
141. Ex parte Stone, 328 S.E.2d 346 (S.C. 1985).
142. Lassiter-Geers v. Reichenbach, 303 Md. 88, 492 A.2d 303 (1985).
143. 309 N.W.2d at 303.
144. Id. at 305. Michigan and New Hampshire have statutorily recognized mutual rights to name nonmarital children at birth. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 333.2824(2) (West 1980) provides that where the father acknowledges paternity,
"upon the written request of both parents, the surname of the child shall be designated by the child's parents." If the father is judged the father by a lawsuit, however, the mother has control over naming. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.2824(4)
(West 1980). New Hampshire's new law provides that when the mother consents to
have a man named as the child's father on its birth certificate, "the surname of the
child shall be any name chosen by the mother and father." N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 126:6-a(II)(a) (1983). Otherwise the name will be "any name chosen by the
mother," N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 126:6-a(IV) (1983), or as determined by a court in
paternity proceedings, § 126:6-a(III) (1983). This law is expected to be revised in the
next legislative session to give the mother or custodial parent the right of naming.
Several states have recognized the right of the unmarried father to participate
in naming a child on its birth certificate to the extent that the> mother is limited in
selecting the child's name to her name, or with her and the faIther's consent, to the
father's or a combination of the two. See supra note 56. Syiich restrictions have
been objected to, but not yet litigated.
145. 430 N.E.2d 433 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
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dren from revering his name.146
The appellate court rejected the trial court's acceptance of the "erroneous presumption" that "a child should share the surname of
its biological father as long as the father is contributing to its support."147 Unfavorable precedent 148 decided only ^ year before by
the same court was also rejected.
In sum, women, who use their own surnames and have been
married to their children's fathers, have often prevailed in cases
concerning the at-birth naming of children of whom they have custody. Older children's names, however, remain almost completely
subject to paternal control.
VI.

Disputes Between Parents Over Naming Older Marital Children
Originally Given Fathers' Names

This section analyzes the class of cases Which determine
whether women have any real voice in naming children: those involving older marital children (over three years qf age) originally
given their fathers' surnames.
Appellate courts in most states have articulated a standard
for the resolution of disputes between parents of marital children
originally given their fathers' surnames. All of the courts purport
to consider the best interests of the children. Oareful review of
the cases, however, demonstrates that this "standard" is not, in
fact, employed by the courts in naming disputes. All states, except
California, 149 have actually accepted and followed the timehonored primary right of the father over the mother to control the
naming of children.
The courts accept three presumptions, sometimes expressly,
but most often indirectly: 1) that honoring the father's right
serves children's "best interests"; 2) that using the father's name
preserves or promotes the paternal/child bond; and/or 3) that unless the children have actually already changed their names by using another name for a long period of time, children's names
should not be changed if the father objects. Most significantly,
however, the courts do not employ a presumption that it is generally not in the best interest of children to not ch4nge their names.
146. Id. at 434.
147. Id. See supra note 71. G.L.A. was expressly followed }n Sullivan v. McGaw,
134 111. App. 3d 455, 480 N.E.2d 1283 (1985).
148. D.R.S. v. R.S.H., 412 N.E.2d 1257 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)] The mother did not
appeal this decision, in part because the father had given up the child he won the
right to name, and in part because the mother married ajid her new husband
adopted the child. See supra note 71.
149. See In re Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d 640, 620 P.2d 579, 169 0al. Rptr. 918 (1980).
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In the cases where a custodial mother prevails over the father's wishes, the father forfeits or waives his right by his own actions and the mother rebuts it by meeting a high burden of proof.
The father forfeits his superior right only where he has utterly
abandoned the child, has failed to pay child support, and/or is
guilty of misconduct amounting to child abuse or I incarceration. A
man can also forfeit his superior right by waiving it by failing to
exercise his paternal right of naming in a timely fashion. 150
Until recently, the overwhelming majority of cases have involved the choice between a natural father's naine and a stepfa
ther's name that the mother has adopted. The cases of the 1970s
and 1980s, however, have involved the mother's birth name, 151 hy
phenated names of the mother's and father's birth names, 152 as
well as remarried names. 153 In Schiffman, and ajso in the Saxton
dissent, distinctions were made expressly on the basis of the particular names chosen by the mother or childreri Usually courts
have ruled against women and children by upholding rights of fa
thers, by stating a preference for the paternal name, and by re
sisting any change of minors' names from the patronymic without
discussion of the alternative name. 154 Most appel
children reintegrating into a family with a stepfather whose name
the mother has adopted. Consequently, making a distinction as to
150. E.g., Nellis v. Pressman, 282 A.2d 539 (D.C. 1971), cert.\ denied, 405 U.S. 975
(1972) (teenagers known by their stepfather's surname for a long while with the
knowledge of their father).
151. In re Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d 640, 620 P.2d 579,169 Cal. ftptr. 918 (1980); Blasi
v. Blasi, 648 S.W.2d 80 (Ky. 1983); Lassiter-Geers v. Reichentyach, 303 Md. 88, 492
A.2d 303 (1985); In re Goldstein, 104 A.D. 616, 479 N.Y.S.:2d 385 (1984); In re
Fletcher, 145 Vt. 209, 486 A.2d 627 (1984) (unclear); Ex parte Stone, 328 S.E.2d 346
(S.C. 1985) (unclear); Jacobs v. Jacobs, 309 N.W.2d 303 (Minn. 1981); In re
Schidlmeier, No. J. 27018-85, slip op. (Pa. Super. Aug. 9, 19851); Hurta v. Hurta, 25
Wash. App. 95, 605 P.2d 1278 (1979); In re Harris, 160 W. V i 422, 236 S.E.2d 426
(1977); Ogle v. Circuit Court, 89 S.D. 18, 227 N.W.2d 621 (1975) (petitioner withdrew
her request for her child's name change).
152. Laks v. Laks, 25 Ariz. App. 58, 540 P.2d 1277 (1975); In re Staros, 280
N.W.2d 409 (Iowa 1979); In re Saxton, 309 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. 1981), cert denied, 455
U.S. 1034 (1982); In re Warschberger, 8 F.L.R. 2514 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Naussau County,
June 21, 1982); Gershowitz v. Gershowitz, 491 N.Y.S.2d 356 (A^p. Div. 1985).
153. All other appellate cases cited in supra notes 77-80. [
154. Most of the at-birth/infancy naming cases of marital children have involved
the mother giving a child her name as opposed to a stepfather's. In Kirksey v. Abbott, 591 S.W.2d 751 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) the mother of a nonirjarital child indicated
that she wanted her daughter to have the same name as her 12-year-old marital son
who bore her last name. She indicated that she would be marrying and changing
her name. The opinion, however, does not make clear whether or not she intended
to have the children also adopt her new name or the origin of her current surname.
Compare cases of older children, In re Saxton, 309 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. 1981), cert,
denied, 455 U.S. 1034 (1982) giving deference to names used a long while. This deference virtually precludes women who originally consent to their children bearing
the father's name from having any say in controlling their names thereafter.
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the names involved only makes it more difficult f<)r most women
to secure naming rights. The issue is a woman's le^al right to control, as custodian, the naming of her children, not the particular
name she may choose.
Whether or not women have any real rights in naming children will be determined in parental disputes over naming children
originally given their fathers' surnames by the mothers and fathers. The trial judiciary used to deny divorcing and divorced women the right to change their names, supposedly put of concern
for children bearing different names than their custodial
mothers. 155 Now it greets women's assertion of the right to name
their children with the same names (or any nonpaternal names)
with sheer personal bias, obstinacy and male protectivism. A
Maryland chancellor put it forthrightly in one case:
Let me say this for the record. I felt very strongly about this
case when it came up; in fact, I will say for the record that I
just think that it is just horrendous that a parent who has been
divorced from her husband would even attempt to change the
child's name and, in a sense, cut off the parental rights of the
father. I was very upset about it. 156
\
This section discusses the procedural and substantive issues
involved in securing women's right to name noninfant marital children originally given the paternal name. Jurisdictional bases for
courts to decide these disputes are discussed first. The second part
discusses further the assumptions, acknowledged and unacknowledged, behind courts' protection of fathers' primary naming right.
It also examines the methods by which courts grant men the right
to control children's names. The third part of this section discusses the burden of proof set up for mothers in naming disputes.
A.

Jurisdiction

of Courts Over Children's

Names

In litigation, jurisdictional and procedural dispufces in children's names cases can become very technical. If a court does not
155. All such cases were reversed on appeal. E.g., In re Banks, 42 Cal. App. 3d
631, 117 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1974); In re Hooper, 436 So. 2d 401 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983);
In re Hauptly, 262 Ind. 150, 312 N.E.2d 857 (1974); Thomas v. ThUias, 100 111. App.
3d 1080, 427 N.E.2d 1009 (1981); Piotrowski v. Piotrowski, 71 Mich. App. 213, 247
N.W.2d 354 (1976); Egner v. Egner, 133 N.J. Super. 403, 337 A.2d 46 (1975). See also
cases cited supra note 9.
156. Hall v. Hall, 30 Md. App. 214, 216, 351 A.2d 917, 920 (1976)1. Such pronouncements bring to mind the conclusion of early commentators: "With some notable exceptions, [judges] have failed to bring to sex discrimination cases those judicial
virtues of detachment, reflection and critical analysis which have served them so
well with respect to other sensitive social issues. . . . " John Johnston & Charles
Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 675, 676 (1971).
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want to consider the controversial issue, one party may easily persuade the court that it has no jurisdiction to do so, Awareness of
the technical issues involved may prevent men i n d / o r guardians
ad litem from keeping names cases out of court.157
Courts exercise jurisdiction to determine children s names in
three situations: 1) pursuant to state general name change statutes; 1 5 8 2) in personal equity injunctive actions to ^>rotect a f a t h e r s
personal interests in controlling the naming of his child;i59 and 3)
in actions involving the care, custody and control of children, in157. For example, one Milwaukee, Wisconsin lower couift judge recently declined to take jurisdiction over a child's name pursuant to divorce action. The
court declined jurisdiction on the grounds that the statutory! name change procedure requires both parents to bring a petition for their childf s name change. The
appointed guardian ad litem had taken this position. The courjt carefully worded its
order in sex neutral terms but the case involved the usual fact isituation, a father
objecting to his child's name being changed from the paternal, The effect of a
court's refusal to take jurisdiction is to prevent women from Having the right to adjudicate women's and children's naming rights if the father insists on imposmg his
name on his children. In re Husmann and Birmingham, Noj, 600-721 (Milwaukee
published opinion of
Circuit Court, Findings and Order, March 15, 1984). In an
the Court of Appeals in 1981, the court ruled that it saw "no j|urisdictional problem
with family court judge entertaining a petition or entering an order for a change of
:e" but stated that it
name of a minor child of the parents to an action for
should exercise it "only where there is no adequate remedy ali law." In re Mendal,
104 Wis. 2d 744, 314 N.W.2d 363 (1981) (an unpublished opinion is not precedential
and cannot be cited in most forums in Wisconsin). See also Young v. Young, 356
N.W.2d 823 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). Maintaining the status quo through this technique has also worked to the benefit of women. E.g., Hurta v. Hurta, 25 Wash. App.
95, 605 P.2d 1278 (1979); Blasi v. Blasi, 648 S.W.2d 80 (Ky. 198|3)
158. Carroll v. Johnson, 263 Ark. 280, 565 S.W.2d 10 (1978) In re Malloy, 185 Cal.
App. 2d 135, 8 Cal. Rptr. 143 (1960); In re Trower, 260 Cal Arip. 2d 75, 66 Cal. Rptr.
873 (1968); In re Worms, 252 Cal. App. 2d 130, 60 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1967); In re McGehee, 147 Cal. App. 2d 25, 304 P.2d 167 (1956); In re Larsoij, 81 Cal. App. 2d 258,
183 P.2d 688 (1947); Lazow v. Lazow, 147 So. 2d 12 (Fla. Dist. t. App. 1962); Wearn
v. Wray, 139 Ga. App. 363, 228 S.E.2d 385 (1976); Tolbert v. [Tolbert, 131 Ga. App.
388, 206 S.E.2d 63 (1974); Fulgham v. Paul, 229 Ga. 463, 192 S. p.2d 376 (1972); Johnson v. Coggins, 124 Ga. App. 603, 184 S.E.2d 696 (1971); Binforjd v. Reid, 83 Ga. App.
280, 63 S.E.2d 345 (1951); In re Meyer, 471 N.E.2d 718 (Ind.
. App. 1984) West v.
Wright, 263 Md. 297, 283 A.2d 401 (1971); Robinson v. Haniel, 302 Minn. 34, 223
N.W.2d 138 (1974); In re Saxton, 309 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. 1981)||, cert, denied, 455 U.S.
1034 (1982); Marshall v. Marshall, 230 Miss. 719, 93 So. 2d 8^2 (1957); In re Spatz,
199 Neb. 332, 258 N.W.2d 814 (1977); In re Lone, 134 N.J. Super-. 213, 338 A.2d 883
(1975); W. v. H., 103 N.J. Super. 24, 246 A.2d 501 (Ch. Div. 1968): Cohan v. Cunningham, 104 A.D.2d 721, 480 N.Y.S.2d 657 (1984); In re Newcomb|,, 15 Ohio App. 3d 107,
472 N.E.2d 1142 (1984); In re Tubbs, 620 P.2d 384 (Okla. 1980) In re Schidlmeier,
No. J. 27018-85, slip op. (Pa. Super. Aug. 9, 1985); In re Christjohn, 286 Pa. Super.
112, 428 A.2d 597 (1981); Ex Parte Stull, 276 S.C. 512, 280 S.E.]£d 209 (1981); Bennett
v. Northcutt, 544 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976); Eschri h. v. Williamson, 475
S.W.2d 380 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972); Newman v. King, 433 S. )W.2d 420 (Tex. 1968);
Plass v. Leithold, 381 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964); Flowelrs v. Cain, 218 Va. 324,
237 S.E.2d 111 (1977); In re Harris, 160 W. Va. 422, 236 S.E.2^ 426 (1977).
159. Mark v. Kahn, 333 Mass. 517, 131 N.E.2d 758 (1956) fcobel v. Sobel, 46 N.J.
Super. 284, 134 A.2d 598 (Ch. Div. 1957); Degerberg v. McCor|mick;, 40 D e l Ch. 471,
184 A.2d 468 (1962). See supra note 76.
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eluding separation,160 divorce or dissolution,161 adoption,162 and paternity proceedings.163 Although appellate courts in Kentucky,
Ohio, and Washington have declined jurisdiction oyer children's
names m divorce matters, 164 other courts have upheld jurisdiction.
An Illinois Court of Appeals summarized the basis of a divorce court's jurisdiction over naming children in 1991. "If the matter of a change of name of a minor child of divorced parents is a
matter incidental to the custody of the child, and we hold that it is,
then the court had the jurisdiction to entertain the (motion and to
160 Eg , Webber v Parker, 167 So 2d 519 (La Ct App 1964)| writ refvised, 264
La 886, 168 So 2d 269 (1964) The jurisdictional basis of Weh
has been superseded by La Rev Stat Ann § 40 34(l)(a)(West Supp 1983)
ny change in the
svirname of a child from that required herem shall be by court •rder as provided
for m R S13 4751 through R S 13 4755 "
161 Norton v Norton, 268 Ark 791, 595 S W 2d 709 (1980), mton v Morrow,
220 Ark 377 247 S W 2d 1015 (1952), Montandon v Montandon 242 Cal App 2d
886, 52 Cal Rptr 43 (1966), In re Nguyen, 684 P 2 d 258 (Colo A| •p 1983) cert de
nied, 105 S Ct 785 (1985), Nelhs v Pressman, 282 A 2d 539 C C 1971), cert de
nied, 405 U S 975 (1972), Solomon v Solomon, 5 111 App 2d 2&7, 125 N E 2d 675
(1955), Weinert v Weinert, 105 111 App 3d 56, 433 N E 2 d 1158 C1982), In re Presson, 102 111 2d 303, 80 111 Dec 294, 465 N E 2d 85 (1984), Burke 1/ Hammonds, 586
S W 2d 307 (Ky Ct App 1979), overruled sub silentio by Blasi v Blasi, 648 S W 2d
80 (Ky 1983), Dalton v Dalton, 367 S W 2d 840 (Ky Ct App 1963), Hall v Hall, 30
Md App 214, 351 A 2d 917 (1976), Fuss v Fuss, 372 Mass 64, 368 N E 2d 271 (1977),
Jacobs v Jacobs, 309 N W 2d 303 (Mmn 1981), Young v YourJg, 356 N W 2d 823
(Minn Ct App 1984), Bruguier v Bruguier, 12 N J Super 350 79 A 2d 497 (1951),
Gershowitz v Gershowitz, 491 N Y S 2d 356 (App Div 1985), Meadows v Meadows,
312 N W 2 d 464 (N D 1981), Reed v Reed, 338 P 2 d 350 (Okla 1959), Walberg v
Walberg, 22 Or App 118, 538 P 2 d 96 (1975), Pendray v Pendjay, 35 Tenn App
284, 245 S W 2d 204 (1951), Jochec v Jochec, No 12,965 (Tex Ctv App 1979) (unpublished), In re Baird, 610 S W 2d 252 (Tex Civ App 1980), Brbwn v Carroll, 683
S W 2d 61 (Tex Civ App 1984) Hurta v Hurta, 25 Wash App 95, 605 P 2d 1278
(1979), Niesen v Niesen, 38 Wis 2d 599, 157 N W 2d 660 (1968)
162 In re Thomas, 404 S W 2d 199 (Mo 1966), Arnett v Matthews, 259 So 2d 535
(Fla Dist Ct App 1972) (name changes granted but not adoptions) Cf Korbm v
Ginsberg, 232 So 2d 417 (Fla Dist Ct App 1970) Name changek pursuant to adoptions are routme and do not make caselaw All states accept the authority of adoptive parents to determme their children's names and no known case concerns an
adoptive couple disagreeing on a child's name In practice many women have felt
pressure to accept the father's surname for an adopted child or risk not gettmg the
child An adoption agency's requirement that a couple use the same surname and/
or give the paternal name to an adopted child would be unconstitutional and subject to challenge if the agency is state funded
163 Sullivan v McGaw, 134 111 App 3d 455, 480 N E 2d 1283 (1985) In re
G L A , 430 N E 2d 433 (Ind Ct App 1982) D R S v R S H , 412 N E 2d 1257 (Ind
Ct App 1980) Kirkse* v Abbott, 591 S W 2d 751 (Mo Ct Atip 1979) Compare
Agee v Altice, 427 So 2d 667 (La Ct App 1983)
1
164 Monteux v Monteux, 5 Ohio App 2d 34, 213 N E 2d 495 (1966), Dolgin v
Dolgin, 1 Ohio App 2d 430, 205 N E 2d 106 (1965), Hurta v Hurtk, 25 Wash App 95,
605 P 2 d 1278 (1979) See also Young v Young, 356 N W 2 d 823 (Mmn Ct App
1984) and Blasi v Blasi, 648 S W 2d 80 (Ky 1983) However, the) Supreme Court did
not expressly overrule Burke v Hammonds, 586 S W 2d 307 (Ky Ct App 1979)
Burke held that the divorce court, pursuant to its jurisdiction oyer custody matters,
could enjom a custodial mother from changing her children's names
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enter the order involved in this appeal."165
Cases pursuant to a divorce court's jurisdicti x>n usually arise
with respect to the enforcement of modification o: custody or support awards and not at the time of divorce or disi lolution.166 Most
women seek to change their children's names so: etime after the
actual divorce and the establishment of a new hoi sehold. Specific
statutory authority for changing children's namej during divorce
proceedings could actually serve to restrict a div< |rce court's jurisdiction to determine children's names at a later ate pursuant to
its continuing jurisdiction over children. The ju: idictional issue
has nevertheless concerned several courts, 167 an< women should
prepare to litigate it.
B.

Father's Primary Right to Require Marfital Children to
Continue Using His Name

Consistent with the basic tenet of the cominon law that no
one has such a property right in his or her personal name such
that he or she can prevent another from using it, 168 courts have
expressly rejected the father's right in naming his marital children
as a constitutional property right. 169 They have, however, accepted
the father's prerogative as a liberty right, similar to the rights ac165. Solomon v. Solomon, 5 111. App. 2d 297, 125 N.E.2d 675 (1955). The Illinois
Supreme Court recently stated: "We agree with Solomon that changing a child's
name is a matter incident to custody of the child, and that the court which had jurisdiction over the divorce can entertain a petition enjoining the name change." In
re Presson, 102 111. 2d 303, 465 N.E.2d 85, 87 (1984), reversing) 116 111. App. 3d 458,
451 N.E.2d 970 (1983).
1
166. But see In re Nguyen, 684 P.2d 258 (Colo. App. 1983), tert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
785 (1985).
167. E.g., J. Byrd concurring in In re Schiffman. The Minnesota Supreme Court
in Jacobs v. Jacobs wrote:
We do not decide at what point a trial court loses jurisdiction to
change a child's surname through modification of a Idivorce decree.
Since the child was not provided for in the original decree, the trial
court had the authority to change the child's surname in the context of
a petition to amend the divorce decree.
Jacobs at 304 n.l. If Young v. Yoimg, 356 N.W.2d 823 (Minli. Ct. App. 1984) had
been appealed, the court would have had the opportunity to decide this issue for
Minnesota. In Blasi v. Blasi, 648 S.W.2d 80, 81 (Ky. 1983), the Supreme Court of
Kentucky recently said that "[h]ad the General Assembly intended for the circuit
court to have jurisdiction to effect a name change it would have specifically granted
such jurisdiction." The Indiana court of appeals ruled against the mother's claim
that the court did not have jurisdiction over names in a paternity proceeding.
D.R.S. v. R.S.H., 412 N.E.2d 1247 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980). See irJ/ra, note 148.
168. See supra note 26.
169. Fulgham v. Paul, 229 Ga. 463, 192 S.E.2d 376 (1972); In re Thomas, 404
S.W.2d 199 (Mo. 1966); Newman v. King, 433 S.W.2d 421 (TeJc. 1968).
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corded parents in agreement in naming their offspring. 170 The
Oklahoma Supreme Court recently articulated the I nature of the
father's primary right in American case law: "It is generally recognized that a father has a protectible claim in the continued use
by the child of the paternal surname in accordance with the usual
custom, even though the mother may be the custodial parent." 171
The highest courts of Arkansas, District of Columbia, Georgia, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Virginia, and West Virginia have accepted the standard that the father has a "primary," "protectable," "natural," or ' time-honored"
right superior to that of the mother to name his children. He can
forfeit that right by his misconduct, or by lack of objection. Even
if the father fails to object, the mother must show that the children's best interests are not served by their use of this name, and
that "the substantial welfare of the child necessitates such
change."172
Appellate courts of Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland New Jersey,
Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, and Texas have likewise accepted this
superior right. 173
In naming minors there is an almost irrebuttable presumption that their surnames should never be changed irom the patronymic if their fathers object. A Georgia appellate court articulated
this presumption as: "Courts generally frown upon name changes
of unemancipated minors where the objecting natural father supports them, and there is no substantial reason therefore other than
personal preference." 174
Unlike the California Supreme Court in Schiffrnan, the Nebraska and Minnesota Supreme Courts in Cohee, Jacobs, and
Saxton did not overrule existing precedent in their states which
were based on the father's superior right. In the frequently cited
case of Robinson v. Hansel , 175 the Minnesota Supreme Court in
1974 had written: "A change in surname, so that a child no longer
bears his father's name, not only obviously is of inherent concern
170. Carroll v. Johnson, 263 Ark. 280, 565 S.W.2d 10 (1978); In\ re Tubbs, 620 P.2d
384 (Okla. 1980).
171. In re Tubbs, 620 P.2d 384 (Okla. 1980).
172. In re Saxton, 309 N.W.2d 298, 301 (Minn. 1981), cert de\nied, 455 U.S. 1034
(1982) (quoting Robinson v. Hansel, 302 Minn. 34, 223 N.W.2d 138 (1974)). Young v.
Young, 356 N.W.2d 823 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984), followed this s{andard. See supra
note 77.
173. See supra note 77.
174. Tolbert v. Tolbert, 131 Ga. App. 388, 206 S.E.2d 63 (1974k
]
175. 302 Minn. 34, 223 N.W.2d 138 (1974).
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to the natural father, so that he should have standing to object, but
is in a real sense a change in status." 176
As justification for protection of the paternal right, the courts
have adopted the additional presumption that a child's bond to his
or her noncustodial father is served by or necessitated by preservation of the paternal name. The courts presume that what the father wants is good for his children. Courts dp not consider
convenience or embarrassment to the children in having a surname different from the household in which they live sufficient to
overcome this presumption. 177 Whether framed as 1) the father's
interest in naming his child; 2) preserving the bond between the
father and children; or 3) the children's interests in being close to
their father, the end result is the same: even if it embarrasses the
children, a virtually irrebuttable presumption in favor of the father's right to control the name.
1.

Duty of Support as the Basis of the Fatb^'s Primary
Right to Control the Naming of Marital
Children in Their Mother's Custody

In 1922, Ruth Hale, advocate of women's right to determine
their own names and co-founder of the Lucy Stone League, in discussing the basis for men's demand that women take their husbands' surnames, articulated the underlying pasis of men's
expectation that they have the absolute right to name their
children:
Custom said, too, that man owned what he paid for, and could
put his name on everything for which he provided money. He
wrote his name more often than a little boy with chalk signs
his to a fence. He put it on his land, his house, nis wife and
children, his slaves when he had them, and on everything that
was his. 178
The legal basis of this right of ownership is t^he legal duty of
support, which in turn derives from the man's traditional status as
head of the household. 179 The West Virginia Supreime Court summarized the rule in 1977: "The weight of authority appears to be
that absent extreme circumstances a father who ^xercises his parental rights has a protectable interest in his children bearing his
surname and this interest is one quid pro quo of his reciprocal ob176. Id. at 35, 223 N.W.2d at 140.
177. Kg., In re Worms, 252 Cal. App. 2d 130, 60 Cal. Rptr, 88 (1967).
178. Ruth Hale, But What About the Postman?, 54 The Bocjkman 560, 561 (Feb.
1922).
179. Kathleen A. Ryan Carlsson, Surnames of Women and legitimate Children,
17 N.Y.L.F. 852 (1971).

1985]

RIGHT OF WOMEN TO NAME THEIR CHILDREN

139

ligation of support and maintenance.'*180
Unmarried fathers rely on this same duty to procure naming
rights. In practice, the primary right of fathers serves as a powerful negotiating tool to keep support payments for both marital and
nonmarital children low.181
Ex-husbands often attempt to avoid their dMy of support
when mothers change the children's names. Courts, however, do
not accept a change of a child's name as grounds to avoid support
obligations. Nor do courts accept failure to make support payments as grounds for automatically terminating a father's naming
rights. 182 Men's primary naming right provides little incentive to
pay child support regularly whereas it does serve to deny women
any real voice in naming their children. Further abandonment or
misconduct on the part of fathers is necessary.183 Misconduct usually means felonious activity leading to incarceration or child
abuse, not merely bad parenting.184
Thus, a father's threat to beat his child if he used his
mother's and stepfather's surname was not "the type of misconduct which the law recognizes as foreclosing a father from complaining of a change in his child's surname," according to a
Delaware court.185 The father, the court explained, "was justified
in insisting that his son use the paternal surname, and in threatening to punish him if he adopted another." 186
The misconduct an ex-husband must engage in to forfeit his
naming rights must be heinous. In a recent case, the Pennsylvania
Superior Court considered that murdering the man whose name
the child was changing to constituted sufficient misconduct to for180. In re Harris, 160 W. Va. 422, 427, 236 S.E.2d 426, 429 (1! 77).
181. In D.R.S. v. R.S.H., 412 N.E.2d 1257, 1279 (Ind. Ct. A] >p. i980), the lower
court judge indicated that he might reduce child support pa; ents if the child's
name were not changed to that of the father. Courts do not ually state this fact
of reality in opinions.
182. E.g., Robinson v. Hansel, 302 Minn, at 34, 223 N.W.2d at 138; In re Krcelic,
90 Misc. 2d 666, 395 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1977); Bilenkin v. Bilenkin, 78 Ohio App. 481, 64
N.E.2d 84 (1945). But see In re Harris, 160 W. Va. 422, 236 S.E.2d 426 (1977).
183. E.g., West v. Wright, 263 Md. 297, 283 A.2d 401 (1971). \n re Harris, 160 W.
Va. 422, 236 S.E.2d 426 (1977).
184. An Indiana trial court recently epitomized this thinking:
I always point out that the man who is going to support the children
should have the children in his name unless there is some valid strong
reason, like he is a murderer or a criminal of some kind that would
keep him from—the children from using his name anq carry it, you
In re G.L.A., 430 N.E.2d 433, 434 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
185. Degerberg v. McCormick, 41 Del. Ch. 46, 52,187 A.2d 4p6, 440 (1963).
186. Id.
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feit a father's naming right. 187
In the rare instances where mothers have prevailed in older
children's name disputes, the children have virtually always been
using the mother's choice of name for a long while* Typically, the
ex-husbands have long known about the children's {ise of the other
name without objecting to its use. 188
Although today most judges would deny that fathers can
purchase possessory rights in their children, courts continue to
connect fathers' naming prerogatives with the duty to support children, whether or not the fathers actually fulfill thijs duty. Women
must prove extreme misconduct before ex-husb^nds forfeit the
right to control the naming of their children.
2.

Requirement of Notice to the Father of Statutory Name
Change Proceedings

Courts further protect the father's right to control the naming of marital children by reading into name change statutes a requirement of notice to the father. Such legal projection imposes
requirements even where the statute does not require both parents
to sign the petition, or to give notice to each other! 189 Courts also
avoid dealing with the issue by dismissing petitions brought by
children themselves. 190 Because a father is entitled to notice, he
can usually cause a statutory name change to be voided for lack of
187 In In re Chnstjohn, 286 Pa Super 112, 428 A 2d 597 (1981), the trial court
took extensive psychiatric testimony as to the damage the murder did to the child
And in W v H , 103 N J Super 24, 246 A 2d 501 (1968), incest and incarceration
were sufficient to rebut the father's right Murder or incarceration, as reflected m
New York lower court cases, are the usual misconduct standards In re Fern, 51
Misc 2d 1012, 274 N Y S 2d 547 (1966), In re Yessmer, 61 Misc id 174, 304 N Y S 2d
901 (1964) In re Calobnsi, 7 F L R 272 (Westchester City SuJ Ct July 21, 1981)
But see In re Krcelic, 90 Misc 2d 666, 395 N Y S 2d 382 (Civ Ct Queens Co 1977),
In re Petras, 123 Misc 2d 665, 475 N Y S 2d 199 (Civ Ct QueerJs Co 1984)
Murdering one's father-m-law m reaction to his assertion that his child's name
would be changed did not constitute "a sudden, violent and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such a pasiion m a reasonable
person" so as to reduce the charge to manslaughter according to the Georgia
Supreme Court Perez v State, 249 Ga 767, 294 S E 2d 498 (1982)
188 Nellis v Pressman, 282 A 2d 539 ( D C 1971), cert de\nied, 405 U S 975
(1972) See Bilenkin v Bilenkin, 78 Ohio App 481, 64 N E 2d 84 (1945)
189 Several states require both parents to sign a name change petition, or that
notice be given the nonpetitioning parent See, e g , Carroll v Johnson, 263 Ark 280,
565 S W 2d 10 (1978) See Op Atty Gen Hawaii (Oct 18, 1979) for a discussion of
the national requirement of notice to noncustodial fathers even m the absence of a
statutory notice requirement the notice requirement is not without exception In
re Fletcher, 146 Vt 209, 486 A 2d 627 (1984) See statutory table m Comment, The
Controversy Over Children's Surnames Familial Autonomy, Equal Protection and
the Child's Best Interests, 1979 Utah L Rev 303
190 Ex parte Stull, 276 S C 512, 280 S E 2d 209 (1981), cf In re Staros, 280
N W 2d 409 (Iowa 1979) Compare In re Fletcher, 486 A 2d 627 (Vt 1974)
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it.191 Men can even enforce their rights by enjoining women from
using name change statutes which contain notice requirements.192
In many states ex-husbands can enjoin their ex-wives from encouraging their children in any way to use a name other than the
father's.*^
C. Burden of Proof Required to Rebut Father's Right and
the Presumption That Marital Children Should
Continue to Bear the Paternal Name
Courts have saddled women with an extremely heavy burden
in proving that marital children should not bear the paternal
name. In asserting his right to have his children continue to bear
his name, a father need only object. He does not even need to appear in court.194 However the dispute arises—in the context of a
statutory name change to which he objects, or by injunction
against the mother—the woman has the burden of proof. She
must rebut the right of the father and the presumptions against
children bearing a name to which the father objects. Under pres
ent law she must rebut the right and presumptions not by assert
ing an equal right to naming her children,195 put by virtually
negating, with clear and compelling facts, that the children's interests are "substantially" served by usage of the natural father's
name.196 She must usually show that her choice d>f name not only
is in the children's best interests, but that their use of the father's
v. Johnson,
191. In re Larson, 81 Cal. App. 2d 258, 183 P.2d 688 (1947)^ Carroll
i
263 Ark. 280, 565 S.W.2d 10 (1978); Lawrence v. Lawrence, i 111. App. 3d 810, 408
N.E.2d 330 (1980); Lazow v. Lazow, 147 So. 2d 12 (Fla. Dist. Ct.LApp. 1962); Eschrich
v. Williamson, 475 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972); In re Tubbs, 620 P.2d 384
(Okla. 1980); In re Harris, 160 W. Va. 422, 236 S.E.2d 426 (1977).
192. Burke v. Hammonds, 586 S.W.2d 307 (Ky. 1974) (enjdining a woman from
changing her child's name by court proceedings or otherwise); Blasi v. Blasi, 648
S.W.2d 80 (Ky. 1983) (refusing jurisdiction to require a woman| to
1 change her child's
name by court proceeding; weakening, if not overruling, Burk , sub silentto).
193. Walberg v. Walberg, 22 Or. App. 118, 538 P.2d 96 (1975); Ouellette v. Ouellette, 245 Or. 138, 420 P.2d 631 (1966); Degerberg v. McCormidk, 41 Del. Ch. 46, 187
A.2d 436 (1963); Mark v. Kahn, 333 Mass. 517, 131 N.E.2d 758 (1956); Young v.
Young, 356 N.W.2d 823 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). But see a New York trial court's language in Collins v. Collins, 483 N.Y.S.2d 151 (Sup. Ct. Scheriectady Co. 1984) (father's motion for change of name on birth certificate from mother's birth name to
his granted, but court refused to order mother to call the child by such name.
"How she refers to her daughter is the prerogative of the defendant.") Id. at 152.
See also In re Presson, 102 111. 2d 303, 465 N.E.2d 85, 90 (1984) ("we cannot prevent
Pamela from calling her son Kelly or by any other name or |:nickname within her
own living room.").
194. E.g., In re Saxton, 309 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. 1981), cert. Idenied, 455 U.S. 1034
(1982).
195. Laks v. Laks, 25 Ariz. App. 58, 540 P.2d 1277 (1975) rejected this argument
as to older children first given their father's name.
I
196. In re Saxton, 309 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. 1981), cert, denie^, 455 U.S. 1034 (1982).
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name is not in their interests. 197
While a father must allege that his objection ik based on the
child's interests, his burden of proof is virtually non-existent. All
a father needs to offer is his own belief that the child's use of a
different name will weaken the parental bond between them. 198
In contrast, the mother has to prove "not by a mere preponderance
of the evidence, but by evidence satisfactory to the trial court ,"199
that her name choice is in the child's best interests
A national consensus as to what constitutes "satisfactory" evidence has yet to develop. In the most frequently cited case on the
burden of proof, Robinson v. Hansel , 200 the court declared:
"[J]udicial discretion in ordering a change of a minor's surname
against the objection of one parent should be exercised with great
caution and only where the evidence is clear and compelling that
the substantial welfare of the child necessitates such change." 201
This standard was reaffirmed by the majority in Saxton, but disputed in a potentially important dissent by Justice Wahl who said
that she would require only that a woman show that the name
change "promotes" her child's interests when the name sought includes her own birthname and does not eliminate the other parent's name. 202 In Saxton the mother sought a name consisting of a
hyphenation of the mother's and father's birth nam^s, rather than
a new marital name. 203
Courts recognize children's preferences as material to the issue but of no great importance or weight unless the children are in
their teens. 204 Courts have suggested the appointment of a guard197. Kg., W. v. H., 103 N.J. Super. 24, 246 A.2d 501 (1968) (effect of incest is
shown to demonstrate that use of father's name would be detrimental to two
daughters); In re Christjohn, 286 Pa. Super. 112, 429 A.2d 597 (1981) (evidence of
effect on child of her stepfather's murder by her father necessaify to show that use
of the father's name was detrimental to the child).
198. Kg., Margolis v. Margolis, 338 Mass. 416, 155 N.E.2d 177 (1959).
199. Plass v. Leithold, 381 S.W.2d 580, 581 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). Italics in the
original.
200. 302 Minn. 34, 223 N.W.2d 138 (1964).
201. Id. at 36, 223 N.W.2d at 140.
202. 309 N.W.2d at 298, 302-303 (Wahl and Amdahl, JJ., dissecting). The Minnesota Court of Appeals reaffirmed the woman's heavy burden of proof in Young v.
Young, 356 N.W.2d 823 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984), which involved |a child's use of his
mother's new marital name.
203. 309 N.W.2d at 302-03. In Robinson v. Hansel the motheil- sought to add her
new husband's surname to the paternal name but not to include it as part of a hyphenated name.
204. See e.g., In re Saxton, 309 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. 1981), cer\t. denied, 455 U.S.
1034 (1982). Recently, in In re Meyer, 471 N.E.2d 718 (Ind. Ct. 1pp. 1984) the Indiana Court of Appeals overturned the trial court's award of a name change to the
mother on the grounds that the child wanted the name, stating that there was "no
showing" of the four and one half year old girl's "maturity" to have a preference as

1985]

RIGHT OF WOMEN TO NAME THEIR CHILDREN

143

ian ad litem to represent children's interests,20^ yet a series of
Texas cases rejected such a requirement. 206 The advisability of using a guardian ad litem depends largely on the particular jurisdiction and attitudes of the bench and bar. The wrong guardian ad
litem can harm women's and children's interests by failing to confront the relative rights involved in a dispute over children's
names.207 The right guardian, however, can effectively challenge
the traditional male power system. A statutory or judicially imposed requirement of the appointment of a guardian ad litem
would thus probably be counter-productive, but iipi the right case a
guardian can be very effective.
As courts awaken to the fact that women and children are asserting constitutional rights in this area, they frame men's right to
oppose women's right to name children in neutral terms. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court, for example, in In re Tubbs , 208 rephrased the father's right: "Every divorced parent—custodial or
not—whose paternal or maternal bond remained unsevered, has a
cognizable claim to having his/her child continue to bear the very
same legal name as that by which it was knowji at the time the
marriage was dissolved."209
In direct reaction to the fear that fathers ifciight lose control
over naming marital children, the Indiana legislature passed a statute in 1979 to give a rebuttable presumption in statutory name
changes proceedings to an objecting noncustodial parent if the parent pays support.210 In a recent decision interpreting the statute,
to her name. See also In re Presson, 102 111. 2d 303, 80 111. I[)ec. 294, 465 N.E.2d 85
(1984)
205. Id. In M.M. v. R.R.M., 358 N.W.2d 86 (Minn. Ct. Apb. 1984) the court cited
Saxton as supporting the appointment of a guardian in a custody dispute stating
that "custody is a more significant issue" than the one addressed in Saxton and thus
warranted the appointment.
206. Brown v. Carroll, 683 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984); Scucchi v. Woodruff,
503 S.W.2d 356 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); Bennett v. NorthcuttL 544 S.W.2d 703 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1976); Newman v. King, 433 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. 1968), noted in Family
Law—Failure to Appoint Guardian Ad Litem for Minor Not Fundamental
Error,
22 Sw. L.J. 649 (1968).
207. See, e.g., supra note 137.
208. 620 P.2d 384 (Okla. 1980).
209. Id. at 385. The 1979 American Law Reports annotation likewise neutralizes
the gender of the "objecting parent." Annot. "Rights and Remedies of Parents Inter Se With Respect to the Names of Their Children," 92 A L.R.3d 1091 (1979).
210. Ind. Code Ann. § 34-4-6-4(d) (Burns Supp. 1985):
In deciding on a petition to change the name of a I minor child, the
court shall be guided by the best interest of the child. . . . However,
there is a presumption in favor of a parent of a minor child who:
(1) Has been making support payments and fulfilling other duties in
accordance with a decree . . . and (2) Objects to the proposed name
change of the child.
In my comments to the bill I expressed that the bill:
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the Indiana Court of Appeals wrote:
[T]he presumption created by the legislature is it is in the best
interest of the child to retain the name of the parent who
makes support payments and fulfills other duties uijposed by a
dissolution decree, if such parent objects to the proposed name
change. To prevail m such an action, then, the petitioning
party must overcome that presumption This is ndt to say, as
Blank posits, such presumption must be overcome before the
best mterest of the child is relevant Rather, the bfest mterest
of the child is always the primary concern with merely a presumption the supporting parent's position is m the best interests of the child 2 1 1
In no known case has a custodial mother sought to change
her marital child's surname from her birth name to the father's
name or to another name. Nor is there any reported case of a noncustodial father attempting to change his marital child's surname
from the parental to the maternal or another I surname. The
courts' attempts to appear neutral amount to sheer judicial hypocrisy. An English commentator tactfully wrote: Hit is submitted
that this is a somewhat unreal situation, since only rarely is the father likely to wish for a name change, but rather to insist on the
children retaining their original surname, his oWn."212 Neutral
language cannot conceal the appallingly disparate purden of proof
imposed upon women in these names cases.
The lower and higher courts of Minnesota iiji Saxton, citing
approvingly to its earlier case of Robinson, thinly
continued acceptance of the father's right and the mother's heavy
burden of proof. The noncustodial father in Saxton insisted that
his children use only his surname, alleging that th^ children's best
interests would be served by his name and because his son was his
"only male heir." The trial referee recommended the father's
appears to be patently designed to prevent women with children in
their custody from statutorily changing their children's names if the
father objects and contributes any support for the child and is in
obeyance with a decree issued pursuant to IC 31-1-11 5
While this discrimination is phrased as a presumption, it appears,
though "neutrally" worded, to clearly be written to give men the predominant naming rights of children
Letter to Lesley DuVall, Chair, Indiana Senate Judiciary Committee (March 5,
1979)
I
211 In re Meyer, 471 N E 2d 718 (Ind Ct App 1984) Neither the constitutionality of the pretextually sex neutral language of the statute, nor any other constitutional issue, was raised by either party before the trial or appellate courts To rebut
the presumption m favor of the noncustodial parent's preference, the evidence
must be "clear and convincing," the court stated It rejected thle finding of the trial
court that the new name would be good for the child as being enough to rebut the
presumption
I
212 Evelyn Ellis, The Choice of Children's Surnames, 9 Anglo-AmL Rev 92
(1980)

I
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choice of surname. He cited the father's right, the standard cases
to protect it, and the contention that the mother had not met her
burden of proof. The referee failed, however, to admit that he was
deferring to the father's choice: "In other words, the Court is not
so much imposing partriarchal custom and tradition upon the children, but rather, securing and maintaining the parent's understanding and agreement when they first named their children at
birth." 213 The Minnesota Supreme Court stated that either parent's choice of name would serve the children's interests. It then
broke the tie between the two names to that name (paternal) used
over a long period of time. 214 In the companion case, Jacobs v. Jacobs , the court enunciated a co-equal right of parenis to name children at birth. The court, nonetheless, rejected Audrey Davis
Saxton's claim that this distinction causes courts Ito support the
patrilineal naming system.
The petitioner in Saxton married in 1969, a time when few
women knew their rights or deviated from custom by not changing
their names at marriage. She divorced in West Virginia when its
statutes still prohibited a divorced woman with! children from
changing her name pursuant to the divorce decree, The change in
name had been the idea of her son, Robert, and discussed by them
and her daughter, Jessica, over a long period of time. The father
had at first agreed, then withdrawn his consent. As Ms. Saxton's
attorney I unsuccessfully wrote the United States Supreme Court:
The Petitioner before this Court is typical of the victims of
prejudice and discrimination against women determining their
own names. "Caught between a rock and a hard place," first
having to fight and litigate simply to not change their names,
or to change them if they had children or might have children,
they are now being slapped in the face again by being told that
it is only right that they be denied participation in the naming
of the children in their custody over the fathers' objection because they consented to naming the children with | the father's
name in the first place!215
The United States Supreme Court will have Ito be convinced
that the issue of naming children raises substantial federal questions and is important and widespread enough for it to render guidance to the state courts. 216 Until then, women must continually
213. In re Saxton, No. 755270 (Dist. Ct. Hennepin Co., Minn., July 16, 1979),
Memorandum of Referee Thomas F. Haeg (citing to Laks v. Laks, 25 Ariz. App. 58,
540 P.2d 1277 (1975)).
214. See supra note 120.
.
215. Reply of Petitioner to Response of Respondent to Petition for A Writ of
Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Minnesota, Saxton v. Denpiis, No. 81-959 (U.S.
S. Ct., 1981).
216. It is unlikely that the Supreme Court will hear any children's names case
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attack and overcome this high burden of proof before they will
have any voice in naming their noninfant children!
VII. Resolving Disputes Over Naming Children at Bifth or
Thereafter—The Developing Custodial Parent Presumption
With the law stacked against women obtaining any right of
participation in the naming of their marital children when the exhusband objects, attorneys in the mid-1970s began arguing that the
law should recognize a presumption in favor of the custodial parent's judgment. Attorneys have made this argument in most of
the recent successful at-birth naming disputes.217 ]New Hampshire
recently adopted the presumption statutorily as a ikieans to resolve
disputes over naming newborn marital children on their birth certificates.218 Pennsylvania promulgated and published regulations
to such effect in 1975.219
which involves any factual dispute over individual children's 'best interests " See
supra note 120
217 "Absent a showing of abuse or neglect, the custodial parent should be presumed to show good judgment m his or her decision regarding the child and the
court should not dictate his or her action " Brief for Appellant by Evergreen Legal
Services, Hurta v Hurta, 25 Wash App 95, 605 P 2d 1278 (1979) "The choice of a
surname should rest with the parent, male or female, who will take custody of the
newborn child and make day-to-day decisions affecting the child's life and best interests " Brief for Appellant, In re Schidlmeier, No J 27018-85, slip op (Pa Super
Aug 9, 1985) Attorneys argued the concept m In re Schiffmak 28 Cal 3d 640, 620
P 2d 579,169 Cal Rptr 918 (1980), Jacobs v Jacobs, 309 N W 2d 303 (Minn 1981), In
re Saxton, 309 N W 2d 298 (Minn 1981), cert denied, 455 U S 1034 (1982), and Cohee v Cohee, 210 Neb 855, 317 N W 2d 381 (1982), as well as ill several unreported
lower cases In Jacobs the Minnesota Supreme Court was obviously disturbed by
the fact situation of a mother seemingly attemptmg to "bastardize" her child by
getting impregnated by her ex-husband after divorce proceedings were filed or finalized Given such a fact situation the court was unlikely to remand with a presumption m favor of the custodial parent See supra notes 114-148 and
accompanying text for discussion of at-birth naming law In In re Schidlmeier, No
J 27018-85, slip op (Pa Super Aug 9, 1985), the mother appellant unsuccessfully
argued that a noncustodial father should not have standing to petition to change
the name of a child m its mother's custody except as part of a petition to change
custody
The NOW LDEF wrote as amici curiae m the unsuccessful Cohee case "When
parents are unable to gree on the child's surname, the law should presume that it is
m the child's best mterests to bear the surname chosen by the) custodial parent
the custodial parent is the head of the household and, as custodian, has the ultimate
responsibility for decisions regarding the child While it may be desirable to encourage the participation of the non-custodial parent m the various phases of the
child's upbringing, the custodial parents should be the final arbiter " Brief of Amici
Curiae, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund joined by the National Center on
Women and Family Law and the (smce defunct) Center For A Woman's Own
Name
218 N H Rev Stat Ann § 126 6-A(I)(a) (1984) ("the choice of surname rests
with the parent who has actual custody following birth")
219 28 Pa Admin Code § 1 7(b) (Shepard's 1975) ("If the parents are divorced
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The custodial parent presumption was not neKv. It had appeared in disputes over marital children's names particularly in
California.220 A mother's right to name nonmarital children is
based on her right as guardian and custodian.221 Parental rights
claimed by joint custodians in ongoing marriages to name their
children against the state are also based on the presumption.222
Adoption of the presumption follows logically from the divorce
courts' exercise of jurisdiction over the naming of children as incidental to children's care, custody, and control.223 Excellent law review commentary has also discussed the presumption favorably.224
Cases involving parental disputes over children's names have,
however, traditionally carved out, as a singular exception to custodial mothers' rights to rear children, the right to name the children. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals once stated that
"evaluating the evidence bearing upon the real issue, the views of
the mother are also entitled to consideration."225 Until recently,
this represents the most recognition any court has |made of a woor separated at the time of the child'd birth, the choice of s u r n W rests with the
parent who has custody of the newborn child ") This regulation was cited by Justice Mosk m his concurrmg opinion advocatmg the custodial parent presumption in
In re Schiffman, 28 Cal 3d 640, 620 P 2d 579, 169 Cal Rptr 918 (1980) It was interpreted for the first time m In re Schidlmeier, No J 27018-85, slip op (Pa Super
Aug 9, 1985) See supra note 133 and infra notes 231-234 and accompanying text
220 Reed v Reed, 338 P 2d 350 (Okla 1959), In re Trower, 260 Cal App 2d 75,
66 Cal Rptr 873 (1968), In re Cohn, 181 Misc 1021, 50 N Y S 2d 279 (Sup Ct N Y
County, 1943), Webber v Parker, 167 So 2d 519 (La Ct App 1964), writ refused
264 La 86, 168 So 2d 269 (1964), stopped short of recognizing a custodial parent's
right
221 Supra notes 98-100 and accompanying texty Op Att'y \Gen Wis (Oct 7,
1974)
222 Supra notes 81-96, 102-113 and accompanying text In cases of joint custody,
if the child actually lives with both parents, the naming right khould remain mutual with neither parent having a greater burden of proof to establish that her or
his choice of name should be used by the children
223 See supra notes 160-167 and accompanying text
224 Note, The Controversy Over Children's Surnames
Familial
Autonomy,
Equal Protection and the Child's Best Interests, 1979 Utah L Rbv 303, M Hannah
Leavitt, Surname Alternatives in Pennsylvania, 82 Dick L Re^ 101, 115-16 (1977)
See Kathryn Urbonya, No Judicial Dyslexia
The Custodial Parent
Presumption
Distinguishes the Paternal Right to Name a Child, 58 N D L Rev 793 (1982) (author worked on In re Dengler, 287 N W 2d 637 (Mmn 1979), appeal dismissed, 446
U S 949 (1980), with Prof Thomas Lockney of the University of North Dakota
School of Law), Laura A Foggan, Parents' Childreanng Authority and the Selection of Children's Surnames, 51 Geo Wash L Rev 583 (1983) (as a law student
author worked on an amicus curiae brief for the Washington, E) C Women's Legal
Defense Fund m Miller v Leavitt, No Civ 82-369-E ( W D Okl Dec 24, 1982)
(Journal Entry of Judgment)) and filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the
F und m support of the Application To Suspend the Rules To Rehear and Reconsider the Appeal and Decision m Overton v Overton, 674 P 2d 1089 (Mont 1983)
225 Nelhs v Pressman, 282 A 2d 539 ( D C 1971), cert denied, 405 U S 975
(1972)
I
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men's right to make decisions about naming children in her custody when she is not alleging paternal misconduct. In no other
area of childrearing do courts intervene to the extent of even enjoining or ordering a parent to do what even thp court acknowledges may embarrass the child. 226
California Supreme Court Justice Mosk, iii his pathsetting
and thorough concurring opinion in Schiffman, urged the adoption
of the presumption in favor of the custodial parent in naming matters. Because the custodial parent has been awarded custody of a
child on the basis of the child's best interest, it should be presumed, he wrote, that the
parent with custody . . . has acted in the child's| best interest
in selecting the name. . . . Just as the noncustodial parent can
seek a corrective order if the child's health, education or control are deleteriously affected by the abuse of custodial care, so
the selection of name can be contested on the ground that it is
not in the child's best interest. The burden, however, would
be on the noncustodial parent to establish the intrusion on the
child's best interest.227
To the extent that a custodial mother usually desires the children in her custody to bear in whole or part the same surname she
does, the presumption itself can be said to be based on a presumption that children's best interests are served bv using the same
name as their custodial parent. 228 However, attorneys and commentators appropriately found the presumption primarily on the
legal right to determine what name is in a child's best interests,
not on the specific name selected by the custodian. They base the
226. "Whatever the nature of the 'harassment' of the children by their peers, it
would seem that it was in this case surely no more severe than [that] faced by
thousands of other similarly situated children in a day when broken homes have
become commonplace." Robinson v. Hansel, 302 Minn. 34, 37, 223 N.W.2d 138, 141
(1974). See also Niesen v. Niesen, 38 Wis. 2d 599, 157 N.W.2d 660 (1968); In re
Worms, 252 Cal. App. 2d 130, 60 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1967); Degerberg v. McCormick, 41
Del. Ch. 46, 187 A.2d 436 (1963).
227. In re Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d 640, 648, 620 P.2d 579, 584 169 Cal. Rptr. 918, 923
(1980) (Mosk, J. concurring), noted in Cox, When a Childs\ Surname is Different
From the Custodial Parents, 10 Colo. Lawyer 1651 (July, +981), and discussed in
Urbonya, supra note 224.
228. E.g., in Niesen v. Niesen, 38 Wis. 2d 599, 157 N.W.2dl 660, 663-64 (1968), the
Wisconsin Supreme Court wrote:
There are cases . . . when the use of the stepfather's! surname by the
child avoids not only difficulties but embarrassment to the child who
is unable to explain to his playmates that he is a tragic victim of divorce. Even though the social evil of divorce is widespread, children
and many adults still do not accept as convenient or natural a different
surname for a child and his mother.
See also Pintor v. Martinez, 202 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Civ. App.[l947); Don v. Don, 142
Conn. 309,114 A.2d 203 (1955); Kirksey v. Abbott, 591 S.W.2d 751, 752 (Mo. Ct. App.
1979).
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presumption on the authority of the custodial parent to rear her
children without interference of the noncustodial! parent. 229 As
one commentator characterized it:
The relationship between the custodial parent and child . . . is
built upon the custodial parent's right to direct the child's development—psychological, educational, and religious. Because
a name can have psychological, educational and religious significance, a custodial parent should also determine a child's
name. The selection of a name would thus be one aspect of
the custodial parent's duty to direct the development of a
child's identity.230
In a recent decision, In re Schidlmeier, 231 the Pennsylvania
Superior Court interpreted the state's regulation giving the choice
of surname for a newborn to the custodial parent for the first time
in the context of a noncustodial father petitioning to change the
surname of an infant child from her mother's name to his. The
trial court had dismissed the regulation as irrelevant and found for
the father. The appellate court reversed, cited Jlustice Mosk's
opinion, and stated:
The policy embodied in Section 1.7(a) fairly and practically allocates the responsibility for choosing a newborn child's surname. The custodial parent generally has the right to make
major decisions affecting the best interests of a minor child.232
The court equated the term "custody" with 'legal custody."
After thus ruling that the initial naming had been done pursuant
to valid public policy by the parent with the legal right to custody,
it treated the father's request to change the birth certificate name
of the child eighteen months after her birth as a name change, put
the burden of going forward with the evidence that the proposed
change was in the best interests of the child and stated:
In the case of a contested petition to change a child's name, the
court must carefully evaluate all the relevant factual circumstances to determine if the petitioning parent has Established
229. See, e.g., Joseph Goldstein, Annal Freud & Albert J. Solnit, Beyond the
Best Interests of the Child (1973). It is particularly consistent with the theory that
children's best interests are served by being in the custody of the caretaking parent.
See Women's Legal Defense Fund, Representing Primary Caretaker Parents in
Custody Disputes (1984) for a discussion of the law developing tpwards custody being awarded to the caretaking parent.
As attorney for Ms. Saxton I wrote to the U.S. Supreme Court: "As custodial
parents of their children women now expect to be created not as babysitters of
male property, branded with the male name, but as fully responsible and mature
heads of household with no exception carved out for the naming of their children."
Reply of Petitioner to Response of Respondent to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the Supreme Court of Minnesota at 11.
230. Urbonya, supra note 224, at 815.
231. No. J. 27018-85, slip op. (Pa. Super. Aug. 9, 1985).
232. Id.
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that the change is in the child's best interests. This the court
must do without according a presumption in favor of either
parent. 233
Although it did not expressly adopt the custbdial parent presumption in the case of infants, by shifting the burden to the noncustodial parent, the court effectively prevented noncustodial
fathers from undermining the policy of the regulation to give the
custodial parent the right to name newborns. The court, unfortunately, failed to discuss the policy in broader terms.
The court also failed to articulate the burden of the parent to
prove that a proposed name change is in a child's best interests.
Because the trial court had ruled in the father's favor on the basis
of "tradition and custom," and because the father only alleged that
it would be in the child's best interests to bear the parental name,
the court held for the mother stating that the father's "allegation
does not meet his burden of proof" and that the trial court's rational was not "legally sufficient to sustain a conclusion that the
name change appellee seeks is in the child's best interests." 2 3 4
Appellate courts have not expressly adopted the custodial
parent presumption, and one court to which it has been argued has
expressly rejected it. 235 Georgia and Louisiana have provisions
similar to the Indiana statute giving an express presumption in
favor of a marital child's continued use of the noncustodial parent's name. 2 3 6 In direct contrast, the Virginia legislature amended
its law to provide that a change of name of a minor shall be denied
only if the "change of name is not in the best interest of the minor." 2 3 7 A similar new Minnesota statute was construed in Saxton
as not changing the burdens of proof established by the 1974 decision in Robinson v. Hansel . 238 Several trial judges have accepted
the custodial parent preference as a viable means of resolving disputes between parents, especially when the children are very
young or even unborn. 2 3 9 Recently, the Colorado Court of Ap233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Cohee v. Cohee, 210 Neb. 855, 317 N.W.2d 381 (l|982). The Nebraska
Supreme Court, however, did say that custody should be considered, but it gave no
explanation as to how.
236. Ga. Code Ann. § 19-12-1 (1982); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13:4751(B) (West Supp.
1985). See Ind. Code Ann. § 34-4-6-4(d) (Burns Supp. 1985) an^i supra notes 200-201
and accompanying text.
237. Va. Code § 8.01-217 (1984):
[T]he court, shall, unless the evidence shows that the Change of name
is sought for a fraudulent purpose or would otherwise infringe upon
the rights of others or, in case of a minor, that the change of name is
not in the best interest of the minor, order a change of name. . . .
238. 302 Minn. 34, 223 N.W.2d 138 (1974).
239. Kg., In re Miles, No. 80DR2859 (Dist. Ct. El Paso Ck Col. Nov. 14, 1980);
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peals, although not expressly adopting the presumption, upheld a
trial court order based partially on it. 240
With the demise of the tender years doctririe, which presumed that mothers of young children should have custody, arose
the nationwide standard of awarding custody according to a child's
best interests. The custodial parent presumption oners a sex-neutral standard by which disputes can be resolved.
I believe that trial courts will experiment withl and soon tire
of, hyphenated names as resolutions for naming disputes over
newborns. 241 This will occur as trial and appellat^ courts, along
with state legislatures, move towards recognizing naming as an incident of childrearing entrusted to the custodial parent over newborn or very young children. 242 I also think it is clear that the
presumption will develop from cases where the mother uses her
birth given surname or a surname not assumed because of a marriage, and does not seek to give her child the surname of another
man. Whether the presumption will gain acceptance as a standard
in disputes over naming older children, however, depends upon active and strategic advocacy during the next decade.
Reed v. Reed, No. 1590 (Super. Ct. Tolland Co. Conn. Nov. 23, 1973). In State v.
Tedeno, 101 Misc. 2d 485, 421 N.Y.S.2d 297, 300 (Sup. Ct. 1979) a New York trial
court wrote:
[TJhe significant consideration is that the mother has custody and it is
she who will be the primary caretaking figure and who will make the
major decisions for Alexandria. Moreover, the Court recognizes that
children, as they grow older, generally prefer to use the name of the
parent with whom they live.
240. In re Nguyen, 684 P.2d 258 (Colo. App. 1983), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 785
(1985).
241. Cohee v. Cohee, 210 Neb. 855, 317 N.W.2d 381 (1982). Seel supra notes 14-15
and 128-230 and accompanying text. A hyphenated surname is not necessarily good
for a child, especially if it is imposed when the child is older, and is not often the
choice of either parent in a naming dispute. One commentator advocates a rebuttable presumption in favor of a hyphenated surname but without idiscussion of how
the mother, father (and child) would rebut the presumption and 1by what standard
the court would then choose between the choices of the parents 4s being in the best
interests of the child. Note, Like Father Like Child: The Rights of Parents In their
Children's Surnames, 70 Va. L. Rev. 1303, 1347-48 (1984)
242. New Hampshire and Pennsylvania recognize the presumption by statute
and administrative regulation. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 126:6(11)(a) reads "if the parents are separated or divorced at the time of the child's birth, the choice of surname rests with the parent who has actual custody following birth." 28 Pa. Admin.
Code § 1.7(b) (1975): "If the parents are divorced or separated Jat the time of the
child's birth, the choice of surname rests with the parent who (has custody of the
newborn child." The Pennsylvania Superior Court, however, ik interpreting this
regulation, in In re Schidlmeier, No. J. 27018-85, slip op. (Pa. Super. Aug. 9, 1985),
shied away from expressly articulating the presumption. See supra notes 231-234
and accompanying text. A requirement that one parent, on the basis of her or his
sex, sign a state form for a minor is a violation of equal protection. Johnson v.
Hodges, 372 F. Supp. 1015 (E.D. Ky. 1974) (driver's license). Most states provide
that either or both parents sign a birth certificate.
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VIII. Legal Recognition That a Name Does Not Imply Illegitimacy
or Paternity
One of the spoken and unspoken objections tjo recognizing a
child's right to bear its mother's surname has be^n that, because
customarily nonmarital children are known by the\r mothers' surnames, society will stigmatize marital children as ^illegitimate" if
they also carry their mothers' surnames. Charlotte Perkins
Gilman wrote in 1913: "As to illegitimate children, the term will
disappear from the language. . . . When women have names of
their own, names not obliterated by marriage . . . mere will be no
way of labeling a child at once, as legitimate or otherwise."243
Now that women increasingly have names of their own, society
cannot, and should not, label children as "illegitimate" or "legitimate." The notion that use of a woman's birth name will impose a
"badge of ignobility" on a child has been accepted py several lower
court jurists. Only one appellate court, however, had given the notion any credence until May, 1985.244 Until May 14, 1985 no appellate no court had accepted the notion as reason to deny a child its
mother's name.245
In Doe v Dunning,246 the Washington Stat^ Registrar declined to issue conventional birth certificates to rkonmarital children, assuming that listing the father's name on a conventional
certificate along with the mother's different surname was "indicative of a probability of illegitimacy."247 The Registrar based the
policy on the "custom" of marital children taking their father's
names. The Washington Supreme Court held that "disclosure of
the fact that a child bears the mother's surname is not necessarily
a fact from which illegitimacy can be ascertained.']248 While some
might suspect illegitimacy in looking at the child's pirth certificate,
the court wrote, "[ojthers might view it as an adoption of an
emerging social trend."249
In another case,250 the trial court denied a Roman's petition
243. Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Illegitimate Children, 4 Tl[e Forerunner, 295,
297 (1913).
244. In re Harris, 160 W. Va. 422, 236 S.E.2d 426 (1977).
245. E.g., In re Toekles, 97 Idaho 406, 545 P.2d 1012 (1976); Doe v. Dunning, 87
Wash. 2d 50, 549 P.2d 1 (1976). In Lassiter-Geers v. Reichenb^ch, 303 Md. 88, 492
A.2d 303, 307 (1985) the court upheld a chancellor's application of the "best interest
test to the facts of this case." the chancellor had concluded from the bench that
"some people and a lot of people may well infer this child was born out of
wedlock."
246. 87 Wash. 2d 50, 549 P.2d 1 (1976). See supra, note 2 and accompanying text.
247. Id. at 52, 549 P.2d at 2.
248. Id. at 52, 549 P.2d at 3,
249. Id. at 52, 549 P.2d at 4.
250. In re Toekles, 97 Idaho 406, 545 P.2d 1012 (1976).
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to change the name of her nonmarital child froni the father's
name to hers on the grounds it "would make her a bastard on the
fact of the record." 251 The appeals court reversed, saying that the
order would "only have determined the name by which the child
would be known thereafter. It would not have any effect upon the
child's legitimacy." 252
Still, in the West Virginia case of In re Harris,?53 the majority said "as the circuit judge in one of the cases before us so ably
pointed out, a child's bearing a woman's maiden name does give
fair indication that the child is illegitimate." 254 Were a father to
forfeit his legal right to name the child by disgracing his name or
abandoning the child, the court noted, then a child's name might
be changed to the mother's. The court did not clarify whether the
child would be labeled any less "legitimate'3 under such
circumstances.
In Cohee v. Cohee, the trial court stated that ai common surname of a custodial mother and child is "usually accomplished by
the mother keeping her prior name." 255 The lower court stated
that it may be "easier on the child to have the same name as the
head of the house of the parent, but also easier on the child to
have the name of the father to prevent any implication in later
years that the child was an illegitimate child." 256 The trial judge
expressed no concern about birth status implied from different
surnames of a custodial mother and child. The issue, however, was
dealt with by the Nebraska Supreme Court in one sentence: "We
consider and reject the trial court's reasons that the status of legitimacy would necessarily be raised by different surnames of mother
and son." 257 None of the courts which have denied women the
right to name their marital children have suggested that a child's
bearing the paternal name while its mother bears fyer own name
implies that the child was illegitimate. 258
251. Id. at 407, 545 P.2d at 1013.
252. Id.
253. 160 W. Va. 422, 236 S.E.2d 426 (1977).
254. Id. at 427, 236 S.E.2d at 429.
255. Cohee v. Cohee, Tr. 4:5-6.
256. Tr. 4:12-17.
.
257. Cohee v. Cohee, 210 Neb. 855, 860-61, 317 N.W.2d 381, 384 (1982).
258. In Nellis v. Pressman, 282 A.2d 539, 541 (D.C. 1971), certl denied, 405 U.S.
975 (1972), the father, who objected to his children continuing to bear their
mother's remarried name, said that "it is not natural for children to carry their
mother's name." He did not, however, suggest that their birth status would be
questioned. New Jersey Rules 8:2-l.l(a)4 provides that "since a choice of the options for recording the surname of a child can result in such surname being different from that of its father, the agreement or difference of the two surnames is not
an indication of legitimacy or illegitimacy." The presence and introduction of ma-
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More often it is argued that a woman's naminjg her child with
the putative father's name is evidence of paternity In Doe v. Hancock County Board of Health, Justice Hunter of the Indiana
Supreme Court in dissent stated: "[I]t is clear that the use of a
name does not legally imply that a biological relationship exists
between persons with that same name. The only legal purpose
served by a name is to identify the particular individual who uses
it for that purpose." 259 The Massachusetts Supreme Court in Commonwealth indicated that if there has been no acknowledgment or
adjudication of paternity, there is the "possibility of a dishonest
purpose to harass the alleged father" in naming a| child for an alleged father. 260
Although courts may refer to a name representing membership in a family unit, 261 the courts do not hold that a person's
name itself evidences, in law, one's parentage or birth status. The
law recognizes women's increasing use of their own names, and is
gradually declining to stigmatize children as "legitimate" or "illegitimate." Legal recognition of women's right to name their children will result in more respectful treatment of children.
IX.

The Need for Legislation, Constitutional Challenges and the Equal
Rights Amendment to Guarantee Women Rights in Naming
Children Where the Fathers Disagree
A.

Legislation

Legislation on naming children, proposed or passed over the
past dozen years, has not followed a coherent pi;an This absence
of strategy arises from the lack of knowledge in the women's
movement about the law of naming and its failure to recognize
naming children as a pressing women's issue, The legislation
which has been enacted attempts to resolve twol basic issues: 1)
specification of the names parents may give newporn marital and
nonmarital children on their birth certificates (or Conscious lack of
such specifications), and 2) allocation of the contlrol over naming
ma
ternal grandparents at oral argument helps courts to view thei maternal
name with
respect.
259. Doe v. Hancock County Board of Health, 436 N.E.2d 1791, 794 (Ind. 1982).
See also In re Dillon, 283 Pa. Super. 26, 423 A.2d 426 (1980).
260. Secretary of the Commonwealth v. City Clerk of Lowell, 373 Mass. 178, 192,
366 N.E.2d 717, 726 (1977). This is narcissistic, but it is also a cdmmon fear and negative supposition about women among men and probably the basis of the laws
which require the biological father's consent or a determination of paternity for a
child to bear its father's name on its birth certificate. The same presumed intent to
harass could be manifested, moreover, by giving a child a man'si name as a first and/
or middle name.
261. E.g., In re Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d at 647, 620 P.2d at 583, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 923.
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children between parents, married or unmarried. Beyond unsuccessful attempts to maintain the custom of marital children bearing their fathers' names or to limit parental options, 262 legislation
attempting to impose state control over naming chldren has been
minimal. Except for the repeal of the Louisiana, Nebraska, North
Carolina, and Tennessee limitations on names to be given marital
children at birth, no legislation should be necessary to guarantee
that married parents have the right to name their children with
any name if general common law principles are followed. Statutes
which simply codify the common law and state that parents have
the right to name their children as they wish, such as those in
Michigan and New Hampshire, are technically not necessary. Statutes mandating that a nonmarital child bear a certain surname on
its birth certificate depending on its birth status or jhe relationship
between the parents need to be repealed or invalidated by
litigation.
New Hampshire provides an example of positive legislation
which would be useful to guarantee women rights in naming children. The statute specifies that if parents are divorced or separated at the time of birth, the choice of name rests Iwith the parent
having actual custody. 263
A proposal in Wisconsin goes further. 264 First,I, it codifies Wisconsin's recognition of the common law right of parents who are
married to each other and not separated, to register the given
name(s) and surname of a child. 265 Then it provides that if the
parents are separated or divorced at the time of birth, the given
name(s) and surname shall be registered by the parent with actual
262 In Iowa the state registrar supported a bill which provided: "The custodian
shall not give the child a name which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, or
otherwise potentially harmful to the future of the child" and gave the registrar the
authority to refuse to register such names. 1973 Iowa S B 201 Michigan's similar
name change statute was amended m the mid 1970s
Several states have considered at-birth name selection statutes such as the Louisiana, Nebraska, North Carolina, and Tennessee statutes Eg , 1979-80 H B 639
(Ohio) (marital child to be registered m name mutually agreed upon by parents,
and if they do not agree, a hyphenated surname with mother's name first,
nonmarital child in mother's name unless both sign, then according to both parent's
agreement), N C S B 306 (1979) (marital child given either pkrent's name or hyphenated name), N J.A B 3368 (April 28, 1975) (birth certificate to mclude "surnames of the mother, the father, and the child, which names need not necessarily
be the same")
263 N H Rev Stat Ann § 126 6-a(I)(a) (Supp 1983) P« lylvania has a pubhshed regulation to such effect See supra, notes 62, 218, 231-2 and accompanying
text
264 No 1677/7 Leg Ref Bureau Conversations with Ra; tond Nashold, State
Registrar of Vital Statistics, Edward Steichen, Bureau Chief
d Kenna del Sol,
Legislative Attorney (June, 1985)
265 63 Op Atty Gen Wis 501 (Oct 7, 1974).
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custody. If, however, a court has awarded custody tb another, the
names selected by such person shall be registered.
If the parents were not married to each other] from conception to birth, the bill provides for the mother to register the child's
names unless a court has granted legal custody to another in which
case that person selects the given and last names.
The proposal further provides that upon an acknowledgment
of paternity (signed by both parents), the mother, or the father if a
court has granted him legal custody, can change the names of a
child under seven years of age. If the parents marry each other
following the birth, the parents have the mutual right to change a
child's name on its birth certificate, again if the child is under
seven.266
Additionally, where the children are age seven br older, legislation could provide that children's preferences regarding any
name change be admissible and that at age fourteen require their
consent. Such provisions would give children a longLoverdue voice
in proceedings that purport to determine their best interest.267
Because of the spoken and unspoken fear that women will, as
men have, impose their surnames on children irrespective of the
children's best interests, it appears highly unlikely that legislatures will adopt a comprehensive custodial parent presumption.268
Legislatures should be encouraged to accept the presumption for
the naming of infants, such as New Hampshire anq Pennsylvania
266. The provision could go even further and provide for birth certificate name
change by a custodial parent or person until a child reaches seven years.
Oregon and Maryland have considered statutes specifically providing for name
changes of children at the time of divorce to the custodial parent's name. Ore. H.B.
2102 (1979); Md. S.B. 961 (1977) (only in cases of child legitimized by marrige being
dissolved).
267. My experience with litigants indicates that children over jseven years of age'
should be listened to. Because parents and children should openly discuss the issue
I do not believe that their testimony should be sealed. To putj children at ease,
however, judges should generally interview children in chambers instead of open
court, with parents and attorneys present unless the children object. For an indepth discussion and analysis of questioning children in the context of custody and
visitation proceedings, see Cathy Jones, Judicial Questioning oj\ Children in Custody and Visitation Proceedings, 18 Family L.Q. 43 (1984).
268. Indeed, legislatures have proved to be reactionary. Seel e.g., Louisiana's,
North Carolina's, and Tennessee's recent legislation protecting tne husband's control over naming at birth, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:34(a)(l) (West 1984); N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 130A-101(e) (Supp. 1983); Tenn. Code Ann. § 53-445 (SupJ. 1982), and Georgia's, Indiana's, and Louisiana's protection of men in state name change proceedings, Ga. Code Ann. § 19-12-1 (1982); Ind. Code Ann. § 34-4-6-4(d) (Burns Supp.
1982); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13:4751(B) (West Supp. 1985). Similarly, in interpreting
Pennsylvania's regulation providing for the custodial parent to name newborns, an
appellate court fell short of adopting a custodial presumption for statutory name
change petitions. In re Schidlmeier, No. J. 27018-85, slip op. (Pa. Super. Aug. 9,
1985). See supra notes 231-234 and accompanying text.
I
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have. Because the courts are giving such minimal support to women, legislatures must also be asked to address the custodial parent presumption as a solution to resolving disputes between
parents over their children's names.
B.

Constitutional Challenges and the Equal
Rights Amendment

The right of women to name themselves is supported by centuries of common law and the fact that there is no case on record
requiring a married woman to have the consent of her husband to
use her own name. Children's names, however, bring to current
litigation a virtually unblemished history of judicial encouragement of the perpetuation of the patrilineal naming system and of
men's power to name marital children in parental dispute
situations.
State and federal constitutional rights of Women to name
their children have only been raised in a few of the children's
names cases involving disputes between parents,p69 The courts
have recognized a constitutional right of fathers to protect their
"time-honored" superior naming right,270 and parents to name
their children against state interference where they are in agreement. 271 The courts have not been receptive to recognizing independent women's or children's constitutional rights in this
area.272 At most, the courts express that parents have an equal
right in naming children at birth.
If litigants successfully force the courts to de&l with constitutional issues, the failure of the Equal Rights Amendment may not
have much effect. Courts should invalidate any superior naming
269. E.g., In re Saxton, 309 N.W. 2 d 2 98 (Minn. 1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 1034
(1982); Laks v. Laks, 25 Ariz. App. 58, 540 P.2d 1277 (1975); In\ re Warschberger, 8
F.L.R. 2514 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Naussau County, June 21, 1982); Ovdrton v. Overton, 674
P.2d 1089 (Mont. 1983) (particularly Application To Suspend the Rules to Rehear
and Reconsider the Appeal and Decision). In re Schidlmeier, |No. J. 27018-85, slip
op. (Pa. Super. Aug. 9, 1985).
270. In re Tubbs, 620 P.2d 384 (Okla. 1980); Carroll v. Johnson, 263 Ark. 280, 565
S.W.2d 10 (1978).
271. E.g., Sydney v. Pingree, 564 F. Supp. 412 (S.D. Fla. 1^82) (Order granting
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment); O'Brien v. Tilsok 523 F. Supp. 494
(E.D.N.C. 1981); Jech v. Burch, 466 F. Supp. 714 (D. Hawaii 1979); Doe v. Hancock
County Board of Health, 436 N.E.2d 791 (Ind. 1982) (Hunter, j(, dissenting).
272. But see Jones v. McDowell, 53 N.C. App. 434, 281 S.E.2d 192 (1981) (invalidating a statute mandating that a child's surname automatically change to its father's at legitimation over the mother's objection and irrespective of the age of the
child); Laks v. Laks, 25 Ariz. App. 58, 540 P.2d 1277 (1975); O'Brien v. Tilson, 523 F.
Supp. 494 (E.D.N.C. 1981); Doe v. Hancock County Board of Health, 436 N.E.2d 791
(Ind. 1982) (Hunter, J., dissenting). Saxton, 309 N.W.2d at 29p, expressly rejected
constitutional right of women to name their children.
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right of the father over marital children. In Kirchberg v. Feenstra,213 the United States Supreme Court held tnat a Louisiana
statute giving the husband exclusive control over community property violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The
Louisiana, North Carolina, and Tennessee birth naming statutes
are ripe for challenge on this basis. These statutes represent the
type of gender-based discrimination that the United States
Supreme Court could be expected to strike down on equal protection grounds.
Under existing standards of equal protection,27^ courts should
eliminate men's superior right to name marital children. However, as Ruth Hale pointed out fifty years ago,275 men do not give
up the right to brand what they consider their property easily. Local family lawyers are apt not even to fight for a woman client's
desire to name her children over the father's objection. Courts at
all levels rarely evidence a judicial detachment in ruling on the issue. To the contrary, they all but openly express their clear desire
to retain the traditional presumption of the paternal surname, particularly where children are older. The failure of the Equal Rights
Amendment will consequently make achievement pf equal rights
in naming children considerably more difficult.
Unquestionably, the Equal Rights Amendment 276 would invalidate any superior naming right of the father oyer children of
any age. It should invalidate any presumption that continued use
of the father's name, when the father wants it retained, is in the
children's best interests. Acceptance of criteria to determine children's interests which protect the father's traditional right would
similarly become invalid. Until the federal amendment becomes a
reality, state equal rights provisions should be employed to invalidate the power of men to name children.
273. 450 U.S. 455 (1981).
274. Id.; Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.SJ 718 (1982); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981); Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Frjmtiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Weinberger v. Weisenfeld,
420 U.S. 636 (1975); Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U S . 142 (1980).
275. Hale, supra note 6 (referring to men imposing their nam^s on their wives as
property).
276. "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied 6r abridged by the
United States or any state on account of sex." Proposed Amendment to the United
States Constitution, Section 1, S.J. Res. 8, S.J. Res. 9 and H.R.J. |Res. 208, 92d Cong.
1st Sess. (1971).
See The Impact of the Equal Rights Amendment
Hearings on S.J. Res. 10
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Commi on the Judiciary,
98th Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess., Part 2, 375-77 (1984) (letter to Senaior Orrin G. Hatch
from Priscilla Ruth MacDougall, August 5, 1983).
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Conclusion

The right of women to determine their children's names is at
a crossroads. After the landmark case of In re Schiff man, a newspaper editorialized:
Sure it smacks of discrimination to require that al woman assume her husband's surname upon marriage and that children
she bears also go by her husband's name. But it is tidy. In a
culture that developed as a male-dominated society, it was natural that the family name follow the male line of descent. . . .
[W]hy don't we leave well enough alone and hope the California Supreme Court ruling becomes a forgotten | footnote in
legal history?277
Forbush had to become a footnote in legal history in order
for women to have the right to control their own names. Schiff
man should become a guiding light for the future in order for women to have any bona fide right to name their children. Whether
it will or not depends on the next decade of advocacy.
277. What to Call What's-His-Name, Virginian Pilot, Jan. 5,11981, at A-10, col. 1.

